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LAND REFORM: A STUDY OF

SOCIOLOGICAL PROCESSES

by



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ABSTRACT

The study was designed to analyze the dynamics of land reform in five selected developing countries - India, Pakistan and Bangladesh from South Asia and Mexico and Colombia from Latin America. So far as the dynamics of land reform is concerned, two somewhat contrasting trends may be discerned; one emphasizes the role of the political elites who decide the when, what and how of land reform. The other trend places similarly strong emphasis on the role of the development planners who are entrusted with the task of implementing land reform. These perspectives, therefore, emphasize the importance of motivating the political elites or of training the planners in techniques of land reform. It is stressed here that in analyzing the dynamics of land reform, one must take into account the role of the peasantry - the intended beneficiary. It is argued that the existence of a strong peasant organization placing a demand for land reform from below is vital for the initiation and successful implementation of genuine land reform.

Land reform is primarily intended to favorably modify a 'defective' land tenure system characterized by concentration of landholding and asymmetric tenancy

arrangements. The ultimate objectives, according to development theorists, are: growth in the agricultural sector and hence in the economy as a whole, and reducing social inequality manifested, most often, by an unequal distribution of wealth, income and power.

An analysis of the land tenure systems in the selected developing countries reveals that they are characterized by 'defective' features - land concentration and asymmetric tenancy arrangements. However, the character, content and mode of implementation of their land reform programs vary widely. These variations seem to indicate that although the defective features may provide the necessary objective conditions for land reform, they do not constitute the sufficient conditions. In other words, the initiation and implementation of land reform programs depend on other socioeconomic variables. Most importantly, these variations emphasize the need to differentiate between various land reform programs. It is argued that, on the basis of the following three 'core' factors land reforms may be qualitatively differentiated: the percentage of the rural population affected by land reform; the percentage of agricultural land affected by land reform, and the ratio of proposed land ceiling to the average farm size. Accordingly, land reforms are classified into reformative and palliative.

A reformatory or genuine land reform aims at realizing the socio-economic goals and would affect a significant percentage of the rural population and of agricultural land, and would have a low ratio of land ceiling to the average farm size. A palliative land reform, on the other hand, is politically motivated and would not affect a significant percentages of rural population or agricultural land. The ratio of land ceiling to average farm size would tend to be high.

Following these criteria, the major land reform programs undertaken in the selected countries have been analyzed. It is found that among the countries under study, only Mexico seems to have experienced a reformatory land reform, the others being palliative. The character of political elites in these countries has been analyzed to examine how a variation in their character may explain the variation in the type of land reform. No significant variation in the character of political elites is observed. Therefore, it is argued that perhaps the reformatory character of the Mexican land reform can be explained in terms of the peasant movement that swept Mexico during 1910-1920.

An attempt has been made to briefly discuss the structural factors adversely affecting the development

of peasant organization and peasant movement in developing countries. The culture of repression in which the peasants live has been emphasized as a negative factor in this respect. It is argued that peasants would be reluctant to take collective initiative for land tenure changes or to form an organization to push their demands when, due to a high man-land ratio, (high population pressure on land) they are in intense competition with each other for access to scarce land. It can, therefore, be said that the Latin American countries are more likely to experience peasant movements than the South Asian countries. However, the character and outcome of a peasant movement depend on so many other factors (e.g., the character of its leadership, its composition, the socio-economic structure in which it takes place) that more extensive and intensive studies are needed to probe the subject thoroughly.

PREFACE

The great majority of the developing countries, in spite of forceful attempts at modernization and development for the last couple of decades, have failed to make a significant and lasting impact on the problem of mass poverty. Huge investments, often financed by bilateral or multilateral aid and loans, in modern science, technology and infrastructure, have produced impressive results in terms of increasing productivity and, occasionally, in raising the per capita income. But this often impressive achievement seems to have increased rather than reduced the embarrassingly persistent poverty at the grass-root level and the deepening dualism between the relatively small modern industrial sector and the vast so-called traditional rural sector. The swamping of the countryside with vast and, often still growing, numbers of marginal cultivators and landless agricultural laborers deprived of even the basic necessities of life around a minority of prosperous commercial farmers effectively concentrating power, privilege and property in their hands, exemplifies this dualism. The swelling of the ranks of such impoverished peasants and agriproletariat quickly dissipated the

euphoria of development and brought the questions of social justice and equality to the forefront.

This inability of coping with the problems of dualism and inequality led to focus increasing attention on structural and institutional factors associated with development on the one hand and, on rural development, on the other. A 'broad institutional approach', therefore, is advocated which views development 'not only as an interaction of land, labor, capital and organization, but also of attitudes, values and institutions' (Myrdal, 1968). A complete social transformation is, therefore, emphasized as a pre-condition as well as a concomitant of development.

Dualism is attacked at its roots through rural development. Reform of the land tenure system is emphasized as one of the most significant elements of broader social transformation at the countryside. However, how to initiate (and successfully implement) land reform remains the basic but perplexing question. The present study attempts to critically analyze and assess the role of certain pertinent factors that affect the character, the mode of implementation and the outcome of land reform. It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze all such factors - simply because neither is it intended

to be that comprehensive, nor is it possible, perhaps, to list all the pertinent factors in the first place.

The chapters that follow examine, broadly speaking, four subjects: (i) land reform as a means of promoting socio-economic development. The evolution of the concept of land reform and various justifications for it will be discussed here. The major emphasis will be to analyze the relationship between land reform, agricultural production and capital formation (chapter II); (ii) the land tenure systems in the selected developing countries (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh from South Asia and Mexico and Colombia from Latin America). The major thrust will be to analyze those characteristics of the land tenure system which are commonly labeled as 'defective' and, therefore, taken as the rationale for land reform by development theorists (chapter III); (iii) the land reform programs in the selected countries. The primary objective is to determine whether (or in which countries) the land reforms were 'palliative' or 'reformative' in character. The character of the land reform programs (palliative/reformative) will be determined on the basis of three basic elements: (a) the percentage of land affected by the land reform; (b) the percentage of rural population affected, and (c) the ratio of proposed land ceiling to the average farm size

(chapter IV). Finally, (iv) an attempt will be made to analyze the relative role of two principal factors - political elites and the peasantry - in the processes of initiation and implementation of land reform (chapter V), in the context of land reform programs in the five selected countries. It also includes a discussion of various hypotheses explaining sociocultural obstacles to peasant movement and organization. The findings of the present study are presented in the conclusion (chapter VI). This chapter also includes a selected bibliography.

If rural development is the major concern of the developing countries, the issue of land reform lies at the core of that concern. The present study represents an attempt at analyzing and understanding the dynamics of land reform in the Third World. Many of the ideas expressed in this study at various points are derived, directly or indirectly, from my experience as a student and later university teacher and researcher in Bangladesh - 'a test case for development'. I am indebted to the University of Alberta for offering me the opportunity of pursuing higher studies in Sociology that enabled me not only to broaden my intellectual horizon but also to develop my research expertise. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Baha Abu-Laban, Professor of Sociology and Acting Dean of the Faculty of Arts, the University of Alberta

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

- (i) The purpose of the study
- (ii) The problem
- (iii) Review of relevant literature
- (iv) Some theoretical considerations
- (v) Framework of the present study
- (vi) Methodology
- (vii) Significance of the study.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

(i) The purpose of the study

The dynamics of land reform in developing countries is the focus of attention of the present study. It specifically proposes:

(i) to analyze the land tenure system in selected developing countries with a view to determine how far they are characterized by (a) concentration of landholding and (b) asymmetric tenancy arrangements. These two features are commonly labeled as 'obstacles' or 'impediments' to rural development and, therefore, they also serve as the rationale for land reform;

(ii) to critically analyze major land reform programs in these countries. The objective is to examine how far these land reform programs have contributed to agricultural growth and socioeconomic equality. On the basis of certain core variables (which presumably indicate the potentiality of these land reform programs in realizing the goals of agricultural growth and social equality),

these land reform programs would be classified either as 'palliative' or 'reformative';

(iii) to critically assess the relative role of the political elites and peasant organization in the initiation and implementation of land reform programs. In this respect Mexico would serve as a case study since among the selected countries only Mexico seems to have experienced a reformative land reform following the Revolution of 1910-1920; and, finally,

(iv) to critically discuss some of the hypotheses that seek to explain the lack of peasant organization and movement in developing countries in general. The purpose is to examine how far these hypotheses may be applicable to the countries under study.

(ii) The problem

Social and economic development has been a major preoccupation of Third World countries since the Second World War. In the span of about thirty years, there have been some observable shifts in emphasis and direction of development efforts in these countries. Presently, increasing emphasis appears to be placed on the issue of rural development as distinct from industrialization, on the assumption that the development of the rural sector is a major factor in, perhaps a prerequisite for, overall

national development.

Economic, social as well as political arguments have been put forward to stress the need for agricultural and rural development. Economists have emphasized the important instrumental role of agriculture in economic development. To achieve balanced economic development, it has been argued, agriculture must carry the burden of:

(i) producing more food as demand increases with economic development;

(ii) releasing additional labor for the urban-industrial sector;

(iii) bolstering foreign exchange earnings by increasing the production of export crops;

(iv) generating capital for investment in the industrial sector; and,

(v) generating additional aggregate demands for locally produced manufacturing goods as a result of rising farm incomes (Johnson and Mellor, 1961).

Moreover, the following factors also have drawn increasing attention to the significance of the rural sector:

(i) in most of the developing countries, the vast majority of the population live in rural areas and is directly dependent on agriculture for livelihood. At the

same time, in most of these countries, some 50 to 80 per cent of the economically active labor force is engaged in agriculture.

(ii) The agricultural sector, in most of the developing countries, contributes the greatest share to the Gross National Product (GNP). Moreover, in most cases agricultural products are the leading export commodities earning most of the foreign exchange.

(iii) In general, compared to the urban sector, the rural sector is less developed and, therefore, more poverty stricken giving birth to what has been termed 'dual economy' within developing countries. In its recent survey, the World Bank has concluded that more than 80 per cent of the poor in the developing countries are living in the rural areas (IBRD, 1975). The per capita income is also lower, sometimes significantly, in the rural sector (Chenery, et.al., 1974; Elliott, 1975).

It has, therefore, been stressed that a development effort that does not pay adequate attention to the problems of such an important sector can hardly be called pragmatic or expect success. It has been pointed out that successful industrialization and sustained economic growth cannot be achieved without parallel development in the agrarian sector since they are interrelated and complementary (Schickele, 1968; U.N., 1970, 1976);

(UNRISD, 1974).

This growing concern with the rural sector marks not only a shift of emphasis but also a shift of approach. The shifts have been from industrialization to rural development, and from a growth-oriented approach to a development-oriented one. Rural development is emphasized not only to achieve or accelerate economic growth in agriculture, but also to effectively deal with the problem of economic dualism and associated problems of inequality and poverty. Along with the goal of economic growth which is usually identified by reference to such quantifiable indices as increase in the per capita income and GNP, an array of 'social' goals, such as reduction of poverty, inequality and unemployment, are also emphasized.

This emphasis on economic as well as social goals, or, growth coupled with equality, has led to the growing awareness of structural factors associated with socio-economic development in the rural sector. The structural factor that has received most attention is the land tenure system, the web of rights, obligations and values that determine the relationship between different groups of men vis-a-vis the most important productive resource in the rural sector - land. The land tenure system and its impact on development has come under critical review. The

crucial role of the land tenure system with respect to the social goals of development (reduction of inequality, poverty and unemployment) is emphasized. Numerous studies seem to have reached the conclusion that certain features of the land tenure systems prevailing in most of the underdeveloped countries are 'impediments' to their socioeconomic development. The features most commonly labeled as impediments seem to be: (a) concentration of landholding, and (b) asymmetric tenancy arrangements (Stavenhagen, 1970; Barraclough, 1973; U.N., 1951, 1976).

Land reform, a publicly controlled planned change in the existing pattern of landownership, is advocated by development theorists to deal, primarily, with the problems generated by such defective elements of the land tenure system as those mentioned above (concentration of landholding and asymmetric tenancy arrangements). Diffusion of wealth and income through more equitable distribution of land is thus the primary objective of land reform. However, it has also been asserted that reform of the land tenure system may contribute to higher productivity (Barraclough, 1973; U.N., 1951, 1976; IBRD, 1975, Koo, 1968). The underlying assumption seems to be that extreme inequality resulting primarily from high land concentration "acts as a bottleneck to development by depriving both the very rich and the very poor

of any real incentive to work for higher productivity" (King, 1977: 7).

Although high land concentration and asymmetric tenancy arrangements have been most commonly cited by development theorists as the main justification for land reform, historical evidence suggests that the existence of such features in the land tenure system does not necessarily lead to either the initiation or successful implementation of land reform programs. Other social, cultural and political factors seem to have always influenced the dynamics of land reform. Besides, land reform was not always initiated to achieve the above noted social goals. The means adopted also varied from one country to another or from one period to another. In some cases, political objectives were more pronounced than the social ones. Consequently, land reform movements in developing countries often differ fundamentally in terms of character and outcome. Whereas, for example, in China and Cuba land reform movements finally resulted in a fundamental restructuring of society, in India, or Pakistan or Colombia, such a basic societal change did not take place. In some countries, it was through violence that a change in the land tenure system was effected (Mexico); while in others, constitutional means were adopted to achieve the goal (Taiwan, Japan, India).

In some countries, widespread peasant discontent and rural violence forced political elites to initiate land reform (Mexico, Philippines, Bolivia), while in others, political elites took such steps in the apparent absence of rural unrest (Egypt, Pakistan, Iran). In some countries, according to development theorists, land reform programs achieved impressive success in realizing the social goals of redistributing wealth and income as well as the economic goal of increasing productivity (China, Japan, Taiwan), while in others, programs remained a 'series of laws and pious proclamations' without much tangible results (Colombia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh).

These bewildering differences in the character, content and mode of implementation of land reform programs in various developing countries raise two basic questions:

(a) how land reforms can be differentiated qualitatively? In other words, is it possible to identify certain core variables on the basis of which it can be said that a particular land reform program is 'reformative' (i.e., aimed at achieving the economic goal of increasing productivity and the social goal of reducing inequality), or 'palliative' (i.e., primarily aimed at achieving certain narrowly defined political goals, e.g., legitimacy for a regime or winning peasant support); and

(b) what are the factors that may explain the dynamics of land reform? Is it possible to identify certain fundamental factors that determine the character of land reform programs as well as their initiation and implementation?

The present study is an attempt to critically analyze some pertinent aspects of these basic issues concerning land reform.

(iii) Review of relevant literature: two major trends

A review of relevant literature reveals two predominant ways in which the whole question of land reform has been treated:

(a) as an economic-technical problem that needs attention for the sake of modernization of agriculture. In this approach, increasing agricultural productivity is the prime focus of attention and land reform is treated as a measure/program to achieve that objective to be implemented by development planners; and

(b) as a political problem having repercussions for the political system. In this approach, land reform is often conceived of as conscious policy choice between various alternatives by the policy makers. In other words, land reform is viewed as a deliberate act of

'social engineering' performed by the political elites.

In the former approach (the economic approach), the emphasis is on the relationship between the land tenure system, agricultural growth and industrialization. Thus, land reform is treated primarily as an economic issue (Jacoby, 1953; Sachs, 1964; U.N., 1951, 1962, 1966; Warriner, 1955; Froehlich, 1961). Such almost exclusive concern with the economic aspects of land reform can be explained, partly at least, by the fact that until recently economists were more or less the only social scientists who took active interest in this field. A more comprehensive approach to land tenure problems was suggested by Elias Tuma (1965) and the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (1965/66). However, their studies were more concerned with systematically collecting and presenting data on various aspects of the land tenure system than on analyzing and interpreting them.

In recent years, political scientists have begun to study the political implications of land tenure problems and the role of political elites in land reform (Senior, 1958; Hirschman, 1963; Kaufman, 1967, 1972; Mitchell, 1968; Russett, 1964, Tai, 1974; Olson, 1974). In this approach (the political approach), land reform is viewed

primarily as a political tool that can be used by political elites, under certain circumstances, to achieve certain political goals. However, as one political scientist has recently observed:

(t)here are only a few works treating the political aspects of land reform, and generally these few are either descriptive or narrowly concerned with specific political condition or with a particular country. No work has yet examined comprehensively and comparatively the politics of land reform in different countries.
(Tai, 1974: 2-3).

Broadly speaking, these studies have treated land reform primarily as a measure (to correct a defective land tenure system) to be implemented either by the development planners or by the policy makers. Moreover, while most of the 'economic' studies of land reform tend to suggest that it is the existence of a defective land tenure system that leads governments to initiate land reform; most of the 'political' studies seem to suggest that land reform is one of the many tools through which political elites try to gain legitimacy or enhance/consolidate their power. Thus, both of these approaches have tried to explain land reform in terms of one basic factor - the defective land tenure system (the economic approach), or the perceived need of the political elites (the political approach). Such over-emphasis on one factor,

however paramount it may be, seems to have seriously undermined the credibility of these approaches. Besides, the latter approach does not apparently distinguish between 'effective' and 'ineffective' (or, 'good' and 'bad') land reforms. It has directed its attention primarily to the political conditions in which a political elite may initiate land reform without much concern for the 'type' of land reform being initiated.

(iv) Some theoretical considerations

Land reform is viewed here in a wider perspective - as one of the measures of modernization and socioeconomic development in the developing countries. Thus, the broader issue of socioeconomic development becomes relevant to the present study. The field of development is dominated by two often conflicting theoretical perspectives - the functionalist-diffusion approach and the dependencia theory. The functionalist-diffusion tradition is dominated by Hoselitz (1960), Moore (1963), Smelser (1963), and Eisenstadt, (1966, 1970), while its impetus came from the writings of Durkheim, Weber and Talcott Parsons.

The salient features of the functionalist-diffusion theory of development may be summarized as follows:

(a) that the present 'developing' countries are

characterized by ascription, particularism, and functional diffuseness (Hoselitz), or by traditional values and institutions (Moore, Smelser, Eisenstadt);

(b) that the 'developed' countries are characterized by achievement-orientation, universalism and functional specificity (Hoselitz) or by highly differentiated social structure (Smelser), advanced technology, relative political stability and 'modern' values and institutions (Moore, Eisenstadt);

(c) that development involves the transformation of the traditional societies into modern ones;

(d) that this transformation is accomplished by entrepreneurs who are social deviants and/or occasionally marginal individuals (Hoselitz), or through the diffusion of technology, capital and values (Eisenstadt, Moore, Smelser). Industrialization, urbanization, commercialization of agriculture and technological development are the underlying processes of modernization and development.

The drawbacks of the functionalist-diffusion theories have been pointed out by various authors. It has been pointed out that the conceptualization of tradition and modernity as essentially asymmetrical categories is unsatisfactory simply because such a conceptualization fails to recognize the structural heterogeneity and cultural diversity of so-called 'traditional' societies

(Singer, 1959; Gusfield, 1966; Bendix, 1967; Rudolf and Rudolf, 1967). It is misleading to treat tradition and modernity as mutually exclusive terms (Bendix, 1967); modernity supplements but does not necessarily supplant traditionalism.

Modern society is not simply modern; it is modern and traditional. The attitudes and behavior patterns may in some cases be fused; in others they may comfortably coexist, one alongside the other, despite the apparent incongruity of it all. (Huntington, 1971: 292).

Singer (1968) questioned the simple linear view of change or development proposed by the functionalist-diffusion theories. Frank (1969) termed this approach 'ahistorical' and embedded with Western ethnocentrism.

By and large, the major weaknesses of these functionalist-diffusion modernization theories may be summarized as follows:

(a) the inherent 'traditional-modern' dichotomy that imposes ideal-types on reality rather than explaining its diversity;

(b) lack of interest in history and historical roots of underdevelopment of 'traditional' societies;

(c) too much emphasis on placid evolution of societies, and, therefore, deemphasis of conflict;

(d) the apparent built-in Western ethnocentrism;

(e) too much tightly-knit classification of societies

in terms of pattern variables or 'traditional-modern' values, and

(f) lack of emphasis on the economic dependency of the 'traditional' or underdeveloped societies and its impact on their development.

The dependencia theory, on the other hand, developed a dialectical approach and treated underdevelopment of the contemporary developing countries as a historical process clearly related with the development of the now developed countries (Frank, 1969, 1972; Johnson, 1968). It, therefore, proclaimed, "Europe did not 'discover' the underdeveloped countries; on the contrary, she created them" (Griffin, 1968: 38).

Such a dialectical approach to underdevelopment emerged only during the last decade or two.¹ The primary concern was to explain what has been variously termed as 'imperialism', 'neocolonialism', or, more recently, 'dependency'. Although the immediate objective is to explain the mechanisms of underdevelopment, the dependencia theory, as it came to be known widely, draws heavily from the 'classical' theories of imperialism expounded by Hobson, Bukharin, Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg and, above all, Lenin whose primary task was to explain the unusual scramble for overseas colonies by the imperial powers

during the period roughly from 1870 to 1917. In spite of such diversity of objectives, the dependencia theorists followed Lenin and time and again based their arguments on Lenin's analysis of imperialism. The essentials of Lenin's theory of imperialism may be stated as follows:

"(a) the capitalist economy in its 'advanced stages' involves a concentration of capital and production in such a way that the competitive market is replaced in its basic branches by a monopolistic one;

"(b) this trend was historically accomplished through internal differentiation of capitalist functions, leading not only to the formation of a financial stratum among entrepreneurs but to the marked prominence of the banking system in the capitalist mode of production. Furthermore, the fusion of industrial capital with financial capital under the control of the latter turned out to be the decisive feature of the political and economic relations within capitalist classes; with all the practical consequences that such a system of relations has in terms of state organization, politics and ideology;

"(c) capitalism thus reached its 'ultimate stage of development' both internally and externally. Internally, control of the productive system by financiers turned the productive forces and the capital accumulation process toward the search for new possibilities for investment.

The problem of 'capital realization' became in this way an imperative necessity to permit the continuing of capitalist expansion. In addition there were internal limits that impeded the continuous reinvestment of new capital (impoverishment of the masses, a faster rate of capital growth than that of the internal market, and so on). External outlets had to be found to ensure the continuity of capitalist advance and accumulation;

"(d) the increased and increasing speed of the development of productive forces under monopolistic control also pushed the advanced capitalist countries toward the political control of foreign lands. The search for control over raw materials is yet another reason why capitalism in its monopolistic stage becomes expansionist" (Cardoso, 1972: 84).

Although the character of imperialism even according to the neo-Marxists or dependencia theorists, has changed quite considerably since the writings of Lenin at the turn of the century, the dependencia theorists seem committed to use Lenin's theoretical assumptions to explain the dynamics of underdevelopment in contemporary developing countries.² Modern dependencia theory has many proponents and, as such, often differing conceptual assumptions.³ However, the basic points of the dependencia theory may be summarized as follows:

(a) "the social, economic and political conditions prevailing throughout today's Third World ('less developed countries' or LDCs in UN usage) are not due to the persistence of an original (undeveloped or untouched) state of affairs, but are the results of the same world historical process in which the 'first world' (developed market economies') became 'developed'; the development of the latter involved a closely associated course of development for the former, a process of subordinate development or underdevelopment.

(b) "The prime mover in this combined process was capital seeking profits, i.e., seeking opportunities to accumulate capital; specifically, capitalist merchants, capitalist bankers, capitalist insurers, etc., and finally, capitalist manufacturers.

(c) "Their activities involve accumulating capital where this could be done cheaply, and investing it where the return to investment was highest, and this gave rise to a process of surplus removal from some parts of the world to others perpetuating and rigidifying in new ways the low levels of productivity in the areas from which the surplus was taken; and also a structuring of these economies so as to subordinate them systematically to the structures of the economies where capital was being accumulated. This expressed itself in the 'external orientation' of the subordinate economies (export of

primary commodities, import of all manufactures); in monoculture; in dependent industrialization (dependent on external forces-demand, strategic division of labour, technology, etc. - for its dynamics and structuration).

(d) "Secondary structural consequences of this served to reproduce the process and constantly block local initiatives to pursue an autonomous development path, e.g., the low incomes of the majority due to the creation of surplus labour and marginalisation imply a generally small domestic market; highly unequal income distribution implies an import-oriented consumer demand, etc.

(e) "The corresponding emergence and formation of social classes at the capitalist periphery with interests in common with the bourgeoisie of the metropolises made possible the development of colonial, neo-colonial and semi-colonial states representing successive types of such alliances.

(f) "The term 'underdevelopment' refers to these self-perpetuating processes, these self-reproducing structures, and to their results. The term 'dependency' is sometimes used to refer to exactly the same things, and sometimes more specifically to refer to the non-autonomous nature of the laws or tendencies governing change in the social formations of the periphery" (Leys, 1972: 92-93).

Though it has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the dynamics of underdevelopment in the Third World, the dependencia theory is sometimes criticized for its lack of conceptual clarity, too much obsession with 'revolutionary phraseology' and, consequently, commitment to a certain ideology. It can hardly be denied that the central concepts of the underdevelopment-dependencia theory (UDT), e.g., imperialism, underdevelopment, dependency, etc., have not been defined in the same way by different dependencia theorists and, therefore, their conclusions regarding the relationship between these concepts also differed. The what and why of imperialism are often not clearly stated or stated differently by different scholars although the general label of 'imperialism' is retained. It seems that the term 'imperialism' means overseas expansion of capitalism to Lenin, while it meant domination and subordination of one country by another to Magdoff. For Lenin, capital went outside in search of more profit or, in other words, when the law of diminishing returns began to affect the capital-profit ratio at home; for Dean and Magdoff (1965), "the driving force of (U.S.) imperialism is the need to acquire and control access to strategic raw materials."⁴

Similarly, lack of clarity surrounds the concept of dependency also. Sometimes it has been used as a generic referent to certain characteristics of an economy or society;⁵ sometimes to refer to certain forms of relationship between two or more countries;⁶ and often to refer to non-autonomy or 'functional incompleteness' of an economy.⁷ With a view to salvage the concept, Caporaso proposed three 'sets of factors' which are important for dependency: measures of magnitude of reliance on external source(s); choice-based measures, and domestic distortion measures.⁸ In spite of such attempts at conceptual clarification and to quantify different concepts of the dependencia theory to make it empirically testable, much of the confusion still persists. Caporaso himself noted:

(i)nstead of measurement and testing, I would expect that a sober assessment of the kinds of knowledge claims made by dependency theory would be a first order of business.... I suspect there will be great controversy at this first stage and that severe disagreement will exist between those who want to move dependency theory in the direction of verifiable theory along positivist line and those who see it as an interpretive device. At this juncture, different scholars may have to part company and go different ways.
(Caporaso, 1978: 43).

Since the prime objective is to explain underdevelopment, the fundamental knowledge claim of the dependencia


theory seems to be that there are three processes underlying underdevelopment: (a) expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus of the LDCs by world capitalism or, its newest form, imperialism; (b) polarization of the capitalist system into metropolitan center(s) and peripheral satellites; and (c) "the continuity and ubiquity of the structural essentials of economic development and underdevelopment throughout the expansion and development of the capitalist system at all times and places" (Baran, 1957: 12). The metropolis-satellite relationship between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is the fundamental global societal reality of present times. How is such a metropolis-satellite relationship maintained?

On this question, the dependencia theorists offer at least two sets of explanations; one emphasizing capital inflow in LDCs from the metropolitan countries, creation of a dependent economic structure and the resultant exploitation.

The metropolis expropriates economic surplus from its satellites and appropriates it for its own economic development. The satellites remain underdeveloped for lack of access to their own surplus and as a consequence of the same polarization and exploitative contradictions which the metropolis introduces and maintains in the satellite's domestic economic structure. The combination of these contradictions, once firmly implanted,

reinforces the processes of development in the increasingly dominant metropolis and underdevelopment in the even more dependent satellites until they are resolved through the abandonment of capitalism by one or both interdependent parts.
(Frank, 1967: 9).

Another school of dependencia theory explains underdevelopment in terms of the outflow of raw materials (rather than manufactured goods) from the LDCs to the developed countries. Samir Amin, for example, developed the following model to describe the difference between a self-centered and a peripheral system:



The peripheral economic system is dominated by an export sector (mineral or agricultural primary products) created "under an impulse from the centre." The reason for creating an export sector:

lies in obtaining from the periphery products which are the basic elements of constant capital (raw materials) or of variable capital (food products) at production costs lower than those at the

centre for similar products (or obviously of substitutes in the case of specific products such as coffee or tea).
(Amin, 1974: 13).

The fundamental principle is to get the product at 'production costs lower than that at the centre'; in other words, the labor in the periphery should be cheap enough to make the investment (by the centre) profitable. The profitability can be assured only if the rest of the society can be forced to perform a specific economic function - 'providing cheap labour to the export sector'. The wage rate in the export sector, therefore, will be 'as low as the economic, social and political conditions allow it to be'.

In such a peripheral system, the major distortion occurs in the unequal or heterogenous development of the productive forces. The productive forces in the export sector is well developed, advanced and modern (in the urban sector); while it is 'backward', 'traditional' or less developed in the rest of the economy (rural sector). Such heterogeneity in the development of the productive forces 'maintained by the system, is the condition which allows the export sector to benefit from cheap labour'.

With the gradual expansion of the export sector, an internal market makes its appearance. Since part of the capital invested in the export sector is locally owned, part of the profit goes to the local investor classes. These classes serve as "conveyor-belts, latifundists in some places, Kulaks in others, comprador commercial bourgeoisies, state bureaucracies, etc. The internal market is thus mainly based on the demand for 'luxury goods' from these social classes." (Amin, 1974: 14).

The social consequence of such peripheral development is what Samir Amin termed 'the marginalisation of the masses'. Marginalisation involves:

a series of mechanisms heterogenous in nature which impoverish the masses: proletarianisation of small agricultural producers and cottage industry workers, rural semi-proletarianisation and impoverishment without proletarianisation of peasants organized in village communities, urbanisation and massive increase of urban unemployment and underemployment, etc." (Amin, 1974: 15).

According to this model, the peripheral economy (based on sectors 1 and 3) may get rid of the constraints on its development only through transforming itself into a self-centered, autonomous economy (based on sectors 2 and 4). Given the reality of the present-day world economic system, such a transformation is indeed extremely difficult to accomplish.

The question of such a dialectical relationship between development and underdevelopment can hardly be overlooked. The fact that colonialism has adversely affected the development potential of colonized countries is corroborated by history. Similarly, the dependency of the LDCs on the metropole countries (for capital, technology, and so on) cannot be denied. The argument that fundamental structural changes in the LDCs are prerequisites for their socioeconomic development is more or less convincing. And yet the dependencia theory cannot be accepted in its details.

Over emphasis of certain factors at the cost of others appears to be a common problem with the theories of development. Theories of modernization and the dependencia theory seem to suffer equally from this problem. The functionalist-diffusion theories of development:

tended to locate the root causes of underdevelopment within the polity, culture and social and economic structures of the developing countries themselves. Lack of development was thus associated with a lack of 'achievement orientation' in the culture of the developing countries, with a lack of entrepreneurial spirit within the economic sector, and with the inflexibility of 'traditional' social and political structures.
(Mack, 1974: 36-37).

These theories did not take into account either the historical fact of colonialism or that of present

linkages between the developed and underdeveloped countries and their effects on the development potential of contemporary LDCs. In short, these theories located the causes of underdevelopment within the underdeveloped countries themselves. By ignoring colonialism and neo-colonialism, these theories discovered the root causes of underdevelopment within the very systems or structures they were trying to explain and understand, and thereby "effectively shifted the responsibility for poverty onto the impoverished" (Mack, 1974: 37). To overcome such 'internal' structural obstacles to development, these theories emphatically suggested the 'diffusion' or transfer of western technology, capital and ideas and institutions.

Emerging as a radical response to such an approach, the dependencia theory not only rejected the basic assumptions of the functionalist-diffusion perspective, but went a little too far to deemphasize, if not ignore, the 'internal' factors. The obstacles or constraints to development are sought not within the system, but beyond it. Constraints are externally imposed and therefore the primary need is to rebel against the external forces. The dependencia theory, therefore,

tends to exaggerate the role of external influences and consequently downplays the internal obstacles to the development of more equitable domestic economic, social and political systems. A lessening of dependence on the industrialized world requires not only the achievement of better international bargains but also improved management of local resources and significant social and economic changes within developing countries.
(Erb, 1975: 140).

Both of these approaches suffer from limitations. The dependencia theory is no less idiosyncratic for its overemphasis on external constraints or imperialism/neo-colonialism than the functionalist-diffusion theories for their overemphasis on internal constraints. The inadequacy of these theories becomes more apparent when they are applied in analyzing the dynamics of change in the rural sector or to comprehend the problems of rural development. The functionalist-diffusion theories seem to apply the same traditional-modern or developed-underdeveloped dichotomy to analyze the rural sector. It is traditional, backward, and archaic relative to the urban sector. Development, therefore, would require the diffusion or transfer of science, technology and skill from the modern urban sector to the traditional agrarian sector. The traditional-modern dichotomy or economic dualism is thus reapplied at the intra-national level. The impetus for rural development, therefore, must come

from outside; it is to be imposed from above.

On the question of rural development, two distinct and yet interrelated trends may be discerned in the dependencia theory. On the one hand, Frank (and others following him) seems to emphasize the existence of a metropolis-satellite relationship within the national boundary, the rural sector being the satellite of the urban sector. The surplus from the agricultural sector is expropriated and appropriated by the urban sector. The task, therefore, is to destroy this dependent relationship.

The Samir Amin model, on the other hand, seems to establish a link between the rural sector and the international metropolis via the urban export sector. The rural sector provides cheap labor to the urban sector whose export industries are established and exploited by the metropolis. So long as the export sector is geared to the need of the metropolis, the rural sector is bound to suffer from marginalisation and remain underdeveloped. Rural development is, therefore, dependent upon the destruction of the metropolis-satellite relationship at the inter-national level.

Considering the shortcomings of these theories, a new approach is in order which may overcome these drawbacks. Here I have tried to sketch the basic features of such an approach. However, it must be emphasized that in developing the new approach, total rejection of neither the dependencia nor the functionalist-diffusion theories is intended. The point is to synthesize the stronger aspects of these two theoretical traditions. Following Hoogvelt (1976: 5), it can be said that the present endeavor

(f)rom a methodological point of view ... presents an attempt to overcome the limitations in the study of development of each of these two major schools by boldly combining their perspectives. The highly abstract - indeed ahistorical - structural-functionalist model of societal evolution will be complemented by a Marxist historical interpretation of international processes of development and underdevelopment. (Hoogvelt 1976: 5).

There are two sources of constraints on development - constraints endogenous to the system and constraints exogenous to the system. Development, as conceived of here, has both a growth and a distributive dimension, that roughly correspond to the two processes involved - horizontal differentiation and vertical assimilation. The growth dimension refers to the productive aspect of development - GNP, per capita income, etc. Structural

and functional differentiation, up to a certain point, is believed to contribute positively to growth. The other dimension refers to the sharing of growth by different segments of the population. Sharing presupposes the participation of different groups in the processes of growth and participation is contingent upon actual or perceived fair distribution. Participation and distribution are thus mutually reinforcing. Unfair distributive system that precludes peoples' full participation in the processes of development, not only impairs the productive potential of the economy but also generates social and political discontent. Such discontent is not only not conducive to development but may become, eventually, another constraint on development. Therefore, internal constraints are, primarily, those that restrict the full participation of different segments of the population in the developmental efforts and thus preserve or reinforce a distributive system that is skewed in favor of a definite section of the population. Cultural values as well as social, economic and political institutions are the components of the internal constraint matrix.

The external constraint matrix consists of the adverse effects of the relationship between the developed and developing countries on the economics of the latter. The interaction on the national level may take the form

of trade, capital and technology transfer or even exchange of ideas and knowledge. Interdependence among nations is obvious; however, such interdependence becomes a source of external constraint only when it is not symmetrical. Part of the external constraint matrix may become so fused with some aspects of the internal constraint matrix that it may become difficult to separate them empirically, if not also, analytically. The interpenetration of the internal class structure and that of the external metropolis is a case in point. Most visible and both analytically and empirically separable aspects of external constraint matrix are technology and capital transfer (broadly speaking, foreign aid) mechanisms and asymmetrical trade relationship. In other cases, external constraints are almost 'internalized' or become part of the internal constraint matrix.

Thus, sources of underdevelopment are both internal and external; however, since most of the external constraints are 'internalized' or are fused with internal constraints, development efforts should be directed primarily to the system, not outside the system. Destruction of the metropolis-satellite relationship does not necessarily imply revolt against the metropolis or abolishing capitalism, but reforming those aspects of the internal structure through which the mechanisms of

'dependency' work. The internal structural factors are, therefore, more important than the external ones; agents of imperialism within the system deserve more attention than imperialism per se. The energy of development strategists, therefore, should be directed more to the internal constraints. Albeit, an understanding of the external constraints, their character and impact, will undoubtedly contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of internal variables.

Rural development, according to this approach, means increasing productivity in the rural sector along with a measure ensuring equitable distribution of wealth. Since in the context of the rural sector, access to and control over land (not necessarily ownership) determines, generally speaking, one's participation in the processes of production and the share of the wealth produced, the land tenure system plays a vital role in rural development. A land tenure system that negates the principle of equity or discourages structural and functional differentiation by concentrating social, economic and political power, may be regarded as an internal constraint on development or dysfunctional to development.

Land reform is primarily a means through which attempts are made to reform the 'dysfunctional' aspects of the land tenure system. However, since dysfunctional land tenure system is characterized by the concentration of economic, social and political power in the same role incumbents, land reform entails changes in the broader power structure. In this sense, land reform may be regarded as a challenge to the power structure in all its three dimensions - economic, social and political. In other words, it is a means of social change; and since in developing countries agriculture is often predominant, land reform is one of the major means of initiating social change. As any other measure of social change, its dynamics are determined by so many factors - cultural, social, economic, and political. Forces both external and internal to the system interact to decide the outcome of such efforts of social change. The external forces, arising out of the dependency of the developing countries, in most cases, work through internal structural/institutional elements.

The internal and external forces interacting on land reform (or, more broadly, social change) include, among others, the class structure (an internal force, but also the force through which external forces may be channeled), political elites, peasant consciousness and organization,

sociocultural values and the character of integration between the urban and the rural sectors. The schema used to treat land reform movements as part of the processes of social change having both internal and external interacting forces, may be summarized as follows:

(i) in a particular LDC there exists what may be termed a traditional, relatively rigid, social structure. The land tenure system, being an interdependent part of the broader social structure, also demonstrates some 'traditional' features, most notably, concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements.

(ii) There are individuals and/or groups who benefit from this traditional social structure and therefore seek to retain it. These privileged individuals or groups, by virtue of their control over the most vital productive resource - land, constitute the power structure or, alternately, can significantly influence the power structure in LDCs.

(iii) Since the economies of underdeveloped countries are characterized by dependency having a metropolis-satellite relationship with the economies of the developed industrialized countries, the power structure of the LDCs is reinforced by the power structure of the developed countries. In other words, the metropolises have an interest in maintaining the traditional social structure in the developing countries.

(iv) An alteration of the traditional social structure therefore involves an alteration of the metropolis-satellite relationship. The metropolises, as a consequence, may react to structural changes in the satellites. However, the type and degree of their reaction will differ according to their perceived interest or their stake in the changes concerned. Such reaction forms the most important external force to the dynamics of social change in LDCs. However, the metropolis-satellite relationship, once established, is 'internalized' and, therefore, the adverse forces arising out of such relationship, are manifested through elements within the system, such as, the class structure and the political elites.

(v) New objective economic, social and political conditions emerge that produce intensified stress on the traditional structure. These 'stress factors' constitute the internal forces of change.

(vi) There is a change in the dominant values and the traditional values are questioned and finally "being replaced by new ones less in accord with the traditional structure."

(vii) "There is precipitating event or combination of personalities and events (the catalyst) which initiate (and/or accelerate) the disintegration of the old social structure."

(viii) "This process of change 'snowballs' through the process of what Myrdal calls 'cumulative causation'.

(ix) "The movement is organized and channeled in a particular direction by persons or groups able to take advantage of the new situation."⁹

(x) The outcome of the movement depends on the interplay between the intensity of the internal forces (new objective economic, social and political conditions as well as new cultural values) and the forces external to the system.

This new approach, thus, seeks to adopt a balanced outlook to the whole question of social change in the developing countries. Its aim is to integrate the major thrusts of the functionalist-diffusion approach and that of the dependencia theory. Change may be initiated by forces internal to the system (class struggle, value conflict, new religious, political movements, etc.) or external forces (colonial domination, inflow of foreign capital, technology and economic and cultural 'imperialism'). Similarly, 'obstacles' or constraints to change may be internal (class structure, political elites, traditional values, etc.), or externally induced (economic dependency, military domination). External constraints are generally internalized, i.e., they act through forces internal to the system, although in

extreme cases, it may take the form of direct threat by the metropolis. Due to such 'internalization' of external constraints, efforts of change should be directed more to the internal sources of constraints than to the external ones.

Land reform is induced/planned social change, that seeks to alter the land tenure system to ensure economic growth as well as socioeconomic equality. The success or otherwise of land reform is determined by the interplay of forces for and against the planned changes. Since an alteration of the land tenure system, particularly in the context of the developing countries, entails changes in the broader sociopolitical structure, the struggle for change may be intense involving forces at the societal level. A 'dysfunctional' land tenure system provides the material, objective basis for land reform, and the interplay of forces decide its character and outcome and mode of implementation.

(v) The framework of the present study

Land reform, therefore, is not simply a measure to be implemented either by development planners or by the policy makers. In the context of developing countries, land is not only a principal source of wealth, but also

a basis of political power and social prestige. Consequently, concentration of landholding implies, generally speaking, not only the concentration of economic wealth, but also that of political power and social status. Land reform, therefore, implies a change not only in the distribution of wealth and income but also in the distribution of social and political power. Therefore, land reform is conceived of as a process involving economic, political and sociocultural factors. The incidence of concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements with all their repercussions on the system of production and distribution are the economic factors that serve as a rationale or objective conditions for land reform. However, the mere presence of these objective material conditions do not necessarily lead to the initiation and/or implementation of land reform programs. Nor these conditions determine exclusively the type or character of the land reform programs that may be initiated.

Insofar as land reform entails changes in the power structure or "attempts to modify the economic basis of politics" (Parsons, 1956: 20), it assumes a political character involving, primarily, three groups: (i) the political elites, the power holders of the society, with whom lies the ultimate authority to initiate and

implement land reform; (ii) the landlords, who are the privileged in the existing land tenure system and, therefore, stand to lose most in the event of successful implementation of the land reform; and (iii) the peasantry, who are the intended beneficiaries. In the context of developing countries, the landlords - those who own land but do not physically work on land - may be included in the category of political elites. This, however, does not imply that all landlords are political elites, or that all political elites are landlords. It means that most of the landlords are also political elites and that the political system as a whole is dominated by landed interests. It may, therefore, be concluded that land reform involves two principal groups: (a) the political elites, and (b) the peasantry. The dynamics of land reform - its character, initiation and implementation - is determined, it may be argued, by the interaction of these two principal groups. The task is to critically analyze the role of these two groups in the dynamics of land reform in selected developing countries. This being the prime objective, the present study proposes to investigate the following pertinent issues:

(a) the land tenure system in selected developing countries. The objective in this instance is to determine how far the land tenure systems in the sample countries are characterized by defective features - (i) concentration

of landholdings, and (ii) asymmetric tenancy arrangements. A land tenure system characterized by these two features may be considered as an 'impediment' to socioeconomic development (U.N., 1951, 1976; IBRD, 1975; ILO, 1975), and consequently, provide the rationale for land reform. If the land tenure systems of the sampled countries are found to be characterized, to a substantial extent, by concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements, it may be concluded that the material objective conditions for land reform exist in these countries.

(b) Major land reform measures undertaken in the sample countries would be critically analyzed. The purpose is to examine how far these land reform measures were aimed at realizing the economic and social goals (of increasing agricultural productivity and reducing distributional inequality) or, other, primarily political, goals (e.g., earning legitimacy, consolidating power, etc.). A land reform program aimed at realizing the economic and social goals is termed a 'genuine' or 'reformative' land reform; while one aimed at realizing, explicitly or implicitly, political goals, is termed 'palliative'. In determining the character of the land reform program, three core variables will be considered:

(i) the percentage of the rural population affected by the land reform;

(ii) the percentage of the agricultural land affected by the land reform; and

(iii) the ratio of proposed land ceiling to the average farm size.*

Two essentially interrelated assumptions are made here:

(i) a land reform program that affects a substantial percentage of the rural population, a substantial percentage of the agricultural land, and keeps the ratio of land ceiling and the average farm size at a low level, has a greater potential of realizing the underlying social and economic goals; and (ii) that these core variables and socioeconomic development are interrelated. In other words, these variables do indicate, in a broader sense, the character of a land reform program. It, therefore, follows that a palliative land reform would not affect a substantial percentage of the rural population, or a substantial percentage of the agricultural land. The ratio of land ceiling to the average farm size will also be higher in such cases.

Using these criteria, the sample countries will be classified into two groups (i) one experiencing reformative land reform, and (ii) the other experiencing palliative land reform.

* For details, see chapter IV.

(c) The next step is to critically analyze the relative role of the political elites and the peasantry in the land reforms. Since the study is based on secondary data, I have followed the following course. The character of the political elites in each of the sample countries will be analyzed.* If the character of the political elites does not differ fundamentally from the countries that experienced reformative land reform (in this case, Mexico) to the countries that experienced palliative land reform, it will be argued that the variable political elite can hardly explain the character of land reform. Consequently, it will be argued that it is the peasantry (i.e., peasant organization and movement) that determines the character of a land reform program.

(d) Therefore, the role of peasant radicalism in the Mexican land reform will be analyzed from a historical perspective. It will be argued that the reformative character of the Mexican land reform can be explained more fruitfully in terms of peasant radicalism than in terms of the character of its political elites.

(e) Finally, various theories explaining the obstacles (either psychological or structural) to peasant organization and movement in the context of developing

* For details, see chapter V.

countries will be critically examined. The objective in this instance is to throw some light on the structural factors that may explain, broadly speaking, the lack of peasant organization and movement in most of the developing countries.

(vi) Methodology

(1) The sample: Five developing countries have been chosen for the study, two from Latin America and three from South Asia. The selected Latin American countries (LACs) are Mexico and Colombia; while the selected South Asian countries (SACs) are India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Although a certain degree of arbitrariness is often discernible in any selection of sample, in this case two factors have particularly been taken into consideration: to make the study general enough to cover land reform issues and problems of those countries that have, in the process of land reform movements, experienced substantial rural unrest and violence (Mexico), and those countries where land reform is generally pursued through constitutional/legal means (India, Bangladesh). It is also intended to cover countries where acute population pressure has made land reform not only a paramount issue but has made the question of land redistribution, in the literal sense, an almost absurd proposition (Bangladesh,

India); and countries where, due to lack of acute population pressure and/or availability of yet unutilized land, land redistribution is not only a viable proposition, but may often take the form of colonization (Colombia, and to a lesser extent, Mexico).

Moreover, the South Asian and the Latin American countries, in certain respects, form two distinct categories. All of them share certain characteristics. Their land tenure systems seem to have certain common features, particularly, concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements. Land reform as a policy issue seems to constitute a central element of their development efforts. Rural unrest, in varying degrees, can be observed in all these countries. Nevertheless, the South Asian and the Latin American countries vary in terms of population size, density of population, per capita income, rural-urban distribution of population, general level of economic development, and so on. Their political history as well as present form of political structures also differ considerably. They also differ in terms of sociocultural values and religious beliefs. These differences will provide the opportunity to study the dynamics of land reform under varying conditions and institutional settings, thereby giving a comparative perspective to the present study.

(2) Operationalization of key concepts and variables:

(i) Land reform: The term land reform has been interpreted in a bewildering variety of meanings. Some used it in a broad sense to refer to any change in the land tenure system as well as any program that aims to reorganize or improve the institutional framework of agriculture (Jacoby, 1971); while others tried to restrict the term to refer to structural changes in the land tenure system only (Warriner, 1969; Alexander, 1974). It is in the latter sense that the term has been used here. Land reform, in this sense, refers to publicly sponsored changes in the existing character of land ownership with a view to effect a more equitable distribution of income, wealth and power. Land reform may involve:

- (a) compulsory take over of land by the state,
- (b) from big landlords,
- (c) usually with partial compensation, and
- (d) redistribution of the land in such a way as to ensure more wider and equitable distribution of the produce of the land than before.

Land reform may be redistributivist, in which case the State sells, rents or may just give away the acquired land for private cultivation in smaller units than hitherto; or, it may be collectivist, where the land is farmed jointly, often in larger units than hitherto,

and its produce shared, through cooperative, collective or state farming.

Land reform, so conceived, is by definition, 'an equalizing policy'. It may contribute to growth (economic goal); but its primary thrust is to reduce poverty and income inequality (social goals). Success or failure of a land reform program may be determined in terms of the realization or otherwise of these social and economic goals. However, in the context of the present study, a more fundamental distinction is made between 'genuine or reformative' land reform where the attainment of the social and economic goals is both the manifest and latent functions of the program; and 'palliative' land reform where the latent function of the program is to achieve some other objective, such as, consolidation of power, gaining legitimacy or popular support.

(ii) Land tenure system: The term land tenure system refers to the institutional framework (both legal and supra-legal or traditional) that regulates the rights of access to, and utilization of, land as a productive resource. By regulating the rights of access to land, the land tenure system shapes not only the pattern in which the fruits of land are distributed, but also the dominant societal values. Two elements of the land

tenure system commonly labeled as impediments to socio-economic development are of particular relevance for the present study: concentration of landholdings, and asymmetric tenancy arrangements.

Concentration of land refers to a situation in which a large amount of agricultural land is controlled by a few people while the vast majority are left with little farmland. The social significance of an unequal distribution of land may vary from society to society, depending on such factors as the size of the labor force, the quantity and quality of land, the size of the urban-industrial sector, and the level of technological development. In the developing countries, where population pressure on land is usually high, the urban-industrial sector has little capacity to absorb surplus rural population, and where access to land is vital for the peasantry, concentration of land has a particularly detrimental affect on socioeconomic development. In this study, two factors will be used to analyze land concentration:

(a) Gini Index of land concentration: In discussing the issue of unequal distribution of land, most authors have referred to the Gini index, although the variables used to arrive at the Gini index are seldom noted. Lack of detailed information on the pattern of land ownership

in the five countries will not permit me to construct the Gini index of land concentration myself. I shall, therefore, use the Gini index as reported by other authors. The Gini index is particularly helpful to compare various countries with reference to land concentration. However, the indexes reported for various countries are for different years and are based on different data sources and procedures. This, unfortunately, will limit comparability of the results for different countries. Thus one should be cautious in making generalizations simply on the basis of such indexes.

(b) Pattern of distribution of land ownership: While Gini index will be more useful to compare different countries on the basis of land concentration, data on the pattern of distribution of land ownership may provide a better picture of land concentration within a given country. In this respect, data such as area of farmland owned by the upper 20 per cent of the population; or, alternately, by the lower 20 per cent of the population; area of farmland belonging to big landlords or small peasants, etc., will be used. Again, data for different countries will, on occasion, be for different years. An effort will be made, whenever possible, to present two data sets for each country, one set for the period preceding and another set for the period following the land reform program.

A tenancy arrangement has been termed asymmetric when it is characterized by:

(a) high land rent. There seems to be a general consensus among development planners that a rent in excess of 30 per cent of the produce (or its value) of the land is 'high', and in excess of 50 per cent is 'exorbitant'. However, this is a very crude method to determine the 'excessiveness' of land rent. It assumes that land rent is always determined by the value of the produce of the land, and that, high land rent is always 'exploitative'. Neither is true in all circumstances. As Clark and Haswell (1964) have pointed out, land rent is often influenced by the 'social' value of land. When possession of land is highly valued socially, or control over land may enhance one's power or help one to gain political office by virtue of control over the peasants working on the land, land rent may be high. In such cases, high land rent does not necessarily indicate exploitation in the economic sense. Nevertheless, in the absence of more satisfactory and elaborate information, such data has been used to indicate the asymmetry of tenancy arrangements (Cf. Tai, 1974; Griffin, 1974).

(b) Insecurity of tenure. Most frequently the absence of any written contract between the landlord and the tenant is cited as the only indicator of insecurity of tenure. Data on the insecurity of tenure is

perhaps most fragmentary because, firstly, terms of tenancy are seldom written or precise, and secondly, relevant laws and regulations are of little use since they are seldom practiced by the landlords or enforced by governments (Ladejinsky, 1977; Griffin, 1974). Such data, therefore, will be used with great caution and efforts will be made to check the data from two or more sources.

(c) The practice of 'free' labor by the tenant for the landlord. Various studies have provided useful information on the extent of 'free' labor a tenant is required to render to the landlord in various forms. However, information on free labor is more thorough for the Latin American than the South Asian countries (Cf. Feder, 1971; Stavenhagen, 1970; Barraclough, 1973).

In general, data on asymmetric tenancy arrangements are rather fragmentary. Therefore, with a view to complement such data, efforts will be made to present, whenever available, data on the following aspects:

(a) the incidence of tenancy in the sample countries;

(b) pattern of income distribution in the rural sector;

(c) distribution of institutional credit among different farming groups (e.g., what percentages of credit went to big landholders or small farmers), and

(d) use of fertilizers and high yielding varieties (HYV) of seeds among different farming groups.

It is believed that such data, along with that on land rent, insecurity of tenancy and free labor, will help provide a more comprehensive picture of the asymmetry of tenancy arrangements in the countries under study.

(iii) Political elites: The political elite is considered in the study as one of the principal actors in the dynamics of land reform, the other being the peasantry. The political elite is composed of those few who, as the incumbents of strategic power roles, exercise power on behalf of the many. However, departing from the familiar Lasswellian idea, the term as used here, excludes the 'informal' elites. It refers specifically to incumbents of 'formal' positions including leaders of the government, members of legislative assemblies at various levels, high ranking government bureaucrats and leaders of political parties. Data pertaining to each of these specific categories of elites are not available for all the countries under study. Therefore, broad, general data and information on political elites as such will be used.

(iv) The peasantry: In analyzing the rural sector, a fundamental distinction is made between:

(a) landlords, who do not work physically on land, but own the land and, therefore, have a right to its produce. In this sense, landlords constitute a privileged group. To what extent the occupants of a particular role or set of roles will form a class depends upon the extent of their sharing common interest(s) vis-a-vis the factors of production. The landlords, therefore, in aggregate or collectively, constitute a class, and,

(b) the peasantry, which is conceived of here as a set of roles, differentiated into certain other roles - small farmer, tenant, sharecropper, squatter, serf, rural proletariat, etc. Each of these roles has certain rights and obligations vis-a-vis the factors of production (land being the major one). These rights and obligations are socioculturally defined and, therefore, may vary in details from society to society or from time to time. The common denominator of all these roles - subsumed under the term peasantry - across time and place, is physical labor on land. In this sense, the peasantry is distinguishable from the landlord. Against the landlord, the mutually exclusive category of roles is that of the rural proletariat, the incumbents having no rural rights to land at all. They participate with their labor in the production machinery whose capital,

organization, administration, product, and surplus value are controlled by the landowners. The other roles, included in the category of peasants, fall in between these two mutually exclusive role sets in terms of their position vis-a-vis the factors of production, organization, administration and surplus value. Therefore, their forming a class depends on the degree of their actual or perceived alienation from these processes and instruments of production. Under certain circumstances they may form a class. So the peasantry is not treated as a class but as a role set having the potentiality of becoming and acting like a class under certain socio-cultural and historical circumstances.

The peasantry, as noted earlier, is divided into various categories (small peasants, sharecroppers, tenants, agriproletariat, etc.), and since the study is concerned with the role of the peasantry, it might be argued that it would be more comprehensive if the roles of all these categories of peasants could be analyzed separately on the assumption that their interests and level of participation in reform movements may differ.

Often the rural sector is classified in terms of ownership or non-ownership of land resulting in similar categories of people-big landlords, small peasants,

sharecroppers and landless agricultural laborers. These groups having different amounts of land (or no land at all) at their disposal presumably would react differently to any peasant movement. Such a classification has been fruitfully used by various authors to analyze the relative roles of these groups in peasant movements. Eric Wolf analyzed the dynamics of the Russian Revolution following such a classificatory scheme. In analyzing the Chinese Revolution, Mao Tse-tung followed a similar approach. However, because of lack of detailed data on the selected countries, and because of the secondary nature of the present study, I could not use such a classificatory scheme. However, considering the fact that apart from the landlords, the other categories are often overlapping and interchangeable, the classificatory scheme used here may also be considered relevant and worthwhile. Nevertheless, the limitations of such an approach in intensively analyzing the complexities of peasant movement should be borne in mind while considering the conclusions of this study. Unfortunately, the literature does not provide detailed information specific to each of these categories. Even if such data is available, it seems that, in the context of developing countries, these distinctions among the peasantry are of limited practical significance. The small peasants, tenants, and sharecroppers are not always, in reality,

three distinct categories, but rather three role sets that are highly interchangeable. The same peasant is sometimes a tenant, sometimes a sharecropper and sometimes even a petty 'landlord' renting a portion of his land to others. Often a peasant may assume these roles concurrently, being a tenant in relation to one, a sharecropper in relation to another, and a 'landlord' in relation to still another. The peasantry, therefore, may be treated as a single category.

(3) Data source and limitations

The present study is based on a content analysis of data and materials from the following sources:

(a) government publications (e.g., national development plans) and statistical reports;

(b) books and articles by independent authors;

(c) publications of various research organizations (e.g., that of the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin, Latin American Studies Centre at the University of Liverpool, and the Michigan State University Asian Studies Center); and

(d) research reports and materials published by such international organizations as the United Nations, the World Bank, International Labor Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Like any other study based exclusively on secondary sources, the present study has some limitations. I have already pointed out some of the data related difficulties in the earlier section on the operationalization of key variables. A few more general data problems may be pointed out here. First, the paucity of sociological studies in the field of land reform will make the task rather difficult and at the same time challenging. Second, the lack of reliability of official statistics supplied by governments of most developing countries will impose some restrictions on the present study. Moreover, there is the problem of comparability of data on different countries. Most often, the lack of comparability of data arises from the diversity of measurement standards employed by different scholars or compiled by different governments. Data on the same subject but coming from different sources may be conflicting. Developing countries often lack continuity in data collection over time. There are problems concerning official statistics in particular, and the quality of information available may somewhat curtail the scope of the study.

In short, limitations of the present study stem from two factors:

(a) my restricted access to data. In spite of best efforts, financial constraints refrained me from directly

using the data-rich library at the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison. I had to remain content with whatever data I could receive by mail.

(b) Lack of sociological studies on land reform. As mentioned earlier, the economic aspects of land reform has been more extensively studied than the sociological or political aspects. There is hardly any comparative study on the dynamics of land reform. Moreover, most of the 'socio-political' studies are ideologically biased and, therefore, not much reliable as a data source.

However, the publications of independent research institutions and international organizations (sources c and d above) are of high quality and contain valuable data on various aspects of socioeconomic development of the developing countries. The U.N. (and its affiliated agencies) and the World Bank materials are particularly helpful in this respect. The availability of these data will greatly compensate for the data problems listed above. Best efforts are being made to fully exploit these sources in order to enhance the credibility of the present study.

(vii) Significance of the study

The study is limited in its scope and emphasis. However, it may contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of land reform and socioeconomic development in the developing countries by analyzing (a) the character of the land tenure systems in selected developing countries, (b) the character of the major land reform programs undertaken in these countries, and (c) the relative role of the political elite and the peasantry in the initiation and implementation of land reform programs.

Although the importance of land reform for socioeconomic development of the Third World has been emphasized, almost unanimously, by development theorists, little attempt has been made to analyze the dynamics of land reform from a broad, comprehensive perspective. Present literature on the dynamics of land reform seems to be sharply divided into two conflicting approaches: one claiming the supremacy of the political elites in initiating and implementing land reform, while the other emphasizes the crucial role of the development planners in this respect. The former approach would like to 'motivate' the political elites in realizing the need for land reform, while the latter would like to 'develop' the manpower resource of the national planning departments.

In other words, land reform is treated as a measure/program to be imposed from above. The role of the peasantry, the intended beneficiaries, is more or less overlooked. By emphasizing the role of the peasantry, the present study attempts to rectify, partially at least, this theoretical imbalance and develop a more comprehensive approach to the understanding of the dynamics of land reform.

Thus, the major contributions of the present study may be summarized as follows:

(a) It attempts to develop a framework of differentiating land reforms in terms of certain 'core' variables indicative of their quality and presumably their potentiality of realizing the socioeconomic goals. Such a qualitative differentiation of land reforms is important in view of the large number of land reform laws that are 'simply proclamations glorifying the statute books'.

(b) Currently in explaining the dynamics of land reform, much emphasis is placed on (i) the political elites and ways to motivate them for land reform, and (ii) on developing the bureaucratic structure to facilitate the implementation of land reform programs. The role of peasant organization is often neglected. By emphasizing the relative role of the peasantry, the present study attempts to develop a more balanced

approach in explaining the dynamics of land reform.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

1. Hoogvelt (1976: 2) termed the neo-Marxist approach 'structural-dynamic'; however, the term 'dialectic' seems to be more appropriate since this approach emphasizes a dialectic relationship between development and under-development. Hoogvelt, nevertheless, pointed out the essential differences between the functional-diffusionist approach and the neo-Marxist approach.

2. An evaluation of the relevance of Lenin's analysis of imperialism in the context of contemporary developing world, is beyond the scope of the present study. It is suffice to quote a dependencia theorist in this respect. "Unfortunately, a certain piety towards Lenin's writings still prevents Marxists from disengaging themselves intellectually from the influence of a marginal work which never had any scientific pretensions, and which was written rapidly, in the difficult conditions of exile, with no other documentation at hand but the Bern library. The author himself described it as a simple 'attempt at popularization'; and far from being a general theory of imperialism, it was only an empirical analysis conditioned by a particular historical situation" (Emmanuel, 1972: 36).

3. Major proponents of the modern dependencia theory include Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, John Galtung, Harry Magdoff, Paul Sweezy and Samir Amin. However, there are a host of other scholars, particularly from Latin America, who have made significant contribution in this field. Lenin (1917) remains the chief source of theoretical inspiration. Lenin himself was influenced by Hobson (1902) and Luxemburg (1913).

4. In recent years attempts have been made to define the concept of imperialism rigorously. Caporaso, for example, defined imperialism as "a state of inequality and dependence in interstate relations where both the inequality and dependence are maintained by exploitation." Or, in other words, "imperialism = (x)(y)(z), where x equals inequality, y equals dependence, and z equals exploitation." These values are multiplicative rather than additive and each of these three variables must be present for imperialism to exist and "if the value of any of the variables goes to zero, no imperialism exists" (Caporaso, in Rosen and Kurth, eds., 1974: 91-92).

5. Cf. Sanjaya Lall (1975): "In the usage of the dependencia school,... 'dependence' is meant to describe certain characteristics (economic as well as social and political) of the economy as a whole and is intended to trace certain processes which are causally linked to its underdevelopment and which are expected to adversely affect its development in the future."

6. Cf. Das Santos (1970: 231): "By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development."

7. Cf. Cardoso (in Stephen, ed., 1973: 163): "Capitalist accumulation in dependent economies does not complete its cycle. Lacking 'autonomous technology' - as vulger perlanse has it - and compelled therefore to utilize imported technology, dependent capitalism is crippled.... It is crippled because it lacks a fully developed capital-goods sector. The accumulation, expansion, and self-realization of local capital requires and depends on a dynamic complement outside itself; it must insert itself into the circuit of international capitalism."

8. Caporaso (1978: 25-26) treated these 'sets of factors' in the following way. Magnitude of reliance - large share of needs supplied externally; large share of markets are foreign; large ratio of foreign to domestic capital, technology, production facilities, etc.; choice-based measures - heavy reliance on one partner, high opportunity cost (reliance not easily shifted), few opportunities for diversification, for allies, etc. (for 'natural' and for political reasons), commodity concentration of exports and commodity concentration of total domestic production; domestic distortion measures - lack of integration across economic sectors, lack of responsiveness of production structures to increased or decreased demand, responsiveness to externally generated demand.

9. All these quotes are from Solon Barraclough (1973: 35). Some of the ideas presented in this schema are also taken from Barraclough.

CHAPTER II

LAND REFORM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. Land Reform: Evolution of the Concept

- (i) Land reform: the concept
- (ii) Land reform: some justifications
- (iii) Typology of land reforms: some pertinent factors
- (iv) Land reform in history

B. Land Reform and Socio-Economic Development

- (i) Land reform as a measure of development
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- (iii) Land reform and capital formation

CHAPTER II

LAND REFORM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

A. Land Reform: Evolution of the Concept

(i) Land reform: the concept

As a concept, 'land reform' has received a bewildering variety of interpretations. Some have defined it in such a broad way as to include any change in the manner in which land is held and used or, in short, any change in the agricultural economy (U.N., 1951; 1962);¹ while others maintained that the term should be used only to refer to land redistribution (Warriner, 1969).² In some cases, land reform and agrarian reform are used almost interchangeably; while in others a sharp distinction is made between these two concepts (Alexander, 1974; Tuma, 1965), the first to refer to land redistribution and the latter to such 'complementary' changes as extension of agricultural credit, improvement of marketing facilities, development of infrastructure and so on.³ Much of the confusion resulted from the interdisciplinary nature of the subject which kept the issue of land reform an

'academic no-man's land'. Scholars from various disciplines studied land reform; but they tended to retain particular viewpoints of their parent disciplines, thereby displaying a built-in bias or perceptual fixation. Moreover, not only 'reform', but also 'land' is a term of multifarious meanings.

In law it (land) is property, in political science it is a source of power and strategy. In economics it is a factor of production and a form of capital. In social psychology it is a personalized guarantor of security; in anthropology an item of culture, and in sociology a part of the social system. In agriculture it means basically the soil. To geographers land can mean most of these things, but most of all perhaps surface land use (King, 1977: 4).

Consequently, while studying 'reform', scholars from different disciplines tended to emphasize different aspects and defined the term 'land reform' in many ways.

A great variety of definitions of land reform, therefore, may be discovered in the literature. For Tai (1974: 11):

the term refers to public programs that seek to restructure equitably and rationally a defective land tenure system by compulsory, drastic, and rapid means. The objectives of reform are to attain just relationships among the agricultural population and to improve the utilization of land. The means by which these objectives are attained are government sponsored tenurial changes.

Tai conceived of tenurial changes in a broader perspective to include both 'redistributive programs' (land redistribution and tenancy reform) and 'developmental programs' (cooperative farming and publicly instituted land settlement). "The former programs seek to reallocate equitably the sources of agricultural income, while the latter aim at improvement of farming efficiency and at expansion of farming areas" (Tai, 1974: 12). One of the most renowned scholars in this field, Erich H. Jacoby followed similar broader conception and equated land reform with agrarian reform:

land reform or agrarian reform are terms most frequently used to denote any integrated programme that aims at reorganizing the institutional framework of agriculture in order to facilitate social and economic progress in accordance with the philosophy, values and creed of the community concerned (Jacoby, 1971: 24).

Other scholars, on the other hand, adopted a more restricted meaning of the term land reform and, as noted earlier, maintained a distinction between land reform and agrarian or agricultural reform. Land reform is meant to refer to structural changes in the rural sector involving changes in the land tenure system; while the term 'agricultural reform' is used to refer to certain institutional changes, such as, changes in the land use pattern, introduction of modern science and technology in

agriculture, extension and/or improvement of certain services to rural areas (education, health-care, etc.); extension of credit and marketing facilities, and so on.⁴ According to this group of scholars "(t)o use the term (land reform) in (a) wide sense (to change all agrarian institutions) confuses the real issues." Land redistribution is the crux of land reform and:

(t)he redistribution of property in land is a very difficult change to carry through, far more difficult and controversial than other measures, and we cannot really put it on the same level as other institutional improvements. The order of magnitude is too different, and we take the edge off it if we ignore this fact (Warriner, 1955: 2).⁵

This emphasis on land redistribution led Russell King (1977: 5) to observe that "land reform is invariably a more or less direct, publicly controlled change in the existing character of land ownership, and it normally attempts a diffusion of wealth, income or productive capacity." Following similar line of argument, Michael Lipton (in Lehmann, 1974: 270) maintained that:

(1)and reform comprises (1) compulsory take-over of land, usually (a) by the State, (b) from the biggest landowners, and (c) with partial compensation; and (2) the farming of that land in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land relationship more widely than before the take-over. The State may give, sell or rent such land for private cultivation in smaller units than hitherto (distributivist reform); or the land may be jointly farmed and its

usufruct shared, through cooperative, collective or State farming (collectivist reform).

Redistribution of land, thus, remains the core of land reform.⁶ However, it seems to be too narrow a conception to restrict the term (land reform) to redistribution only. In a broader sense, land reform may be defined as land tenure reform which may take various forms or may consist of various elements. Land reform or land tenure reform, in this sense, is of two main types: "land redistribution, which involves the breaking up or combining of existing holdings and leads to a change in the scale of ownership; and tenancy reform, which effects improvements in tenancy contracts, with no change in the distribution of ownership" (King, 1977: 6). In other words, land redistribution may involve (a) changes in the form of ownership (e.g., private to state ownership or vice-versa); and (b) changes in the scale of operation (smaller or larger farm units); while tenancy reform may involve (a) changes in the relationship between the owners and operators of land (laws defining the rights and obligations of the landlords and tenants); and (b) changes in the pattern of distribution of agricultural produce (laws defining the share of different parties). In most cases, land reform laws include measures directed to all these aspects of the

agrarian structure. Consequently, expropriation and ceiling on landholding as well as regulations concerning land rent, eviction of tenants, etc. are common to most land reform legislations.

(ii) Land Reform: some justifications

Land reform is specifically relevant and advocated for developing countries where a large (often the overwhelming majority) percentage of the population live in rural areas and is dependent on agriculture. It is assumed that agricultural modernization and development in these countries are preconditions for their overall national development, and that land reform will ensure or contribute significantly to the development of the agrarian sector.

There can be little doubt that in economies where an overwhelming majority of the people live by agriculture, raising of agricultural productivity is a necessary condition of economic growth and improvement of the standard of living of the masses. Agricultural productivity per acre and per capita is often circumscribed and limited by the prevailing land system. Hence land reforms occupy a pivotal position in any programme of planned development of agricultural communities and underdeveloped economies. This is particularly so if the prevailing land system inhibits all initiative, stifles all effort and prevents any enlargement of inputs due to insecurity, rack-renting, the practice of sub-letting and a feudal or feudalistic structure of land rights (Singh and Misra, 1964: 10).

Thus 'defective' land tenure system is regarded as an impediment to development and land reform is advocated to deal with this impediment, at least partially. A U.N. report in 1957 emphasized the point more succinctly:

(u)nsatisfactory forms or conditions of land tenure may constitute a major impediment to development by creating or perpetuating social unrest, as well as by hampering the modernization of agriculture. Out-of-date cropping systems, for instance, may be propped up by tenancy laws or customs. The application of modern methods may be impossible because farmers' incomes are depressed by exorbitant rents to an extent which leaves no margin for saving or investment. The tenant may lack the minimum security of tenure which would encourage him to invest savings in improvements or would encourage a creditor to grant the cultivator a loan. The tenants' bargaining position may be further weakened by the host of intermediaries between the cultivator and the legal owner of the soil. Under unsatisfactory conditions of land tenure, it is doubtful whether subsidies or efforts by extension services to encourage development will be fully effective because the tenant may receive only a small share of any increases in production due to his own efforts or investments, and so has little incentive to make them (U.N., 1957: 73).

In most underdeveloped countries, a basic problem is that of vast underemployment and unemployment in agriculture. It has been stressed that land reform may ease this situation and greatly increase the volume of employment in the rural sector. An ILO report in 1960

emphasized the point:

a wider distribution of ownership can certainly stabilise and increase the volume of farm employment and production, since it allows a fuller employment of the family labour force. Large estate systems in the less developed countries aim at reducing the costs of labour by employing hired workers only at peak seasons, so that for long periods of the year the workers are unemployed. If, however, farm workers are settled on independent holdings they have an incentive to work more regularly; they will tend to diversify cropping and keep livestock so as to spread labour requirements and employ their families; their skill in management and initiative can be developed. Where redistribution of ownership is accompanied by public investment in land improvement or reclamation, the gains in production will be all the greater (ILO, 1960: 226).

Apart from its expected contribution to agricultural productivity, and generation of employment, land reform is also justified on the ground that it will significantly enhance social justice.

Most land reforms occur in situations where great disparities in wealth, income and power exist in agriculture. Proposals for land reform assume that such inequalities are handicaps to progress, and indeed there is some evidence to indicate that extreme inequality acts as a bottleneck to development by depriving both the very rich and the very poor of any real incentive to work for higher productivity. Because there are great inequalities in many underdeveloped countries, because there are many influences tending to make such inequalities cumulative and because the

forces opposed to changing this situation are firmly entrenched, there are strong arguments for an egalitarian emphasis as a rough guide to reform policy. Stated in this way, land reform can both have basic function of providing some measure of social justice, and act to remove barriers to economic development
(King, 1977: 7).

Social justice through more equitable land tenure system is also believed to bestow socioeconomic freedom and dignity to the impoverished peasantry.⁸ This emphasis on social justice clearly manifests an underlying policy which is equally concerned with the rate of overall economic growth and its composition and the distribution of its benefits.

Development theorists, thus, justify land reform on three grounds:

(a) as a means to stimulate agricultural productivity (economic goal);

(b) as a means to increase employment in the rural sector (economic goal); and

(c) as a means to promote social and economic equality through more equitable distribution of wealth and income (social goal). These, jointly, may be termed the 'socioeconomic goals' of land reform; and a land reform program that aims at/achieves these goals may be termed 'genuine' or 'reformative' from the point of view of a development theorist.

It is debateable whether these two sets of objectives (economic goals and social goal) are conflicting or complementary. Some authors have stressed the complementarity of these two sets of goals. Sidhu (1976: 23-24), for example, wrote:

... welfare (social goal) and investment (economic goal) aspects are one organic whole. Increasing the size of the cake is not possible without assuring its appropriate distribution. The welfare aspect is important precisely because it is a condition of development. In the situation of developing countries, the relatively higher incomes do not reflect ability and skills but privileged access to property, market power and social status. This situation acts as a brake on talent and effort. This makes land reform a crucial issue in the situation of limited growth prospects in the early stages of development. In countries where 70 to 85 per cent of the population depends on agriculture as the source of livelihood, land tenure is the basic economic law and it must assure justice to goad men into action.

Other writers, on the contrary, maintained that:

(t)he most frequent conflict is ... between social equality and economic efficiency. The point is illustrated by India: here the fixing of a 20-acre ceiling on landownership would correspond to an egalitarian motive of enabling every farming household in the country to have a minimum subsistence plot of 2 acres; but the creation of millions of 2-acre plots would adversely affect food production and reduce the marketable surplus, which for India would be disastrous (King, 1977: 11).

However, in arguing the incompatibility of the economic and social goals, it has been assumed that land reform is necessarily redistributivist; that small farms are necessarily less productive or less efficient; and that equality can be assured only through distributing pieces of land to farmers. All these assumptions can be seriously questioned; the validity of each of these assumptions may vary from society to society depending on the circumstances in which, and the objectives for which, land reform programs have been undertaken. Under certain circumstances, land reform may be collectivist rather than redistributivist; and creation and expansion of employment opportunities and a more equitable distribution of the produce of land (e.g., through wage regulations) may prove to be more effective in ensuring social justice than mere redistribution of land.

Whatever form it takes, development theorists seem to agree that the ultimate objective of land reform is the maximization of agricultural output and productivity. Changes in the land tenure system so as to ensure a fairer or more equitable distribution of agricultural income is believed to contribute to the realization of this primary goal. In some cases, this 'economic goal' may demand structural and institutional changes in the

rural sector; while in others no such demand may be felt. In developed countries, for example, governments are more concerned with regulating land use pattern and the utilization of land, while in developing countries the problem is to regulate access to land and consequently the pattern of distribution of the produce of land. The term land reform refers to this latter situation and involves (a) redistribution of land, and/or (b) tenancy reforms. Tenancy reform tries to regulate the rights and obligations of the tenants with a view to enhance their overall economic status and strengthen their position vis-a-vis the landlord. Such reform usually attempts to regulate the rights of the tenant in the following areas: (a) volume of rent (usually reducing land rent); (b) mode of rent payment (usually giving the tenant the right to pay rent in the form most suitable to him); (c) security (safeguarding the tenant against eviction); and (d) acquiring land (usually granting the tenant the first option to purchase the land in case the owner sells it).

The effectiveness of tenancy reforms (without redistribution of land or other parallel structural changes) has been questioned by various development theorists. It is generally agreed that such reforms, in the context of the sociopolitical and economic situation

pertaining to most developing countries, are of limited scope and value. Michael Lipton, for example, observed:

(f)first, dispersed and largely illiterate tenants must be told of their rights; but the indirect means of local and sometimes national communication (radio and the press) are highly responsive to the preferences of big landlords, while land reform officials taking the news direct to the tenants are in danger, and do well to go armed. Second, the landlords tend to control political and legal institutions and are usually the source of many types of rural patronage, including protection, consumer loans, contact with officials, marketing channels, and part-time employment; so a small tenant will seldom insist on his rights. The State cannot replace all the important services landlords have to offer. Third, administrative scarcity is inherent in the very definition of underdevelopment, and tenancy reforms make particularly heavy demands on the administration; the situation must be kept under permanent watch, and rent controllers must be paid and supervised enough to prevent their corruption by landlords (Lipton, in Lehmann, 1974: 275).

To these may be added the effect of population pressure and the consequent intensification of the competition for access to land. Faced with acute competition for land, few tenants would dare to raise the question of rights.

Last but not least, land reform is often viewed as a means to enhance political stability. A contented peasantry is often the key to political stability in developing agrarian societies and this demands a more

just or equitable land tenure system.

When the system of land tenure in predominantly agricultural countries provides the cultivator with a reasonable reward for his efforts, it stands for economic, social and political stability in the countryside and very often, and by the same token, in the country as a whole. The obverse is true when the system of landholding denies the cultivator the conditions under which he can secure for himself a reward for his labor commensurate with his role as a producer (Ladejinsky, 1977: 354-55).

Huntington echoed the same opinion when he observed that land reform must be initiated to effect necessary changes in the land tenure system with a view to create a contented peasantry, since,

(t)he peasantry,... may be the bulwark of the status quo or the shock troops of revolution.... Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide a viable living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, revolution is likely, if not inevitable, unless government takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions. No social group is more conservative than a land-owning peasantry, and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays too high a rental (Huntington, 1968: 375).

Land reform, therefore, is advocated to pacify the discontented peasantry thereby enhancing political stability.⁹

Since land reform, in the final analysis, is carried out by political elites, it is most often used to attain certain political goals - to legitimize or consolidate political power, to diffuse a threat to the political system, to broaden the political participation of the peasantry and so on. 'Revolutionary' military rulers, often introduce land reform to legitimize their 'revolution'. However, such political use of land reform neither means that it is the political elites alone who decide the why, when, how and what of land reform; nor that the political objective is the only driving force.¹⁰ Political benefits often justify land reform. However, in the long run, the political benefits are secondary byproducts being dependent upon the realization of the social and economic objectives discussed above.

(iii) Typology of Land Reform: some pertinent factors

Redistribution of wealth, income and power is the most crucial point of land reform. This may be achieved through land redistribution in the literal sense of the term or through tenancy reforms (ceiling, rent control, etc.), or both. The character and outcome of such redistributive process are determined by various factors. Some of the pertinent factors seem to be:¹¹

1. who takes the initiative: (a) is the process of redistribution started by a constitutionally established

government?; (b) is it started by a 'revolutionary' government coming to power through force:/ or (c) is it started by a discontented and rebellious peasantry?

2. Is there any compensation paid to the affected landlords? Or, in other words, is the land expropriated or confiscated?

3. How much land is redistributed? Or, broadly speaking, how much land (as a percentage of all agricultural land) is affected by the land reform measures? Or, alternately, how many people have been benefitted from the land reform programs?

4. Is expropriation or confiscation limited to land only? Or, the land as well as other means of production (e.g., machines and tools) and other factors of production (most importantly, capital) are also included in the process of expropriation/confiscation? It has been emphasized that a land reform program confined to redistribution of land alone can hardly achieve success (U.N., 1976; Ladejinsky, 1977; King, 1977).

5. Who are the beneficiaries? or intended beneficiaries? Is land redistributed to small peasants, or landless agricultural laborers or both? What are the groups

to be benefited from other land reform measures (e.g., tenancy laws)? These are important to evaluate the impact of the land reform measures on the economy as a whole as well as to analyze their 'social' significance.

6. Last but not least, is the process of land redistribution accompanied by a process of socioeconomic and political reorganization? What is done about redistribution of social and political power? Do the beneficiaries have access to decision-making processes? It is essentially concerned with the question of how far land reform measures have curbed the social and political power of the landed elites.

These are some of the pertinent factors that need to be taken into account to analyze the character of the land reform and to evaluate its impact on the socioeconomic structure.

It is on the basis of these factors that various authors classified land reforms. One of the most frequently used classifications is provided by Jacoby. He classified land reforms into two types - constitutional land reform and revolutionary land reform. Constitutional land reforms are initiated by generally 'conservative' governments (a); the affected landlords are usually paid

compensation in various forms, i.e., land is expropriated (b); the measures affect only a small percentage of the total agricultural land or of the total rural population (c); expropriation is usually limited to land, other means and factors of production remaining outside the scope of the reform measures (d); small peasants are usually the intended beneficiaries (e); and usually there is no or little concurrent reorganization of the socioeconomic and political structure (f). Therefore, the political power of the landed elite is not seriously damaged and, consequently, the participation of the peasantry in political decision-making processes is not enhanced.

Land reform measures undertaken in most developing countries are 'constitutional' in terms of the above mentioned factors and, according to Jacoby (1971: 213), "despite a few remarkable results, the prospects for land redistribution initiated by constitutional action ... are far from encouraging." Therefore, he turned attention to the socialist land reforms which he termed 'revolutionary'. In socialist land reforms massive land redistribution is carried out along with a fundamental reorganization of the entire economy. Through various forms of collective and state farming a thorough reconstruction of the agrarian structure is carried out.

The Chinese and Cuban, among some others, are cited by Jacoby as examples of revolutionary land reform.¹²

Such a classification of land reforms into constitutional and revolutionary, however, seems to be too simplistic. There are so many varieties of land reforms that a much more complex schema is needed to classify them. As mentioned earlier, land reforms have two primary objectives: increasing agricultural production and furthering economic and social equality. The political objectives of gaining legitimacy, pacifying the peasantry or forestalling a revolution are secondary objectives (from the point of view of the development theorist), often dependent upon the realization of the primary ones. Taking these objectives into consideration, land reforms may be classified into two broad categories:

1. Reformative (or 'genuine') land reforms, where the social and economic objectives are pursued. In this case elites demonstrate strong commitment to land reform and effective measures are taken to realize the goals of boosting agricultural production and lessening socioeconomic inequality. The degree of political elites' commitment to land reform is demonstrated by:

(a) the rapidity of the implementation of the land reform measures;

(b) the volume of land expropriated or otherwise

affected (measured as a percentage of the total agricultural land);

(c) the number of beneficiaries (measured as a percentage of the total intended beneficiaries);

(d) the ratio of the ceiling on landholding to the average size of farm in the country concerned;

(e) the impact of land reform on agricultural production;

(f) the impact of land reform on socioeconomic inequality and so on. In reformative land reform the political goals become secondary and often come as by-products or effects of the measures taken to achieve the social and economic goals.

2. Palliative land reforms, where political elites show little interest in realizing the social and economic objectives. Instead, primary focus is placed on the political objectives. 'Negative' scores on the factors mentioned above (e.g., slow implementation of the land reform measures; expropriation of small percentage of the total agricultural land; small number of beneficiaries; fixing the ceiling at a high level compared to the average farm size; and little impact of the land reform measures on agricultural production or socioeconomic inequality, etc.) would indicate that the land reform program is palliative rather than reformative.

In terms of the mode of introduction and/or implementation, a land reform, whether reformative or palliative, may be constitutional (introduced by legally established government through legislative actions) or 'revolutionary' (introduced by supralegally established governments, such as, military rulers, or governments coming to power through revolution). Similarly, a land reform may be termed capitalist (or non-socialist) when the institution of private property in land is maintained. A land reform that abolishes private property in land may be termed socialist. A capitalist (or non-socialist) land reform, in turn, may be distributivist (whereby the expropriated land is distributed among peasants in units smaller than hitherto); or collectivist (whereby land is jointly farmed in units bigger than hitherto and its produce shared through some sort of cooperative mechanism respecting individual ownership of land). Non-socialist land reform is generally undertaken by constitutionally established governments; while socialist land reform is usually undertaken by 'revolutionary' governments during or after a revolution. The main difference between these two types of land reforms may be presented as follows:

<u>Non-socialist land reform</u>	<u>Socialist land reform</u>
Constitutional/legal means to implement land reform measures.	Supra-constitutional means to implement reform laws.
Usually limited redistribution of land.	Massive redistribution of land.
Usually redistributive in nature.	Usually collectivist in nature.
Usually land is expropriated.	Usually land is confiscated.
Increasing agricultural production and modernization of the rural sector are usually the chief objectives.	Total economic reorganization is usually emphasized. Removal of economic dependency is therefore attempted.
Landlordism is not usually abolished, but curtailed. Private property retained.	Landlordism is abolished. Private property no longer retained.
Land reform laws are usually applied from above.	Usually land reform measures are carried out by locally created special agencies.

However, since the present study is concerned with the role of political elites and peasant organization in land reform, the distinction between reformative and palliative seems to be more pertinent.

(iv) Land Reform in History

Land reform, either palliative or reformative, is a recurrent phenomenon in history. Since the invention of agriculture, land became a crucial productive resource and "(t)he struggle for land and for the right to use

land, the vicissitudes of man's relation to land" (Jacoby, 1971: 19) became an ever-recurring feature of the history of man.

Reforms of the agrarian structure seem to have been enacted in Biblical times, for there is an Old Testament reference to the redistribution of land every fiftieth year. In ancient China too land reform was a recognised right of the people; every few years the land was redivided and the people set on a new footing of equality... Most of the fundamental social changes that have occurred in history - the Fall of the Roman Empire, the American Revolution, the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, to name a few - have had land reform aspects. (King, 1977: 28).

In his Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform (1965) Elias H. Tuma has presented a historical account of land reform in ancient Greece and Rome as well as in modern Mexico, Japan and Egypt.¹³

Although background is scanty, it seems that the land reforms of ancient Greece and Rome had restoration of social and political stability as the prime objective (Tuma, 1965; King, 1977). The reforms of both Solon and Pisistratus in sixth century B.C. Athens and of Tiberius and Gracchus in second century B.C. Rome were preceded by extensive land concentration in the hands of the few rich and the impoverishment of the large peasantry. In Greece,

the poorer peasants were forced to borrow from the richer landowners. Many became indebted and, having only their labour and their land as security, ended up as virtual slaves (called hektemors) working what was their own land, now marked by holoi or 'mortgage stones'. The hektemor worked the land as 'sixth-partner', which meant that he kept only one-sixth of the product of his labour for himself, the rest going to the creditor. As more and more peasant land was seized by the rich, the hektemors reacted by demanding a change of government and redistribution of land (King, 1977: 29).

Similar land concentration and consequent social and political tension preceded the reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. These land reforms achieved little success.¹⁴

Land reform as a modern phenomenon owes its origin to the French revolution.

One of the most famous and widespread agrarian reforms of modern times took place in France during the French Revolution in the 1790s. At that time, the lands belonging to the nobility, the Crown, and the Church were seized and turned over to the former tenants. This brought into existence the land-owning peasant class which has been the backbone of the French economy and political life for almost two hundred years (Alexander, 1974: 6).

The American revolution was also followed by some sort of land reform.¹⁵

An altogether different type of land reform followed the Russian revolution.

The Soviet reforms abolished the right of private ownership, forbade alienation of land, prohibited tenancy and decreed equalisation of holding, making tilling the land the basis of both right and size of holding. The measures were unique on several counts. The basic departure from previous reform policy was that the Soviet measures were conceived as part of a national programme. Rather than being an isolated measure of formal tenure reform, the plan on which the reform policy was based concerned itself with agricultural production and the development of the economy as a whole, as well as fulfilling the political aspirations of the party in power
(King, 1977: 34-35).

Similar socialist land reforms were introduced in the East European countries after the Second World War. However, in spite of 'socialization of the means of production' and the abolishment of the institution of private property, some form of private ownership of land in various degrees (along with the collective/socialist sector) survived in some of these countries. On this basis, the East European countries may be classified into three groups: countries where communes/collectives dominate the agrarian economy (Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania); countries with modified forms of collectives (Hungary, Czechoslovakia); and countries where the owner-operated sector either survived or was

revived significantly (Poland, Yugoslavia). Table 2:1 presents this classification. Such continued existence or revival of 'private agricultural plots' in socialist economies has been explained in various ways. However, without attempting to explain this controversy, it can be said that these private plots seem to be more productive. In Hungary, for example, these plots in 1961 comprised less than 4 per cent of the total farmland (13 per cent of the arable area), but produced "about a third of the total output of wine, fruit and vegetables; 60 percent of milk, 64 percent of meat and 90 percent of eggs" (King, 1977: 42).

TABLE 2:1

DISTRIBUTION OF FARM TYPES IN EASTERN EUROPE, circa 1961

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AREA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Owner-operated</u>	<u>State farms</u>	<u>Collective farms</u>
Albania	20.0	7.5	72.5
Bulgaria	0.1	6.8	93.1
Rumania	4.8	44.0	51.2
East Germany	7.4	7.6	85.0
Czechoslovakia	11.1	21.1	67.8
Hungary	3.7	32.6	63.7
Poland	86.0	12.9	1.1
Yugoslavia	87.6	6.4	6.0
U.S.S.R.	0.0	31.0	69.0

Source: King, 1977: 43.

Since the Second World War, land reform became an issue particularly in the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Rapid population growth, increasing concentration of landholding, continuing dependence on agriculture and the like contributed to a deterioration of the employment and income situations in these developing countries. Increasing unemployment and inequality, particularly in the rural sector, heightened social and political tensions and, consequently, land reform became a demand. Land reform is advocated as an instrument to accomplish a more equitable distribution of wealth, income and political power. It assumed added significance for the poverty-stricken underdeveloped countries who faced declining or stagnant agricultural production. With the publication of United Nations' 1951 study, land reform became an internationally recognized development issue. The U.N. study concluded that:

for many countries the agrarian structure, and in particular systems of land tenure, prevent a rise in the standard of living of small farmers and agricultural labourers and impede economic development, both by preventing the expansion of the food supply and by causing agriculture - usually the major economic activity of the country - to stagnate
(U.N., 1951: 89).

The Communist victory in China and later in Vietnam with wide participation of discontented peasants and the

subsequent land reform, almost turned it into an ideological issue. Discontented peasantry seemed to act as the bulwark of the Communist revolutions and therefore, it was stressed that timely and peaceful land reform is an effective way to thwart communist threat and preclude revolution.

Many people wouldn't hesitate to approve of a revolutionary movement if it is the only way the common man can secure his elementary wants. But we must realize how serious a threat an agrarian revolution could be at this point of history, even if the upheaval seems justifiable from that point of view. The only way to thwart Communist designs on Asia is to preclude such revolutionary outbursts through timely reforms, peacefully, before the peasants take the law into their own hands and set the countryside ablaze.

(Ladejinsky, 1977: 133).

With these words, Wolf Ladejinsky, the chief architect of U.S. land reform efforts in post-war Japan, Korea and elsewhere, cautioned the 'free world' and stressed the need for land reform to ensure social and political stability in the Third World.¹⁶

This 'internationalization' of land reform assumed a new dimension with the Cuban revolution. The grossly unequal access to land in Latin America became the focus of attention and land reform was again emphasized to save the continent from the threat of Communist takeover. Land reform in Latin America became an important

element of the U.S. foreign policy and finally in 1961 the Punta del Este Conference of the Organization of American States (OAS) vowed to initiate comprehensive agrarian reform programs in Latin American countries to ensure rapid economic development along with social justice. The formation of the Alliance for Progress and the United States' pressure on Latin American countries to make good their pledges for land reform gave a new impetus to the phenomenon. The United States openly and unequivocally declared:

We are insisting on reforms as a condition of our national support to Latin America. We would rather withhold our assistance than to participate in the maintenance of a status quo characterized by social injustice
(qt. in Carroll, 1964: 112).

Thus, the United Nations, the Alliance for Progress and occasionally even the Vatican,¹⁷ contributed to create such an atmosphere that land reform in developing countries became a widely recognized and desirable phenomenon. Accordingly, since the 1950s almost all the countries in the developing world initiated some form of land reform. However, as the latest U.N. report (1976) testifies, these 'reforms' have done little to improve the situation. Land reform, therefore, remains an unfulfilled but necessary promise.

B. Land Reform and Socioeconomic Development

(i) Land reform as a measure of development

Land reform, as defined here, includes (i) land redistribution; and (ii) tenancy reform, which:

normally comprises the granting to the tenant of one or more of the following rights:

(a) limited rents, typically (assuming no landlord share in inputs) to one-third of the value of gross output, instead of the prevailing levels of 50-75 per cent;

(b) conversion, at the tenant's discretion, from crop-share to fixed rental;

(c) security against eviction, save for bad farming or non-payment of legal rent; and

(d) first option to purchase the property, should the owner sell

(Lipton, in Lehmann, 1974: 275).

The effectiveness of tenancy reform, as noted earlier, is questionable in view of the concentration of political power in the hands of the landlords, and the scarcity of land in most developing countries. Tenancy laws regulating rents, ceilings and security most often than not remain 'laws' widely evaded by the landlords and least carefully applied by the bureaucrats. Ceilings are often evaded by mala fide transfers and dividing the land into numerous sub-ceiling holdings in the name of dependents and relatives (often dead or non-existent

relatives also); tenancy security laws are evaded by shifting tenants around every year or even every season or resuming personal cultivation thereby transforming the tenants into laborers 'so that no single tenant cultivates a piece of land long enough to establish a claim to rent reduction, prior right of purchase or security of tenure'. Such ineffectiveness of tenancy reforms in most developing countries has led one observer to say that "if you can do a land reform (meaning land redistribution) you don't need tenancy reform; if you can't, tenancy reform won't work" (Lipton, in Lehmann, 1974: 277). Therefore, for all practical purposes, land reform invariably refers to land redistribution.

Land reform, as mentioned earlier, is usually justified on two grounds: (a) that it will contribute to social equality, and (b) that it will help modernize the rural sector and boost production. The social equality argument has a humanitarian connotation; it arises from a genuine concern for the poverty, insecurity, subjugation, illiteracy and lack of opportunity that plague the life of the peasantry in most developing countries. It arises from an impulse and determination to give:

...full recognition of the right of all people to share fully in our progress. For there is no place in democratic life for institutions which benefit the

few while denying the needs of the many even though the elimination of such institutions may require far-reaching and difficult changes such as land reform and tax reform and vast improvements in education, health and housing conditions. Without these changes our common effort cannot succeed

(Message from President Kennedy to the Alliance for Progress, qt. in Barraclough, 1974: xxiv).

The economic argument is based on the assumption that the existing pattern of land tenure is a major obstacle to development in the Third World. This is because, as Barraclough mentions in reference to Latin America,

(1) (t)raditional land tenure patterns impede the introduction of new technology and economically rational land and labor use. (2) They result in patterns of income distribution, consumption, expenditure and investment that restrict the growth of new industries. (3) They fortify a rigid social structure in which opportunities for improvement of one's social status are rare. (4) They have led the dependent classes and ethnic groups to develop protective mechanisms tending to support the status quo and low levels of aspiration.

(5) They have concentrated both arbitrary and institutional political powers in the hands of those who control most of the land; the result is a social order in which those who work the land have no effective representation, rendering the institutions of local government practically powerless to fulfill their functions of public service

(Barraclough, 1974: xxv-xxvi).

In more economic terms, the existing land tenure system in most developing countries adversely affects (a) employment, and (b) industrialization. Concentration of landholdings, one of the characteristics of the land tenure system, significantly restricts employment either through lack of optimum utilization of land, or through substituting human labor for machines. Secondly, concentration of wealth develops a highly skewed pattern of income distribution which in turn gives birth to a particular consumption pattern that adversely affects investment and marketed surplus jeopardizing efforts of industrialization. The adverse effects of existing land tenure system on the socioeconomic development of the developing countries have been well documented by various authors (Barracclough, 1973; Ladejinsky, 1977; Stavenhagen, 1970). However, on the subject of the relationship between agrarian reform and economic development, there seems to have some confusion or indecisiveness among various authors. Take for example, the following remarks by Carroll (1964):

there seems now to be general agreement that a much higher performance could be expected from Latin American agriculture - if land-ownership were more diffused so that more farms were of 'family-type' or medium-size, if there were more owner-operator entrepreneurs, if clear land-titles were generally the rule, if higher wages were paid to farm labour, if credit were not concentrated in the hands of a few,

and if markets were accessible to all producers... Only an increase in rural purchasing power can sufficiently enlarge domestic markets for manufactured goods and associated services.

As Lehmann (1974) noted, this cascade of 'ifs' only shows the indecisiveness of the author regarding the contributory role of agrarian reform.

Land reform is expected to contribute directly to agricultural development; and, through it, to the total economic development of the country concerned. Therefore, an understanding of the role of agriculture in economic development is needed to fully appreciate the role of land reform in this regard. The interrelationships between agriculture and economic development have been aptly described by Johnson and Mellor (1961):

(i) economic development boosts the demand for agricultural products, particularly food. Failure to increase the production of agricultural goods to meet such growth in demand may seriously impede overall economic development.

(ii) The foreign exchange requirements, particularly during the early stages of development, may be provided by the increase in export of agricultural products.

(iii) The labor force required by the expanding sectors of the economy (particularly industry and manufacturing) is to be drawn mainly from agriculture which may release manpower through modernization.¹⁸

(iv) Since in most underdeveloped countries, agriculture constitutes the dominant sector, an increase in agricultural production is required to generate capital to be invested in other sectors of the economy.

(v) Since in most underdeveloped countries the majority of the population live in rural areas, an increase in their income may boost the demand for locally produced consumer items thereby stimulating the expansion of the industrial and manufacturing sectors.

Land reform may affect all the above mentioned aspects of economic development. However, its effect on two aspects is of crucial importance - agricultural production and capital formation.

(ii) Land reform and agricultural production

It is extremely difficult to precisely measure the effect of land reform on agricultural production because of other intervening variables. Land reform usually breaks up large estates into small family holdings. If these estates were commercial in nature and were fairly

efficient in terms of the use of capital, technology and management, production after reform may fall, at least in the short-term especially if land reform is accompanied by exodus of the estate managers. For example, agricultural production showed a decline in Bolivia after the revolution of 1952 which saw big landholdings subdivided into smaller units and parcelled out to peasant families (Heath, et.al., 1969; King, 1977). However, as Ronald J. Clark noted (in Dorner, 1971: 146), other factors were also responsible for this decline.

It is an unfortunate misconception, yet rather widely held, that a decrease in agricultural production resulted from the land redistribution... This association between land reform and a decline in production can probably be attributed to three factors. One, some farms actually were idled and some lands underutilized because of the political situation after 1952 and the adjustments which peasants had to make. Two, products were scarce in urban centers. And, three, in 1956 Bolivia had to import potatoes; other staples especially wheat flour - also were imported in greater quantities after 1952. All these could have resulted from marketing adjustments... and from weather factors... The 'apparent' decline in agricultural production after 1952, while true in part, is better explained by marketing adjustments, transportation bottlenecks, and weather phenomena, with the former two by far the more important factors during that period (Clark, in Dorner, 1971: 146).


Land reform in Iraq also showed some decline in agricultural production in the initial period (King, 1977).

Such initial decline in production is often used as an argument against land reform; moreover, this has often been used to argue that larger farms are more 'productive' or 'efficient' than the smaller ones. Both these arguments are not borne out by fact. It seems to be a universal phenomenon that smaller farms are more productive than the big ones (Fig. 2:1).

Moreover, decline in output has always been a short-term phenomenon. In a recent review, Dovring (1970) reported that after the land reforms in the 1920s, 1950s and 1960s, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam and Iran respectively experienced sudden increases in both output and productivity. Japan and Taiwan furnish the best examples in this regard.

Numerous figures and indices demonstrate the rapid increase in output since 1947 (in Japan), particularly in the non-rice sectors. Agricultural production has grown impressively by 3-4 per cent per year since the reform, though this is well below the 10 per cent rate of the industrial sector. Output of livestock products leaped by six times, and fruit by three times, during the period 1950-1960, despite a drop in agricultural labour force from 16 to 12 millions. Labour productivity, static before the reform, averaged an annual 5 per cent increase from 1954 to 1968. Similarly, land productivity increase, under 1 per cent per year before the reform, was 4 per cent after (King, 1977: 199-200).

FIGURE 2:1
OUTPUT PER HECTARE FOR FARM SIZE GROUPS



For each country, bar at left represents output per hectare for smallest farm size group. Bars to the right represent successively larger farms with their output per hectare expressed as a percent of that of the smallest size group.

a. Colombia 1960

b. Colombia 1966

Source: Dorner and Kanel, in Dorner, ed., 1971: 52-53.

Likewise in Taiwan,

(p)roductivity increased considerably after the reform. How much of this was a direct outcome of reform, however, cannot be specified - other factors, such as improved rice varieties, greater application of fertilizer and pesticides, more advanced technology, all strongly promoted by the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, contributed importantly. One set of data shows inputs increased 11 per cent, outputs 23 per cent, from 1953 to 1960, a gross productivity increase of 12 per cent (King, 1977: 215).

In other countries too (e.g., China, North and South Korea, Egypt, Philippines), land reform seems to have contributed to increased agricultural productivity.

(iii) Land reform and capital formation

Development finance is one of the major concerns for developing countries. Since in most developing countries agriculture forms the backbone of the economy, the question of development finance is ultimately one of releasing resources from agriculture for investment in industrialization. It is a question of tapping the surplus (part of the national income above a nation's culturally determined subsistence requirements) and redirecting it for investment.

In every society an elaborate system of claims on the surplus exists, whether as a material expression of the fealty owed to elders and chiefs in tribal society or the rent, interest, and profits due the owners of capital in capitalist society. These systems of claims are ordinarily so deeply imbedded in the social structure that any effort to redirect the income flows associated with them into socially fruitful investment channels will be severely constrained. Only when the existing claims are eliminated through the revolutionary transformation of society does an opportunity arise for massive redirection of the income flows that compose the surplus into development finance.
(Lippit, 1974: ix).

In traditional agrarian societies, this surplus is accrued primarily to the landlords which is then spent primarily on conspicuous consumption and luxury living rather than on stimulating the economy. Through altering the existing land tenure system, land reform aims to channelize this surplus to investment.¹⁹ In developing countries, this capital formation role of land reform is of prime significance. It has been argued that land reform boosts savings-investment ratio by (i) redistributing income more evenly; and (ii) by providing security to the peasantry (Warriner, 1969; Raup, 1963; Lippit, 1974; King, 1977).

Precise statistical information regarding the effect of land reform on capital formation in various

countries is lacking. However, it is evident that land reform contributed significantly in raising national savings-investment ratio in Japan, Taiwan, China and some other countries (Dore, 1959; Koo, 1968; Wong, 1973; Lippit, 1974; King, 1977). In China, for example, land reform:

redirected income flows amounting to 16.9% of net domestic product (NDP) which had formerly gone to the owners of property in the agricultural sector, of which 1.1% of NDP had nominally taken the form of (agricultural) tax payments. In addition, owner-farmers made nominal tax payments equal to 2.1% of NDP. In the absence of government investment activity in the 1930s, these 'tax' payments made no significant contribution to net investment activity at that time. By redirecting these income flows, the land reform made potentially available for investment finance about 19% of net domestic product - at zero opportunity cost from the standpoint of investment foregone (Lippit, 1974: 78-79).

Similarly in Taiwan, investment increased after land reform and the farmer's income also registered increase.

Since 1953 the landlords' share in the country's total farm income has sharply declined. In 1936-40 25 per cent accrued directly to landlords and moneylenders. By 1950-55 it was 10 per cent, and during 1956-60, only 6 per cent. For these three periods the cultivators' share of aggregate income was 67 per cent, 77 per cent and 81 per cent... In 1950 rent and interest payments drained 30 per cent of total farm income out of agriculture; in 1955 it was 18 per cent and by 1960 11 per cent. Real income

of Taiwanese farm families went up by approximately 60 per cent from 1952 to 1962. Investment also increased, particularly in farm implements, and although the impact of massive American aid should not be discounted, the higher incomes and increased security generated by land reform seem to have been the main source
(King, 1977: 212-213).

Agricultural production and capital formation are thus two major areas in which land reform may contribute. However, the extent and quality of such contribution depend on the character of the land reform itself. In this respect such factors as the class structure of the society, the character of the group/class or political party initiating and implementing the land reform, the nature of the political system, the character of the political elites, etc. become significant.

NOTES ON CHAPTER II

1. The United Nations, in its initial reports on Progress in Land Reform (First, Second and Third Reports), seems to equate land reform with any change in the agrarian structure. The term 'agrarian structure' is used "to mean the institutional framework of agriculture. It includes, in the first place, land tenure, the legal or customary system under which land is owned; the distribution of ownership of farm property between large estates and peasant farms or among peasant farms of various size; land tenancy, the system under which land is operated and its product divided between operator and owner; the organization of credit, production and marketing; the mechanism through which agriculture is financed; the burdens imposed on rural populations by governments in the form of taxation; and the services supplied by governments to rural populations, such as technical advice and educational facilities, health services, water supply and communications" (U.N., 1951: 4-5).

2. Cf. Doreen Warriner (1969: xiv): "Land reform means the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers This is what land reform has meant in practice, past and present."

3. 'Agrarian reform' is often treated as a broader concept that includes any change in the agricultural sector. Land reform, in this sense, forms one element of 'agrarian reform'. Following this line of argument, Tuma (1965: 8-14) argued that agrarian reform consists of two aspects: land -tenure reform and land-operation reform. Alexander (1974) made a distinction between land reform (land redistribution) and agricultural reform which involves "changes in the way land is used, advances in the technology applied to it, new ways of transporting the products to market and changes in many other aspects of the work and life of the farmer."

4. The facts that land reform and agricultural reform are complementary to one another and that the pursuance of one without the other can hardly contribute to development have been stressed by various authors. Jacoby (1971: 170), for example, observed: "(i)f a comparison is made between the various measures designed over the years to improve agrarian conditions, it will be seen that the redistribution of land is the most

spectacular and effective of these, provided that it is accompanied by whatever reforms are necessary under the given circumstances. Time and again experience has proved the often tragic consequences of redistribution programmes that are confined to the mere distribution of public domain land and which ignore the vital problems of agricultural credit, infrastructures, soil improvement and access to markets."

5. Alexander (1974: 2) echoed Warriner when he observed: "(t)he key element is the change in land ownership, the transfer of possession of land from one group in the society to another."

6. Wolf Ladejinsky, one of the most experienced rural development planners, also emphasized the importance of land reform. "Land ownership as the main point of an agrarian reform is difficult to achieve. Examples are legion, and the reason is not far to seek. Land redistribution under agrarian reform is a compulsory measure imposed by a government upon the landowners on economic and legal terms unpalatable to them. In effect this involves a drastic redistribution of property and income at the expense of the landlords. It becomes a revolutionary measure when it passes property, political power, and social status from one group in the society to another. This is the real meaning of an agrarian reform where land redistribution is its central objective" (Ladejinsky, 1977: 361).

7. In these arguments, the land tenure system is treated as an instrumental variable. It is stressed that the land tenure system affects peasants' incentives to invest/develop; which, in turn, affects productivity. By the same token, therefore, it is assumed that by manipulating the land tenure system, the peasantry may be made more entrepreneurial and innovative.

8. It was in this spirit that the Alliance for Progress declared that its primary objective is to "encourage, in accordance with the characteristics of each country, programs of comprehensive agrarian reform leading to the effective transformation, where required, of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use, with a view to replacing latifundios and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land tenure so that, with the help of timely and adequate credit, technical assistance and facilities for the marketing and distribution of products, the land will become for the man who works it the basis of his economic stability, the foundation of his increasing welfare, and the guarantee of his freedom and dignity" (qt. in Barraclough, 1973: xv-xvi).

9. Somewhat overemphasizing the stabilizing role of the peasantry in developing agrarian societies, Huntington (1968: 292) wrote: "(i)f the countryside supports the political system and the government, the system itself is secure against revolution and the government has some hope of making itself secure against rebellion. If the countryside is in opposition, both system and government are in danger of overthrow. The role of the city is constant; it is the permanent source of opposition. The role of the countryside is variable; it is either the source of stability or the source of revolution. For the political system, opposition within the city is disturbing but not lethal. Opposition within the countryside, however, is fatal. He who controls the countryside, controls the country."

10. Following Ladejinsky, Tai (1974: 56) also overemphasized the role of the political elite in land reform. He maintained that "in initiating land reform a political elite is decisively influenced by the perceived need to gain political legitimacy, i.e., to strengthen popular support for a new political order or to safeguard an existing regime against threatened political changes. When the political elite perceives the need to gain legitimacy, the conditions likely to lead to reform will become relevant and important; when it fails to perceive such a need, the mere presence of these conditions may not lead to reform." For Tai such conditions include revolution, rural unrest, deterrence to communism, ideological commitment, international climate, and population pressure. These factors may or may not lead to land reform; the decisive factor is the perceived need for legitimacy by the political elite.

11. The following discussion draws heavily on Judith Astelarra (Land Reform in Chile during Allende's Government), Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975: 13-49).

12. Collective and State farming, according to Jacoby, may have significant importance for developing countries. "From the viewpoint of the man-land relationship, an analysis and assessment of socialist agricultural policy and its ultimate effects upon rural society and upon the role of agriculture in overall economic development may contribute to a better understanding of the potential importance of collective and state farming in agrarian reconstruction in underdeveloped countries" (Jacoby, 1971: 195-96).

13. Elias H. Tuma's study was concerned with eight countries - Greece, Rome, England, France, Russia, Mexico, Japan and Egypt.

14. According to Tuma (1965), these land reforms failed either to minimize socioeconomic inequality considerably or to ensure political stability. In Greece, for example, "(t)he poor believed Solon would quench their grievances against the rich and give them back their mortgaged land; the rich wanted him to restore calm without inflicting any material losses on them; and the general community thought he would create stability, prevent the impending upheaval, and reform the governmental machinery. None of these groups was fully satisfied. The hektemors became free but had no land to work because there was no statutory land redistribution; the rich were angry because all debts were cancelled; and for the community at large, although the 'slave revolution' was avoided, great political instability followed" (King, 1977: 30).

15. About land reform in the United States during the Revolution, Jameson (1940: 34) wrote: "...great confiscations of Tory estates were carried out by the state legislatures, generally in the height of the war. New Hampshire confiscated twenty-eight estates, including the large property of its governor, Sir John Wentworth. In Massachusetts a sweeping act confiscated at one blow all the property of all who had fought against the United States or had even retired into places under British authority without permission from the American government.... In New York, all lands and rents of the crown and all estates of fifty-nine named persons were confiscated.... Altogether it is evident that a great deal of land changed hands, and that the confiscation of Tory estates contributed powerfully to break up the system of large landed properties, since the state usually sold the lands thus acquired in much smaller parcels..."

16. Concerning the role of the U.S. in agrarian reform in the Third World, Ladejinsky (1977: 133) remarked: "(w)hatever we may contribute to Asia's advancement and stability - be it in the form of dollars, of technical guidance, of organizational advice, or of military assistance - our policy and all our diplomatic competence and tact should be actively and sympathetically guided by the knowledge that the foundations of the social structure stand or fall in the countryside and that the peasant and his interests and aspirations must be in 'the center of the piece'. We must make an effort to

persuade the more conservative Asian groups that rural reform is essential to their own preservation as well as in the interest of the peasantry. Provided such basic attitudes are developed, here and in Asia, the United States could begin to supply the mechanisms of reconstruction and effectively employ them.

17. On several occasions Pope Paul VI reiterated his support for land reform in Latin America. While attending the 39th International Eucharistic Congress in Colombia in 1968, the Pope took the opportunity to address a rally of 35,000 peasants. He denounced 'unjust economic inequalities between rich and poor' and appealed to the 'governments of Latin America and also those of other continents' to initiate land reform (The New York Times, August 24, 1968). In his recent visit to Latin America, the present Pope also demanded extensive land reform to alleviate the miseries of the poor.

18. In the initial phase, however, the agricultural sector, in the context of developing countries, is hoped to employ more and more people on land and retain the vast rural labor force on land.

19. This surplus is often divided into 'commercial surplus' and 'distress surplus'. The commercial surplus is that part of the marketed surplus which market-oriented rich peasants (commercial farmers) set out to market regularly. The distress surplus, on the other hand, is composed of the produce that the poor (and middle) peasants are forced to market. For the poor peasants "(t)hese pressures arise from certain money obligations ... like land revenue, rent and debt service and the need to purchase such necessities of life as salt, kerosene and cloth. They derive from their onerous character, from the poverty of the farmer and the institutional set-up in which he operates... (The economic) obligations become a continuing source of pressure to acquire more cash, through a 'distress sale' of his own produce" (Narain, 1961: 36). Land reform, by liberating the peasantry from the existing oppressive institutional set-up, may eliminate this need for 'distress sale' and in turn may reduce, at least in the short run, the gross 'marketed surplus'. However, with increase in production, the marketed surplus is expected to rise.

CHAPTER III

LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BASIC

CHARACTERISTICS

A. Land Tenure and Forms of Tenancy

- (i) The concept of land tenure
- (ii) Defective features of the land tenure system
- (iii) Forms of tenancy
- (iv) The sample: basic demographic facts

B. Land Concentration and Asymmetric Tenancy Arrangements

- (i) Land concentration: the South Asian countries
- (ii) Land concentration: the Latin American countries
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 - (a) Landlessness
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CHAPTER III

LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

A. Land Tenure and Forms of Tenancy

(i) The concept of land tenure

The term land tenure system (LTS) refers to the institutional arrangements - both legal and supra-legal or traditional - and values that govern the rights to, and control over, the most important factor of production in the rural sector - land. It reflects the multiplicity of relationships between men vis-a-vis land (Tai, 1974; Jacoby, 1971). In modern usage "land is an area whose referent is an immutable grid written upon paper according to rules which correlate the written grid with astral observations. Tenure is some right or rights, partial or whole, to exclude others from the land represented on the grid" (Neale, in Frykenberg, 1969: 3). Therefore, the basic elements of LTS are - land, a physical entity; and a set of relationships governing access to and rights over that physical entity. The first element varies in terms of size and

quality, while the second varies in terms of role-sets that it creates (landlord, tenant, share-cropper, etc.).

The absolute physical size of land does not carry much meaning. It should be understood in a relative sense. The value of a particular land area will vary from region to region (or within the same region across time) in terms of climate, soil quality, levels of technological and socioeconomic development of the region, population pressure (land/man ratio), cultural values (related to land possession), and the like. Therefore, a particular land area (say, 25 acres) may be considered a big farm (and its owner a big landlord) in one area, a medium farm in another, and a small farm in still another. The value of a particular land mass may better be understood in terms of its labor absorption capacity. The basic question, then, becomes: 'can it gainfully employ, and satisfy the basic needs of, an average family?'¹ This is not the most effective, and certainly not the most satisfactory, way to classify farms; nevertheless, it may roughly serve the purpose of this study. Following this somewhat crude criterion, agricultural land in developing countries may be classified into four groups:

1. Sub-family size farm: In terms of providing gainful employment to an average family (exact size

variable) and satisfying the basic needs of such a family, the sub-family size farm is inadequate. Frequently it generates income far below the accepted poverty line.

2. Family-size farm: It can provide more or less satisfactory gainful employment to an average family and can satisfy the basic needs of such a family. However, income generated is still inadequate to give rise to substantial surplus.

3. Multi-family farm: It provides gainful employment not only to an average family, but also to some additional workers. It may generate substantial surplus.

4. Large farm: It is bigger than the multi-family farm; employs or has the resources to employ a still larger number of workers and generates a still bigger surplus. However, the distinguishing feature of the large farm is that the owner usually does not work the land himself, production being carried on by hired labor. In multi-family farms, the owner usually puts on his own labor as well as employs some additional labor. The large farm, therefore, may be commercially organized and owned by absentee landlords.

Since size (in the sense described above) is an important variable in determining the growth potential (or productivity) of a farm, distribution of farms in

terms of these four size categories may provide some understanding of the land tenure system of a particular country. The predominance of sub-family size farms, for example, may indicate, on the one hand, uneconomic or non-optimal use of land and, on the other, diminished growth potential of the economy as a whole. Similarly, the predominance of large farms, under certain circumstances, may indicate concentration of landholding to an extent which is detrimental to development. The significance of the distribution of land in terms of size becomes meaningful, however, only when viewed in conjunction with the structure of tenure relationships that arises on the basis of ownership, control and use of land.

Such production relationships give rise to multifarious roles having various degrees of rights and obligations vis-a-vis control over and use of land. Such rights and obligations may be conceived of as a continuum: absolute control and absolute lack of control being the two extremes and a series of lesser degrees of control lying in between. Ownership and non-ownership are mutually exclusive since they refer to the legal right over land. Control, however, is a much more divisible phenomenon, and refers to the rights and obligations that define one's access to land. Input into

the mode of land use is also a prerogative of control over the land. The term control also includes one's role vis-a-vis other aspects of production. Ownership and control are, therefore, related but not synonymous. One may have absolute ownership without absolute control; however, absolute control usually presupposes absolute ownership. One may enjoy varying degrees of control without ownership. In this sense, land tenure system is specifically concerned with the distribution of control over land among various groups. However, distribution of ownership has an important bearing so far as it is such distribution that determines the share of control over land of various role-sets.

A rural sector may, therefore, easily be classified in terms of owners of land and non-owners of land. However, when control is considered such simple dichotomy becomes almost superfluous. On the basis of control a rural sector is characterized by diverse roles; and the ownership variable makes the whole situation more complex. The rural sectors of developing countries are characterized by various roles on the basis of these variables - ownership and control. The number of roles and their specific features may vary from country to country (or from one region to another); but, broadly speaking, the following roles may be identified across

countries: big landholders, small farmers, subsistence farmers, tenants, sharecroppers, and rural proletariat.

(ii) Defective features of the land tenure system

Distribution of land in terms of size and the pattern of ownership and control in terms of these roles together constitute the basics of the land tenure system. It has generally been argued that the LTS in developing countries is characterized by -

(a) concentration of landholdings, and

(b) asymmetric tenancy arrangements - a system of land relationship in which one party (the landowners) seems to have all the rights and few, if any, obligations, and the other party (the tenants) all the obligations and few, if any, rights. Asymmetry especially refers to unequal control over the organization of production, administration, and, obviously, the surplus product of land. In this sense, it may be construed as a continuum having innumerable variations between the extremes of absolutely symmetric and absolutely asymmetric tenancy arrangements. Asymmetry of the tenancy relationship manifests itself in, and at the same time, a manifestation of, the inequality among different production roles in terms of economic, social and political power. Market imperfection that results in unequal exchange of goods and services among various groups (production roles) may

also be considered as indicators of asymmetric tenancy arrangements.²

There seems to be a consensus that a land tenure system characterized by these two features - concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements - is not conducive to development (Stavenhagen, 1970; Barraclough, 1973; Tai, 1974; U.N., 1976). In the following pages, the basic characteristics of the land tenure system in the five countries under study will be discussed. Primary focus will be on the distribution of land in terms of size, and patterns of tenancy arrangements as reflected in variations of production roles, and socioeconomic and political inequality between these roles. Data on agricultural production, access of various groups to factors of production and resources, etc. will be explored to analyze the character of the rural sector in a more comprehensive way.

The major thrust is on analyzing the impact of the land tenure system on (i) the distribution of economic wealth, and (ii) the distribution of social and political power. An LTS may be termed 'defective' when the possession of and, control over, the economic resources of production (primarily land) determine, to a significant degree, the distribution of economic wealth (income),

the distribution of social wealth (prestige, status), and also the distribution of political wealth (power); in other words, when the dominant roles in these three spheres (economic elites, political elites, and social elites) overlap or correspond indicating concentration of economic, social and political power in the same hands (Barracclough, 1973; U.N., 1976).

The task, therefore, is to analyze how far the five developing countries under study are characterized by a 'defective' land tenure system giving rise to the concentration of economic, social and political power. The existence of a defective LTS may be regarded as providing the objective material conditions for land reform. The five countries are grouped into two categories: (a) the South Asian countries (SACs) - India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; and (b) the Latin American countries (LACs) - Mexico and Colombia. Besides geographical location, demographic factors have also been taken into consideration to classify them into two groups. It is assumed that demographic factors play a significant role in shaping the land tenure system of a country as well as significantly influence its options for land reform.

(iii) Forms of tenancy

A general note on forms of tenancy is in order here. As mentioned earlier, the basic roles to be found in the rural sector are: large landholders, small farmers, subsistence farmers, tenants, sharecroppers and agri-proletariat. Tenure refers to the institutional arrangements through which these roles (or role incumbents) decide on the use of land, on taking relative share of the risk of entrepreneurship and on sharing the produce. In these respects, there are so many variations of tenure arrangements that a more detailed description may be warranted.

Broadly speaking, three basic types of tenure arrangements may be identified: owner-operation, sharecropping, and leasehold. An owner-operator organizes the production on his own, bears all the risks, and gets all the profit. The actual production may be done by hired labor for a fixed wage paid in cash and/or (sometimes) in kind. In this case, all the factors of production (land, labor, capital), means of production (tools, implements) and variable capital (raw materials, seeds) are supplied by the owner-operator. The owner may live on the farm or may live away (absentee landlord) and organize the production through a manager. When such production is carried on exclusively or primarily

for the market, it may be termed commercial farming. In sharecropping, the landlord and the tenant share the organization of production, risks and profit. The means of production are sometimes provided by the landlord, sometimes entirely supplied by the tenant and occasionally they both contribute jointly. Most often the variable capital is supplied by the tenant. In leasehold, the landlord becomes a pure rentier, renting out his land for a fixed amount. The tenant organizes the production, bears all the risks and gets all the profit. The tenant or lessee, in this instance, is an entrepreneur or speculator. These three basic tenure arrangements may be presented in a schematic form in the following way:³

Forms of tenure	Parties involved		Forms of income of the parties	
	I	II	<u>Party I</u>	<u>Party II</u>
1. owner-operation	Landlord	←Workers	Profit	Wage
2. share-cropping	Landlord	↔Tenant	Crop-share	Crop-share
3. Leasehold	Landlord	→Tenant/ Lessee	Rent	Profit

*Arrow indicates the party that bears the risks of production.

The primary roles (landlord, tenant) are, therefore, not easily distinguishable either in terms of the form of tenure or in terms of the form of income. A landlord

may be purely a speculator, paying wages to the labor he employs; he may be a sharecropping landlord, sharing the crop as well as the risks of production; or, he may be a rentier, collecting a fixed rent thereby taking no risk on production. Similarly, the other party may be simply a worker (earning wages), a sharecropper (having a part of the produce and risk), or a speculator/entrepreneur (paying rent and bearing all the risks). These roles with all their variations may be found within a particular community coexisting side by side at the same time; although a particular form of tenure may be predominant at a given time. Moreover, the roles are often overlapping; a single individual may alternately or even simultaneously assume more than one of these roles. Such role overlapping may blurr class differentiation and may have a bearing on the social and political structure.

In reality, the tenurial arrangement may be more complex and varied. In most of the developing countries, production is more often organized by more than two parties, the five countries under study being no exceptions. Often the landlord is an absentee landlord organizing production through one or more intermediaries. The relationship between the tenants and intermediaries also assumes different variations. Seven of the most common

forms of tenurial arrangements involving three parties - landlord, intermediary, and tenant - may be presented in the following schematic fashion:

<u>FORMS OF TENURE</u>	<u>PARTIES INVOLVED^a</u>			<u>FORMS OF INCOME FOR THE PARTIES^b</u>		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Sharecropping-I	LLD	* ← INDY →	TT	CS	S	CS
Sharecropping-II	LLD	→ INDY ←	TT	CS	CS	CS
Rent Collection-I	LLD	→ INDY →	TT	R	CS	CS
Rent Collection-II	LLD	→ INDY ←	TT	R	R	P
Intermediary Operation	LLD	→ INDY ←	TT	R	P	W
Profit Sharing	LLD	← INDY ←	TT	CS	CS	W
Entrepreneurship	LLD	← INDY →	TT	P	S	W

a. LLD = Landlord; INDY = Intermediary;
TT = Tenant.

b. CS = Cropshare; R = Rent; P = Profit;
W = Wage; S = Salary.

*Arrow indicates the party or parties bearing the risks of production.

In these cases also there are variations from one country or locality to another, and often the roles are overlapping which makes the situation much more complex than the schematic presentation suggests. A single individual, for example, may assume all three roles at the same time - a landlord in relation to one, a tenant in relation to another, and an intermediary in relation to still another.

An investigation into these tenure arrangements is important in so far as they indicate not only the pattern of land distribution (and thereby concentration of land-holdings), but also whether and, to what extent, the production relations are asymmetric. Such an investigation will also help analyze the pattern of income distribution and the distribution of social and political power.

(iv) The sample: basic demographic facts

The relationship between population (its size, distribution and characteristics) and economic development of a country is too well-known to warrant a detailed discussion here. So far as land reform and related issues are concerned, it is suffice to say that the size of the population (more specifically, the land/man ratio or, to be more precise, man/resource ratio) significantly determines not only the growth potential of the country but also influences the options open to it. The population size may influence the character of the land reform as well as the methods followed to initiate or implement it.

The countries under study are diverse in terms of their population size, urban-rural distribution of population, life expectancy at birth and, most importantly,

population density per square kilometer. The three South Asian countries (SACs) have a greater volume of population, higher density and also a much higher percentage of rural population. As Table 3:1 indicates, in 1975 India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had populations of 598.10 million, 70.26 million and 76.82 million respectively. In other words, these three countries had a combined population of over 745 million. During the same time, the two Latin American countries (LACs) had a combined population of only about 85 million; the population of Mexico and Colombia being 60.15 million and 24.72 million respectively.

Although these five countries share a relatively high rate of population increase (an average rate of increase of 2.8 percent during 1970-75); in terms of density they vary widely; Bangladesh having a population density of a staggering 533 per square kilometer at one extreme and Colombia having a population density of only 22 per square kilometer at the other extreme. In general, the SACs have a much higher population density; the lowest in this group (Pakistan) having a population density of almost three times than that of the highest scorer among the LACs (Mexico). The difference in terms of life expectancy at birth is also significant; Mexico having a life expectancy at birth of over 60 years (1970)

TABLE 3:1

BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF FIVE SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Country	Total Population (in millions) 1975	Population Density (per sq.Km.) 1975	Rate of Increase (1970-75)	Life Expecty. at Birth	Rural Pop. as Percentage of Total
INDIA	598.10	182	2.1	41.22 (1951-60)	79.40 (1974)
BANGLADESH	76.82	533	2.4	35.80 (1970-75)	91.20 (1974)
PAKISTAN	70.26	87	3.0	51.26 (1962)	74.50 (1972)
MEXICO	60.15	30	3.5	62.38 (1965-70)	37.20 (1975)
COLOMBIA	24.72	22	3.2	60.95 (1970-75)	35.70 (1974)

Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1975: 143-175.

as against only about 36 years for Bangladesh. In general, the LACs have a much higher life expectancy at birth (average 61.67 years) than that of the SACs (average 42.76 years). One of the most significant differences is in terms of rural-urban population distribution. In 1974, Colombia, among the five countries under study, had the highest percentage of urban population at 64.3; while Bangladesh had the lowest at only 8.8 percentage. The average percentage of rural population for the SACs is 81.70, while that for the LACs is only 36.5 percent. In other words, the Latin American countries under study are more urbanized than the South Asian countries.

B. Land Concentration and Asymmetric Tenancy Arrangements

In spite of these demographic differences, the five selected countries share certain common features in terms of their land tenure system. The land tenure system in these countries, broadly speaking, is characterized by (a) concentration of landholdings, and (b) asymmetric tenancy arrangements.⁴ The magnitude, and therefore the implications, of land concentration vary from the countries in Group I (SACs) to those in Group II (LACs). They are, therefore, treated separately.

(i) Land concentration: the South Asian countries

In the South Asian Countries, as shown earlier, land/man ratio is quite high creating a situation wherein landholdings are relatively small in size. In this respect, Bangladesh undoubtedly, presents the most extreme situation. A tiny plot is the rule in Bangladesh. Although relevant data at the national level is lacking, table 3:2 that presents the size distribution of landholdings in a particular thana (police station), may roughly be regarded as applicable to the whole of Bangladesh. It shows almost 70 percent of rural households had less than 2 acres of land. The mean landholding per rural household or family was 1.46 acres only. Only 5 percent of rural households had more than 6 acres of land. The predominance of tiny plots, however, does not imply an altogether egalitarian picture of land distribution in Bangladesh. It is evident from table 3:3 that, in 1960, 26 percent of the rural households of Bangladesh had no land, and 18 percent had less than an acre. Most importantly, however, these 44 percent of the rural households together controlled only slightly over 3 percent of the total agricultural land. Only slightly over 16 percent of the rural households had more than 5 acres of land; nevertheless, they owned more than 57 percent of the total land.

TABLE 3:2BANGLADESH: LANDHOLDING PATTERN IN COMILLA THANA

<u>Landholdings</u>	<u>% of Families</u>
No cultivatable land	15
0.01 - 0.8 acres	26
0.81 - 2.0 acres	28
2.01 - 4.0 acres	18
4.01 - 6.0 acres	8
Over 6.0 acres	5

Source: Faidley and Esmay, in Stevens, et.al.
(eds.), 1976: 130.

TABLE 3:3

BANGLADESH: SIZE DISTRIBUTION AND CONCENTRATION OF LAND-
HOLDINGS, 1960


<u>Size of farm (acres)</u>	<u>% of rural households</u>		<u>% of area</u>	
No land	26.0		0.0	
Under 1	18.0	44.0	3.2	3.2
1-2.5	20.2		13.0	
2.5-5.0	19.5		26.4	
2.5-5.0	16.0		52.6	
25+	0.3	16.3	4.8	57.4

Source: Maddison, 1971: 151.

More recent studies present a more alarming situation. According to a Master Survey of Agriculture conducted in 1967-68, 50 percent of all farmers cultivated only 17 percent of the total land; while the wealthiest 10 percent had more than 36 percent of the land at their disposal. It also noted that 64 percent of the farm families possessed holdings of less than three acres (Stepanek, 1977: 96). During the 1970s (after the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971) land concentration increased further. According to a Land Occupancy Survey (LOS) conducted in 1977, 33 percent of the rural households are landless, while the top 10 percent control as much as 50 percent of the total cultivatable land and "aside from the distribution of land, as the population has grown, the average farm size has fallen from 3.5 acres (in 1967-68) to 2.3 acres; 80% of the farmers now have plots of less than three acres" (Stepanek, 1977: 98). Figure 3:1 presents the size distribution of land holdings in Bangladesh in 1967-68 and 1977.

India demonstrates an almost similar pattern - small average size holdings and yet substantial concentration of land. Although table 3:4 presents the findings of a national sample survey conducted in 1954-55 on distribution of land ownership, it is believed that the

FIGURE 3:1
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS IN BANGLADESH, 1967-
68 AND 1977



Sources: 1967-68 Master Survey of Agriculture
 1977 Land Occupancy Survey
 (Qt. in Stepanek, 1977: 99).

TABLE 3:4INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP, 1954-1955

<u>Size of farms (acres)</u>	<u>% of rural households</u>	<u>% of area</u>
No land	23.09	0.00
0.01-0.99	24.17	1.37
1.00-2.49	13.98	4.86
2.50-4.99	13.49	10.09
5.00-9.99	12.50	18.40
10.00-24.99	9.17	29.11
25.00-49.99	2.66	18.63
50.00 and above	0.94	17.54

Source: Maddison, 1971: 106.

situation since then has not changed significantly (Maddison, 1971: 105). In 1954-55, 23 percent of rural households in India had no land at all; the next 38 percent had less than 2.5 acres on the average covering only 6.23 percent of the total agricultural land; while the top 12.77 percent of the rural households owned more than 65 percent of the total farm land. Figures for 1960-61 do not indicate any significant change (Table 3:5). However, it should be noted that land-man ratio is not so precarious in India as it is in Bangladesh. While the average size of landholding in Bangladesh was only 2.30 acres in 1977 (LOS), in India in 1960-61, the corresponding figure was 4.54 acres. Nevertheless, as table 3:5 indicates, 42 percent of the rural households had less than 1 acre of land each and a mere 2 percent at the top (30 acres or more) possessed almost 23 percent of the cultivated land of India.

Over the years, the Indian situation also worsened. While in 1954-55, 23 percent of the rural households was landless (table 3:4), it increased to 26 percent in 1960-61 (table 3:5). Data collected for India's first agricultural census in 1970-71 showed that the number of very small holdings had registered significant increase over 1960-61 level. As shown in table 3:6,

TABLE 3:5

INDIA: DISTRIBUTION OF LAND BY SIZE CLASS OF OPERATIONALHOLDINGS, 1960-61

Size of farm (acres)	RURAL HOUSEHOLDS		TOTAL AREA	
	Number (in 000)	%	Acres (in 000)	%
0.00	19030	26.24		
up to 0.49	7024	9.69	1083	0.33
0.50-0.99	4355	6.00	3211	0.97
1.00-2.49	11326	15.60	19026	5.77
2.50-4.99	11717	16.17	41991	12.74
5.00-7.49	6537	9.00	39529	11.99
7.50-9.99	3483	4.80	29804	9.05
10.00-12.49	2492	3.45	27456	8.33
12.50-14.99	1438	2.00	19629	5.96
15.00-19.99	1832	2.57	31360	9.51
20.00-24.99	1088	1.50	23912	7.25
25.00-29.99	829	0.88	17100	5.20
30.00-39.99	1047	1.45	38919	11.81
50.00 and above	468	0.65	36565	11.09
TOTAL	72466		329585	

Source: Sidhu, 1976: 153.

one half of all operational holdings were less than one hectare (2.5 acres) in size (in 1970-71), putting them in the category of 'marginal and sub-marginal' units. Altogether, this bottom one-half of cultivators operated just nine percent of the area. This distribution contrasted with the relatively more favorable pattern of 1961-62, when about 39 percent of all holdings had been less than one hectare, accounting for about 7 percent of the land. The additional 19 percent of all cultivators who operated 'small farms' - holdings between one and two hectares in size - accounted for almost 12 percent of the area. The size of this group, whose prospects of becoming viable producers were most favorable with the help of government-subsidized loans for adoption of improved methods and/or ancillary farm occupations, by contrast, was slowly shrinking in number (Frankel, 1978: 493-94).

The Gini index of land concentration also registered some modest increase, from .66 in 1953-54 to .68 in 1960-61 (Minhas, in Srinivasan and Bardhan, eds., 1974: 398). According to the official statistics, the Gini index of land concentration in 1953-54 was .63, in 1961-62 it increased to .65 and to .66 by 1971-72 (see table 3:9).⁵

In Pakistan,⁶ the degree of land concentration is much higher. Before the initiation of land reform in 1960s, even in Punjab, the agriculturally richest region in Pakistan, land concentration was remarkable where 78.70 percent of rural households had only 31.8 percent

TABLE 3:6INDIA: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL HOLDINGS,1961-62 and 1970-71

<u>Size Group</u> <u>(acres)</u>	<u>1961/62</u>		<u>1970/71</u>	
	<u>Number</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Area</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>%</u>	<u>Area</u> <u>%</u>
less than 2.5	39.07	6.86	50.60	9.0
2.5-4.99	22.62	12.32	19.0	11.9
5-9.99	19.80	20.70	15.2	18.5
10.0-24.99	13.99	31.17	11.3	29.7
25 and above	4.52	28.95	3.9	30.9

Source: Frankel, 1978: 493.

TABLE 3:7PAKISTAN: DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS IN PUNJAB, 1950

<u>Size of farm</u> <u>(acres)</u>	<u>RURAL HOUSEHOLDS</u>		<u>FARM AREA</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Acres(in 000)</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 10.00	1809	78.70	7092	31.80
10.00-99	476	20.70	10428	46.70
100.0-499	12	0.50	2502	11.20
500 and above	1	0.01	2295	10.30
		0.6		21.5
TOTAL	2298		22317	

Source: Burki, in Stevens, et.al., eds. 1976: 301.

of the land, while the top .6 percent owned 21.5 percent of the farm area (table 3:7). All Pakistan figures for 1960 do not provide a better picture. As table 3:8 shows, 11.3 percent of the rural households had no land and including them almost a quarter of the farm families had only a mere .7 percent of the total cultivatable land area under their disposal. On the other hand, the top 7 percent of the rural households owned more than 42 percent of the agricultural land.

TABLE 3:8

PAKISTAN: DISTRIBUTION OF OPERATIONAL HOLDINGS IN

AGRICULTURE, 1960

<u>Size of farm (acres)</u>	<u>% of rural household</u>	<u>% of farm area</u>
No land	11.3	0.0
Under 1.0	13.5	0.7
1.0-2.5	15.6	2.8
2.5-5.0	14.7	5.9
5.0-25.0	37.8	47.9
25.0 and above	7.1	42.7

Source: Maddison, 1971: 151.

The Gini index of land concentration in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh yields the following result (table 3:9). It shows that in 1960 India had the highest

degree of land concentration followed by Pakistan and Bangladesh.

TABLE 3:9
INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH: GINI INDEX OF LAND
CONCENTRATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Gini index</u>
India	1953-54 ^a	0.628
	1961-62 ^a	0.650
	1971-72 ^b	0.660
Pakistan	1960	0.615
Bangladesh	1960	0.511 ^a
	1974	0.57b

Sources: For India^a, Pakistan, and Bangladesh^a
Tai, 1974: 310;

For India^b, Govt. of India, Planning
Commission, Sixth Five Year Plan,
1978-83.

For Bangladesh^b, Griffin and Ghose, 1979.

(ii) Land concentration: the Latin American countries

The Latin American countries, in general, demonstrate a more unequal distribution of land. Tables 3:10 and 3:11 present data on the distribution of landholdings in Colombia. Table 3:10 clearly shows a high degree of concentration of land; large farms which constitute only 1 percent of rural households owned almost 45 percent

TABLE 3:10COLOMBIA: CONCENTRATION OF LANDHOLDINGS, 1960

<u>Tenure category</u>	<u>% of rural households</u>		<u>% of farm area</u>	
Landless workers	12.8	68.6	0.0	5.5
Subfamily farms	55.8		5.5	
Family farms	26.3		24.5	
Multifamily farms	4.0	5.1	25.1	70.0
Large farms	1.1		44.9	

Source: Griffin, 1974: 96.

TABLE 3:11COLOMBIA: SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDHOLDINGS,

1960

<u>Size category</u> <u>(in hectares)</u>	<u>FARMS</u>		<u>AREA</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Hectares</u>	<u>%</u>
0.0 - 4.9	756,605	62.6	1,238,976	4.5
5.0 - 29.9	327,425	27.1	3,780,379	13.8
30.0 - 99.9	82,730	6.8	4,275,618	15.6
100 and above	42,912	3.5	18,042,654	66.1

Average Farm Size: 22.60 hectares.

Source: Dorner (ed.), 1971: 170.

of the agricultural land. Multifamily farms and large farms together constitute only 5 percent of the rural households, and yet between them they owned as much as 70 percent of the total farm area. In contrast, almost 13 percent of the rural households owned no land at all, and 68.6 percent of the rural households controlled a mere 5.5 percent of farm land. The Colombian Land Reform Institute, INCORA (Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria) reported in 1963 that "the 874 largest landholdings (or 0.07 percent of the total households) owned 30 per cent of the country's 27 million hectares of farm land; as late as 1967, the size of the largest landholdings ranged from 101,000 to nearly 850,000 hectares" (qt. in Tai, 1974: 25-26). However, it is evident that in the Latin American countries in general, and in Colombia in particular, more land was available per rural household than in the Asian countries. Table 3:11 presents the size distribution of farm land in Colombia. It shows that the average farm size would be over 22 hectares.

Perhaps it was Mexico before the revolution (of 1910-1920 which effected changes in the land tenure system particularly since 1940s) that demonstrated the most extreme form of land concentration (table 3:12). Here only 5 percent of the rural households of big

haciendas owned 93 percent of the farm land. Back in 1910 when revolution swept Mexico, the situation was even worse, with only 1 percent of the rural households owning 97 percent of the land while 96 percent of the population had only 1 percent of the agricultural land under their disposal.

Among the 30 Mexican states, the number of landowners as a proportion of the population ranged from 0.2 percent in Oaxaca to 11.8 per cent in Baja California. In 10 major Mexican states, 2,200 owners possessed land ranging in size from 1,000 to 10,000 hectares; 403 owners from 10,000 to 100,000; and 14 owners from 100,000 to more than 400,000. In some states, haciendas of the size of Florida could be found; and even as late as 1932, some haciendas were so large that they comprised from 15.3 to 93.6 per cent of some Mexican states" (Tai, 1974: 26).

Even after the land reform efforts of successive governments since 1930s, concentration of landholding remains quite high in Mexico. If only private cropland is taken, it is evident that a little over 1 percent of the farm units (the bigger farms) controlled 52 percent of the total private farm land; while the smaller farms had only about 16 percent of the farm land under their disposal, although they constitute more than 85 percent of the total farms (table 3:13). Even if ejidal landholdings are included, the degree of concentration seems to remain quite significant (table 3:14). In 1960, over

TABLE 3:12

MEXICO: CONCENTRATION OF LANDHOLDINGS, 1930

<u>Size of farms (hectares)</u>	<u>% of total households</u>	<u>% of total farm area</u>
Under 1	29	1
1 - 5	39	1
5 - 20	14	1
20 - 50	8	2
50 - 100	3	1
100 - 200	2	2
200+	5	93

Source: Tai, 1974: 23.

TABLE 3:13

MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE CROPLAND, 1960

<u>Farm size (hectares)</u>	<u>FARM UNITS</u>		<u>FARM AREA</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>000 hectares</u>	<u>%</u>
up to 5	929	77.2	1,461	10.8
5.1-10	95	8.0	665	4.9
10.1-25	103	8.6	1,581	11.7
25.1-50	37	3.1	1,280	9.5
50.1-100	22	1.8	1,499	11.1
100.1-200	10	0.8	1,329	9.9
200.1-400	3	0.3	888	6.6
400.1-and over	2	0.2	4,787	35.5
TOTAL	1,201		13,490	

Source: Hansen, 1971: 78.

TABLE 3:14
MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CROPLAND, 1960

<u>Farm Size</u> <u>(hectares)</u>	<u>No. of holdings</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>Total Area</u> <u>(000 hectares)</u>	<u>% of</u> <u>Holdings</u>	<u>% of area</u>
up to 5	1,332.2	2,759.5	49.45	11.75
5.1 - 10	1,079.9	7,991.5	40.09	34.04
10.1 - 25	201.1	2,803.5	7.47	11.94
25.1 - 50	42.5	1,422.7	1.58	6.06
50.1 - 100	22.0	1,498.6	0.82	6.38
100.1 - 200	10.4	1,328.5	0.39	5.66
200.1 - 400	3.3	888.1	0.12	3.78
over 400	2.1	4,785.9	0.08	20.39
			1.41	36.2

Source: Hansen, 1971: 79.

36 percent of Mexico's cropland was occupied by the big farms who constitute only a mere 1.4 percent of the total farms. On the other hand, the small farms (almost half of the total) had less than 12 percent of the cropland under their control.

Mexico and Colombia represent a general trend prevalent in Latin America. High land concentration is a common feature of Latin American countries (Barracclough, 1973; Feder, 1971; Stavenhagen, 1970; U.N., 1976).

It is, therefore, evident that like the South Asian countries, their counterparts in Latin America are also characterized by quite high degree of land concentration. Although the Gini index of land concentration shows some sign of decline over time, it is still significant (table 3:15), despite apparent land redistribution and agrarian reform efforts.

TABLE 3:15

COLOMBIA AND MEXICO: GINI INDEX OF LAND CONCENTRATION

<u>Country</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Gini index</u>
Colombia	1960	0.864
	1969	0.818
Mexico	1930	0.959
	1960	0.694

Source: Tai, 1974: 310.

It is evident that land concentration was much more extensive in the Latin American countries than in the South Asian countries under study. However, as the Gini index measures indicate (tables 3:9 and 3:15), it was significant in both groups of countries.

(iii) Asymmetric tenancy arrangements

(a) Landlessness

Concentration of landholding, however, is not necessarily a 'negative factor' (or dysfunctional) to socioeconomic development. The implications of concentration of land per se may vary from society to society depending on so many other variables, e.g., the level of development of the forces of production and the pattern of production relationships under which the land is tilled. It may have a negative effect on socioeconomic development when land concentration is associated with such factors as significant unemployment in the rural sector, highly skewed income distribution, unequal access of different groups to various infrastructural institutions (e.g., institutional credit) and technology (e.g., irrigation facilities, fertilizers, high yielding varieties of seeds, etc.), concentration of political power, unequal access of various groups to education and the like. An attempt, therefore, will be made to analyze how far the land tenure systems in developing

countries, along with concentration of landholding, are also characterized by these factors.⁷

The prevalence of a substantial percentage of landless or almost landless (sub-family farmers or minifundistas) peasants and agriproletariat seem to constitute a common feature of the land tenure system in developing countries. As table 3:16 demonstrates, one-half of Colombia's farms (over 600,000) had less than three hectares of land each to cultivate in 1960. "In addition to the 600,000 families with exploitation of less than three hectares, there (were) approximately 500,000 other rural families who (had) no land to exploit for themselves" (Havens and Flinn, 1970: 137). In Mexico, the volume of landless laborers registered an increase in absolute numbers during the period 1930-1960, although as a percentage of the total agricultural labor force, their weight declined from 68 in 1930 to 54 in 1960 (table 3:17). However,

if the figures for only 1950 and 1960 are considered, the number of landless agricultural laborers increased by 60 per cent, from 2 million to more than 3.3 million. This means that by 1960 the landless agricultural population was more numerous than in 1930, and also than in 1910, and now makes up more than half of the total labor force in agriculture (Stavenhagen, 1970: 245).⁸

TABLE 3:16

COLOMBIA: DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY SIZE, 1959-60

<u>Size of farm (hectares)</u>	<u>FARM</u>		<u>AREA IN FARM</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>000 hectares</u>	<u>%</u>
Less than 3.0	606,423	50.2	678	2.5
3.0-9.9	319,327	26.4	1,726	6.3
10.0- 49.9	201,020	16.6	4,211	15.4
50.0-99.9	39,990	3.3	2,680	9.8
100.0-499.9	36,010	3.0	6,990	25.6
500.0-999.9	4,141	0.3	2,731	10.0
1000.0+	2,761	0.2	8,322	30.4

Source: Havens and Flinn, 1970: 136.

In India, the percentage of agriproletariat and sub-family landholders vary from state to state. It was concluded by a national survey in 1963-64 that about 25 percent of the rural households (table 3:18) were agricultural labor households. About 60 percent of these labor households had no land and

they depended entirely on the personal labour of their members. They had no other means of livelihood. The remaining 40 percent cultivated small holdings of land; nevertheless, their main dependence was on wage employment. Nearly three-fourths of the labour households worked as casual labourers, that is, they worked if and when work was available. Otherwise they were unemployed. The

TABLE 3:17

MEXICO: THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE, 1930-1960

	1930		1940		1950		1960	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Agricultural Labor Force	3,626	100	3,831	100	4,800	100	6,144	100
Increase			5.6%		20.6%			
Landless Laborers	2,479	68	1,892	49	2,055	43	3,300	54
Increase			-23.7%		8.6%		60%	
Ejidatarios	537	15	1,223	32	1,380	29	1,500	25
			128%		13%		8.7%	
Private Farmers	610	17	716	17	1,365	28	1,300	21
			17%		91%		-4.7%	

Source: Stavenhagen, 1970: 244.

TABLE 3:18

INDIA: STATE-WISE RURAL LABOR HOUSEHOLDS* AS PERCENTAGE
OF ALL RURAL HOUSEHOLDS, 1963-64

<u>State</u>	<u>% of rural labor households</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>With land</u>	<u>Without land</u>	
Andhra Pradesh	10.05	24.69	34.74
Assam	6.74	9.18	15.92
Bihar	15.94	16.94	32.88
Gujarat	2.46	17.33	19.79
Jammu/Kashmir	1.25	1.25	2.50
Kerala	24.83	11.87	36.70
Madhya Pradesh	10.76	11.84	22.60
Maharashtra	8.67	21.33	30.00
Mysore	7.43	16.13	23.56
Orissa	12.60	17.15	29.75
Punjab	2.38	13.45	15.83
Rajasthan	5.38	6.40	11.76
Tamil Nadu	10.33	25.98	36.31
Uttar Pradesh	7.70	7.50	15.20
Union Territories	3.20	4.35	7.55
West Bengal	12.87	20.95	33.82
ALL INDIA	9.99	15.54	25.53

*Rural labor households mean those households that own little or no land and therefore depend on their labor to earn 50 percent or more of their income. Those with land, therefore, are households of sub-family sized farms.

Source: Sidhu, 1976: 145-46.

remaining one-fourth were attached labourers, that is, they worked for a single employer under some kind of contract covering at least a period of one year (Sidhu, 1976: 144-45).

Landless agricultural laborers have always constituted a substantial percentage of the total agricultural labor force in Bangladesh. In 1951 they represented slightly more than 14 percent of the total labor force on farm. In 1961, they composed 17.5 percent, an increase of over 3% in 10 years (table 3:19). Within another fifteen years, in 1977, the landless agricultural labor force constituted almost 27 percent of the total farm labor. Table 3:19 clearly shows that,

landlessness has been increasing - in absolute number, as a proportion of the farm labour force and as a proportion of rural households. The increase has been particularly rapid in the last decade. Since the increase in landlessness has been greater than the increase in the agricultural population, the trend cannot be explained by demographic factors; the distribution (of land) has been changing sharply in an unfavourable direction (Khan, 1979: 416).

In Pakistan,

more than 58 per cent of all farms ... are below subsistence level. The total number of rural households below the subsistence line might be greater, not only because many farms are

jointly cultivated by more than one household, but also because we must include in that category landless labourers who constituted about 11 per cent of the civilian labour force in agriculture in 1961 (Alavi, in Stevens, et.al., 1976: 336).

TABLE 3:19

BANGLADESH: LANDLESSNESS IN THE RURAL SECTOR:

1951-1977

<u>Year</u>	<u>Landless laborers as a percentage of total farming labor force</u>	<u>Number of land- less agricultur- al laborers in millions</u>	<u>Percentage of rural house- holds complete- ly landless</u>
1951	14.3	1.51	-
1961	17.5	2.47	-
1963-64	17.8	2.71	-
1964-65	17.5	2.75	-
1966	-	-	6.97
1967-68	19.8	3.40	-
1977	26.1	4.54	11.07

Source: Khan, 1979: 417.

Unequal distribution of land resulting in the concentration of landholding in relatively few hands and the existence of a substantial segment of landless agricultural labor constitute two of the most fundamental characteristics of the land tenure systems in the

developing countries in general, and in the countries under study in particular. Such concentration, in most cases, has resulted in the emergence of a large percentage of sub-family size farms which can hardly provide even a subsistence level income for the households. Highly skewed income distribution and duality of the rural sector are often associated with such maldistribution of land.⁹ In Latin America, for example,

(t)he estimated 12.6 million poor rural families represented in 1960 about 73 per cent of the total of 17.2 million farm families. The net annual increase in the number of farm families is estimated at about 271,000 families. By 1970, therefore, the number of poor farm families must have risen from about 12.6 million to around 15.0 million ... In other words, out of a total rural population of 114 million in 1970, about 86 million will be living at subsistence levels. In 1980, there will be 18 million poor rural families (Feder, 1971: 4).

(b) Unequal distribution of income

Such concentration of landholding is reflected in the unequal distribution of income in all of Latin America. In rural Colombia, for example,

the concentration of income at the top is worse... where the top 1.5 per cent of the labor force is shown to have 27 per cent of the income (T)he bottom 30 per cent of the rural labor force earns about 8.5 per cent of all rural income... If the unpaid family workers had been included,

the rural (income) distribution
would have been more unequal
(Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 31).

Table 3:20 presents a picture of the income distribution in the rural sector of Colombia in 1964. It is evident that the lowest decile received a mere 1.4 percent of the total income, while 51 percent of the income went to the top decile of the rural population. While the lowest three deciles together received only 8 percent of the total income, the top two deciles received 64 percent of the total income.

TABLE 3:20

COLOMBIA: AVERAGE INCOME BY DECILES OF THE EMPLOYED

LABOR FORCE IN THE RURAL SECTOR, 1964

Agricultural and non-agricultural rural employed
labor force

<u>Decile</u>	<u>% of total income</u>	<u>Average income per employed person per year (pesos)</u>
1	1.40	380
2	3.10	1,940
3	3.60	2,260
4	3.90	2,450
5	4.50	2,620
6	5.50	3,450
7	6.00	3,760
8	8.00	5,020
9	13.00	8,160
10	51.00	32,000

Source: Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 34.

Distributional inequality becomes much more pronounced when income generated in agriculture alone is considered (table 3:21). The table shows that almost 30 percent of the total agricultural income is enjoyed by the top 1.7 percent of the population earning more than twenty-thousand pesos annually. At the other extreme, more than 38 percent of the population earn less than 1500 pesos per year and only slightly more than 11 percent of the income generated by agriculture is accrued to them.

Mexico also demonstrates a highly skewed distribution of income.

Between 1950 and 1957 there was a significant drop in the proportion of aggregate personal income received by the poorer 50 per cent of the Mexican families. Their share dropped from 19.1 per cent of the total in 1950 to 15.6 per cent in 1957, and remained practically unchanged in 1963
(Hansen, 1971: 74).

However, as table 3:22 shows, the percentage of income accruing to the top 10 percent of the families has also declined over the years, from 49 percent in 1950 to 41.50 percent in 1963, indicating a gain for the higher middle income groups. This argument is corroborated by table 3:23 which presents data on the distribution of personal income by deciles of families in absolute figures. It shows that the average monthly income of

TABLE 3:21

COLOMBIA: PERSONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FROM AGRICULTURE,

Annual income (thousand pesos)	BY INCOME CATEGORIES, 1960			
	% of people in the category	% of income accruing to the category	Cumulated % of people	Cumulated % of income
0 - 1	8.87	1.93	8.87	1.93
1 - 1.5	29.76	9.73	38.72	11.67
1.5-2.0	21.77	9.71	60.50	21.38
2.0-3.0	14.00	8.60	74.50	30.07
3.0-5.0	10.56	10.36	85.05	40.43
5.0-10.0	9.82	17.78	94.87	58.20
10.0-20.0	3.44	12.06	99.31	70.27
20.0-100.0	1.41	14.47	99.72	84.73
100.0-200.0	.21	8.19	99.93	92.92
200.0 and more	.07	7.08	100.00	100.00

Source: Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 54.

TABLE 3:22

MEXICO: PERSONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1950, 1957 and 1963(in percent by deciles of families)

Deciles	Percent of families			Percent of total income		
	1950	1957	1963	1950	1957	1963
I	10.0	10.0	10.0	2.7	1.7	2.0
II	10.0	10.0	10.0	3.4	2.7	2.0
III	10.0	10.0	10.0	3.8	3.1	2.5
IV	10.0	10.0	10.0	4.4	3.8	4.5
V	10.0	10.0	10.0	4.8	4.3	4.5
VI	10.0	10.0	10.0	5.5	5.6	6.0
VII	10.0	10.0	10.0	7.0	7.4	8.0
VIII	10.0	10.0	10.0	8.6	10.0	11.5
IX	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.8	14.7	17.5
X	5.2	5.1	5.0	9.2	10.1	14.5
	2.4	2.6	2.5	7.5	12.6	11.0
	2.4	2.3	2.5	32.3	24.0	16.0

Source: Hansen, 1971: 75.

TABLE 3:23

MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME BY DECILES OF
FAMILIES, 1950, 1957 and 1963

<u>Deciles</u>	<u>% of families</u>	Average monthly income (1957 pesos)		
		<u>1950</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1963</u>
I	10.0	247	192	223
II	10.0	311	304	223
III	10.0	348	350	279
IV	10.0	403	429	502
V	10.0	440	485	502
VI	10.0	504	632	669
VII	10.0	641	835	892
VIII	10.0	788	1,128	1,282
IX	10.0	989	1,658	1,952
X	5.2	1,621	2,233	3,234
	2.4	2,858	5,460	4,907
	2.4	12,329	11,765	7,137

Source: Hansen, 1971: 76.

families in the lowest three deciles declined in absolute terms since 1950, from 302 pesos in that year to 251 pesos in 1963. During the same period, the average income of the top decile families also registered a slight decline, from 5602 pesos per month in 1950 to 5092 pesos in 1963. Significant benefits accrued to the middle income families. Families in the 7th, 8th, and 9th deciles, for example, increased their average monthly income from 806 pesos in 1950 to 1207 pesos in 1957 and to 1375 pesos in 1963.

Highly skewed income distributions, thus, characterize Latin America as a whole. This applies to both the urban and the rural sectors. The Gini index of income concentration for six Latin American countries supports this argument (table 3:24).

Although extensive data is lacking, whatever scanty evidence is available suggests that the selected Asian countries are also characterized by grossly unequal distribution of income. Asbjorn Bergan, in his 1963-64 study on income distribution in Pakistan found that more than one-third of all households lie below the subsistence level.*

* Bergan assumed that a household income of Rs. 100 a month (1963-64) represents the lower limit for subsistence. His study here includes both present-day Pakistan and Bangladesh.

If we raise the limit to Rs. 150 per household per month, almost two-thirds of all the households living in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and one-half of those in West Pakistan (now Pakistan), adding up to almost 60 per cent of the households in the country, lie below the limit. At the top income brackets we find only 0.6 per cent of the households above Rs. 900 a months - 0.4 per cent in East and 0.9 in West Pakistan.

(Bergan, in Griffin and Khan, 1972: 212-13).

As table 3:25 shows, the top 20 percent of the households in Pakistan received 45 percent of the income in 1963-64, while the bottom 20 percent received only 6.5 percent of the total income.

TABLE 3:24

LATIN AMERICA: GINI COEFFICIENTS OF INCOME CONCEN-
TRATION IN SIX SELECTED COUNTRIES

<u>Country</u>	<u>Gini Coefficient</u>	
	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
Argentina	.461	.496
Brazil	.629	.458
Chile	.440	.448
Colombia	.553	.590
Mexico	.512	.462
Venezuela	.427	.440

Source: Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 41.

TABLE 3:25

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PRE-TAXHOUSEHOLD INCOME

<u>Percentage of Households</u>	INDIA		PAKISTAN	
	% of Income ¹		% of Income ²	
	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>	<u>Urban</u>	<u>Rural</u>
0 - 10	1.3	0.7	2.5	2.5
10 - 20	2.7	3.3	4.0	4.0
20 - 30	3.6	4.5	5.5	5.0
30 - 40	4.5	5.6	6.5	6.0
40 - 50	5.4	6.6	7.5	7.0
50 - 60	6.5	7.7	8.0	8.5
60 - 70	8.1	9.5	10.5	9.5
70 - 80	10.3	12.1	13.0	12.5
80 - 90	15.2	16.4	15.0	15.0
90 - 100	42.4	33.6	27.5	30.0

1. India: 1960

2. Pakistan: 1963-64.

Source: Maddison, 1971: 88 and 141.

Figures on income distribution in India are also indicative of a rather high degree of inequality. The Indian Planning Commission set up a committee in 1960 to study the problem. The Committee estimated that the top 20 percent of the households received 57.6 and 50.0 percent of the total income in urban and rural areas

respectively (table 3:25). In contrast, the bottom 20 percent of the households received only 4 percent of the total income.

(c) Underutilization of labor and land

Underutilization of land is another feature that characterizes the economies of these countries, particularly those of Latin America. In Latin America in general, there seems to exist a highly uneven distribution of labor force in relation to the farm size. There seems to be an inverse relationship between the size of the farm and size of the labor force employed. At the same time, as Farley (1972: 179) remarks, "(t)he larger the landholding, the more extensive the method of cultivation and the more wasteful the use of the land..." Barraclough (1973: 179) reached the same conclusion while discussing the land use pattern: "land use intensity and land productivity tend to decline markedly as the size of the farm increases."

The highly uneven distribution of labor is evident from a CIDA study of seven Latin American countries (table 3:26). In these seven countries,

representing approximately two-thirds of all Latin American agriculture, about 10.6 million rural workers... were reported by smaller farms (mini-fundias and family farms) totaling

about 113.5 million hectares of cultivated land... On the other hand, less than 10 million workers were reported by the multi-family farms, controlling about 375 million hectares of farmland and 80 million hectares of cultivated land... It is therefore estimated that of the largest producers each has at his disposal on the average over 400 times more land than a small holder and that each farm worker on the largest farms has on the average 44 times more land than a worker on the smallholdings (Feder, 1971: 30).

Such unequal distribution of labor results, on the one hand, in 'overcrowding' of labor in minifundios and, on the other, underutilization of labor on the latifundios. Taking the land/labor ratio on family farms as the 'model' and assuming similar levels of farm management, technology and quality of soil, Ernest Feder (1971: 31) has calculated that the minifundios contain (in 1960s) a total of 4.2 million (out of a total of 5.3 million) or 79 percent 'excess' labor force. By the same token, the latifundios (medium and large multi-family farms) could 'absorb' substantially more labor and could 'solve' the problem of rural unemployment in most of the Latin American countries (table 3:27).

Land-use pattern also varies in terms of farm size. Underutilization of land is most prevalent in the large

TABLE 3:26

LATIN AMERICA:¹ DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND LABOR ON VARIOUS

FARMS, 1960

Farm Class	Farm land (million hec.)	Cultivated land (m. hec.)	Total labor force (million)	Farmland as a % of total land ^a	Labor force as % of total ^b
Minifundios	11.4	6.3	5.3	2.32	26.1
Family farms	102.1	29.4	5.3	20.87	26.1
Multifamily	118.1	39.5	6.0	24.13	29.6
Large farms	257.9	40.7	3.7	52.68	18.2
TOTAL	489.5	115.9	20.3	100.0	100.00

1. The CIDA study on seven countries includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Columbia, and Peru.

a and b = These percentages are computed.

Source: Feder, 1971: 31.

TABLE 3:27

LATIN AMERICA: MEASURES OF POTENTIAL LABOR ABSORPTION
ON LARGE AND MEDIUM-SIZED MULTIFAMILY FARMS IN FIVE
COUNTRIES (1950 - 1960)

Country/ Farm category	Number of Workers (000)			No. of under- privileged families(000)
	Actual	Potential	Difference	
ARGENTINA				
Medium	212	240	28	467
Large	94	587	493	
BRAZIL				
Medium	5,222	18,792	13,570	
Large	2,679	32,907	30,228	4,525
CHILE				
Medium	142	294	152	244
Large	256	2,104	1,848	
COLOMBIA				
Medium	189	838	649	
Large	112	1,781	1,669	961
PERU				
Medium	58	113	55	
Large	397	1,572	1,175	960
ALL FIVE				
Medium	5,823	20,277	14,454	7,157
Large	3,538	38,951	35,413	

Source: Feder, 1971: 94.

multifamily farms. It is evident from table 3:28 that in Latin America in general, more land is placed under cultivation in subfamily farms than in multifamily farms. In Colombia, for example, among the subfamily farms more than 69 percent of the land is cultivated, while in multifamily large farms only 6.3 percent of land is put to use. Corresponding figures for Brazil are 82.2 and 22 percent and for Chile 51.3 and 7.8 percent. Moreover, small farms seem to be more productive compared to large farms inspite of more easy access to credit and technology by the latter (table 3:29).

(T)he contribution made by small farmers to the countries' total agricultural output is generally beyond the resources to which they have access. In five countries for which data are available, the minifundios controlled between .2 and 17 percent of the farmland, but contributed between 3 and 30 percent of the total agricultural product. In contrast, the latifundios controlled between 37 and 81 percent of the land and their contribution varied between 15 and 57 percent
(Feder, 1971: 100).

Underutilization of land, generally speaking, is a feature of large landholdings in Latin America.

TABLE 3:28

LATIN AMERICA: LAND USE BY SIZE GROUPS IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES

<u>Countries/ Size category</u>	<u>Cultivated land (000 hectares)</u>	<u>%</u>
BRAZIL, 1950		
I	1,001	82.2
II	8,287	59.8
III	28,705	36.4
IV	30,387	22.0
COLOMBIA, 1960		
I	941	69.4
II	2,237	36.6
III	1,028	16.1
IV	849	6.3
GUATEMALA, 1950		
I	444	83.3
II	240	48.0
III	424	36.3
IV	367	24.2
ECUADOR, 1960		
I	740	74.1
II	516	45.3
III	395	34.2
IV	430	15.9

Size category: I = Sub-family; II = Family farm;
III = Multifamily medium;
IV = Multifamily large.

Source: Barraclough, 1973: 339-340.

TABLE 3:29
LATIN AMERICA: FARM SIZE AND AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTIVITY IN FIVE COUNTRIES

<u>Country/Farm Class</u>	<u>% of land</u>	<u>Percentage of agricultural out- put supplied</u>
ARGENTINA		
I	3	12
II	45	47
III	15	26
IV	37	15
BRAZIL		
I	a	3
II	6	18
III	34	43
IV	60	36
CHILE		
I	b	4
II	7	16
III	11	23
IV	81	57
ECUADOR		
I	17	26
II	19	33
III	19	22
IV	45	19
GUATEMALA		
I	14	30
II	13	13
III	32	36
IV	41	21

Size category: I = Minifundios; II = Family farms; III = Multifamily farms; IV = Large farms.

a = .5 percent; b = .2 percent.

Source: Feder, 1971: 102.

(d) Factor market imperfection

Perhaps one of the most significant features of the agricultural sector of almost all of the developing countries is gross factor market imperfection manifested, most critically, in the unequal access of different groups to the factors of production. Some groups have easier access to the factors of production than others; or, some groups pay less for some factors of production than others. In this regard, the discussion will be limited to three factors of production - land, capital, and technology. The objective is to analyze whether the costs of the factors vary from one group to another or whether some groups have preferential or monopoly access to any of these factors of production.

A high degree of factor market imperfection may be explained in terms of a multitude of variables - scarcity of resources, relative immobility of resources, poor means of communication and lack of information by competing groups/individuals and so on. However, probably,

the two most important explanations... are government policies, which are systematically biased in favour of certain groups, and the monopoly power possessed by the relatively wealthy and prosperous members of the farming community. These two phenomena tend to re-enforce each other. Wealth, particularly landed wealth is often accompanied by political

influence, and this in turn may be strengthened by the inherited status that accompanies ... the landed gentry. In other words, status, political influence and economic power are often joint attributes of an individual or family, and these can be used to ensure privileged access to the scarce means of production (Griffin, 1974: 17-18).

In analyzing the degree of concentration of land-holding, the unequal nature of land distribution (and, therefore, unequal access to land) has been emphasized. What about land rent? Does land rent vary from one group to another on the basis of certain 'non-economic' factors? There is little data to probe the issue intensively; although it is generally recognized that land rent as such is high in developing countries in general (Griffin, 1974). According to the classical theory of economics, rent is determined by the marginal productivity of land. Since the marginal productivity of land is greatly determined by the quality of the soil, there is a positive relationship between rent and quality of land. However, especially in the context of developing countries, two other factors are also important - population pressure and non-monetary (or symbolic) value of land ownership (Clark and Haswell, 1964). Population pressure on agricultural land makes labor relatively abundant and depresses its value in relation to other

factors of production. Consequently, rent tends to be high. At the same time, when land ownership is valued as a symbol of social status or prestige and a source of power, rental rate tends to be high. Clark and Haswell (1964: 95-110) cited data from such diverse sources as India, China, Egypt, Japan, Belgium, England and Denmark to support these arguments.

In developing countries, the twin factors of population pressure and sociocultural value of land ownership seem to have contributed significantly to an excessively high rate of land rent. However, land rent is excessively high particularly for landless agricultural workers or small farmers for whom getting land on rent is a question of survival. Writing on India, a contemporary scholar observed:

when one of these two factors of production, land or labour, is persistently in very short supply while the other is relatively abundantly available, the return to the abundantly available factor can be very much depressed. For instance, in the case of countries like India where demand for land is very acute and alternative employment opportunities for labourers are almost nonexistent, the owners of land who decide to rent their land to the landless or very small holders can demand and get rent which will include all farm profits and value of farming labour above the (low) subsistence level. (Sidhu, 1976: 168-69).

Highly asymmetric tenancy arrangement in which 50 per-cent or more of the produce is paid as rent, is quite common in most of the developing countries.

It seems that market imperfection is more pronounced in developing countries in the cases of credit and technology. Landlords and peasants not only have unequal access to capital and technology, they also derive unequal benefits from these factors. Access to technology¹⁰ (and other inputs) is dependent, to a great extent, upon the availability of capital and access to credit. On both counts, the small farmers face a distinct disadvantage compared to big farmers or landlords. Imperfection in the rural capital market seems to be universal irrespective of the degree of population pressure on land or of the degree of land concentration. In the first place, big landholders have more capital at their disposal; however, the more important aspect is that they have far more easy access to institutionalized capital market, both private (banks) and public (government credit). Commercial banks find it less risky to lend money to more resourceful big landholders; often public agencies form policies in such a way as to discourage or effectively debar small holders (not to speak of landless peasants) from access to institutionalized credit. Sometimes big landholders are offered

preferential interest rates and sometimes through wealth, power and prestige they can exert effective pressure on the political apparatus to make state policies concerning credit (and other aspects related to agriculture) favorable to their interests. All these quite often force the small peasant to seek credit on the informal market (most notable constituents of such informal credit market being the moneylender and the landlord often wrapped into one) where the interest rate is high and prohibitive. In other words, if capital is considered a scarce resource in developing countries, the big and small landowners have unequal access to that scarce resource which effectively distorts the development potential of the small peasants.

Thus the capital market is fragmented. The big landlords tend to pay less than the social opportunity cost of capital, while small peasants often pay substantially more. In symbols

$$i_s > i < i_b$$

where i is the social cost of capital and i_s and i_b are the price of capital to small and large cultivators respectively (Griffin, 1974: 27).

It is extremely difficult to say anything definitively regarding the behavior of the informal capital market because of lack of reliable data. The rate of interest paid by farmers borrowing capital on the informal market

is often difficult to substantiate. However, institutional credit carries a lower rate of interest, and is often subsidized by the state. Such institutional credit is also cheaper and more accessible to the bigger farmers. A recent survey in the selected areas of Bangladesh, for example, indicated that small farmers with a less than average size of holding received well under half of the institutional credit, although they collectively covered about two-thirds of the total holdings. On the other hand their share of the non-institutional credit amounted to a little over one-half. Naturally, the terms of credit were harder for the non-institutional than for the institutional credit. Moreover, loans are often granted on the security of land which obviously place the tenants or share-croppers at a disadvantage and force them to seek capital from the non-institutional source at a very high cost.

Frequently, there were examples of cooperatives in which the bigger farmers and the members of the managing committee obtained the bulk of the loans. In the case of the Agricultural Bank, about 70% of the loans were provided to farmers with more than 3 acres, about 30% of the loans went to those with 12.5 acres and more
(Islam, 1977: 205).

This means that practically no credit from the institutional sector went to the small farmers. In Bangladesh, it may be recalled, more than 60% of the farmers own

landholdings of 2.5 acres or less. Similarly, in Pakistan, the Agricultural Development Bank offers tubewell loans only to those who own a minimum of 12.5 to 25 acres which effectively excludes more than 80 percent of the farmers (Griffin, 1974: 27). In Colombia,

(t)he establishment by the monetary authorities of interest rate ceilings on loans made by banks and controlled financial intermediaries has ... had the effect of concentrating credit in the hands of large enterprises and large proprietors. Artisans, small industry, and small agricultural producers have had almost no access to institutionalized credit facilities

(Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 208).

Table 3:30 shows that Colombian institutional credit is concentrated overwhelmingly among the rich, particularly those having an asset of 500,000 pesos or more (who constitute less than 1 percent of the farm families).

Unequal access to credit characterize the Indian rural sector also. Since independence in 1947, the government of India has taken numerous steps to expand and improve rural credit. However, as Maddison observed, bulk of this credit,

goes to people with a clear title to land as they are the only ones who can offer security for loans. It has undoubtedly helped to increase investment and output, but insecure tenants, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers have received no benefit from these schemes. They have to rely on the traditional moneylenders whose terms are more expensive...

(Maddison, 1971: 107-8).

TABLE 3:30

COLOMBIA: CLASSIFICATION BY GROSS ASSETS OF THE USERS OF CREDIT,

November, 1970. (% of credit in pesos received by farms and individuals in each asset group)

All asset Groups		To 10,000	10,001 to 20,000	20,001 to 50,000	50,001 to 100,000	100,001 to 300,000	300,001 to 500,000	500,001 and above
Commercial Banks	100	2.3	0.9	2.2	3.0	8.2	7.9	75.5
Development Bank	100	0.6	2.3	3.1	2.8	7.8	7.6	75.8
Agricultural Credit Bank	100	4.2	4.0	9.7	11.2	14.7	6.1	50.1
Mortgage Bank	100	1.0	2.1	8.5	14.2	30.2	15.6	28.4
Banking System	100	2.1	1.8	4.2	5.3	11.3	8.3	67.0

Source: Berry and Urrutia, 1976: 210.

Apart from the interest, the cost of borrowing capital depends also on another factor, the amount of time required to process a loan application. In this respect also the small farmers seem to suffer from a distinct disadvantage. In case of institutional credit, the applicant has to deal with the bureaucracy and the time required to process a loan depends, to a significant degree, on one's personal acquaintance or kin relationship with the officials concerned.¹¹ The big landholders enjoy an obvious edge in this respect over the poor small farmers. A recent study in India observed:

(G)reat variations in the time taken for receiving loans (30 to 165 days) were noticed.... Personal acquaintance of the farmers with bank officials gained considerable weight over the objectivity, rationality and necessity of the loan concerned in certain cases. At some places bank officials did not go far beyond the personal acquaintance in regard to advancing loans...
(Singh and Sandhu, in Griffin, 1974: 30).

Unequal access to land and capital has also been reflected in the area of access to technology. In recent years, the introduction of high yielding varieties of seeds (HYV) has been termed the most significant technological breakthrough for the Third World agriculture. Since 1960, the HYV of wheat and rice cultivation has expanded significantly in certain developing countries, notably Mexico, India, Philippines, Malaysia, Nepal and

Pakistan (FAO, 1975). As a consequence, agricultural production also registered marked increase. In India and Pakistan, the growth rates of wheat production increased from 4.8 and 9.7 percent respectively in 1963/65 to 10.2 and 18.6 percent in 1969/70. In the Philippines, the growth rate of rice production increased dramatically, from 2.9 percent to 8.4 percent during the same period (Cleaver, Jr., 1972: 87). Perhaps the most striking development took place in Mexico where land reform and new technology worked together to quadruple wheat production from 512,000 metric tons in 1952 to 2,100,000 tons in 1967 - in just fifteen years (Cleaver, Jr., 1972: 104). Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that all categories of producers do not have equal access to such technology and that, as a consequence, it does not benefit them equally (Cleaver, Jr., 1972; Griffin, 1974; U.N., 1976). In most of the developing countries where high yielding varieties of foodgrains are being introduced or actively promoted by the government, technological changes seem to promote (i) uneven regional development within a specific developing country; and (ii) income inequality among different sections of the rural population. Uneven regional development is in part a result of the biological characteristics of the new seeds; they need an abundant and controlled water supply and irrigation facilities and therefore the regions that already

have a well-developed irrigation system or otherwise suitable geographical and climatic conditions are favored over other regions. Hence the regions that most benefited from HYV grains in India and Pakistan are the Punjab (in Pakistan) and Haryana and Punjab (in India). Similarly, in Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand the regions most developed in terms of irrigation facilities reaped the most benefit out of this technological breakthrough termed as the 'Green Revolution'. Moreover, the new varieties are intensive in their use of material inputs, especially fertilizer, and therefore, prohibitive to small farmers who have limited resources and restricted access to credit. Therefore, in sum, "the main advantages of the new technology accrued to the rich farmers or to regions which already had favourable factor endowments" (Radha Sinha, 1976: 32). The Green Revolution in general served the large and medium farmers and thereby worsened the already existing inequality between them and the small farmers (Griffin, 1974; Griffin and Ghose, 1979; Rondinelli, 1979; Khan, 1979; ILO, 1977).

Along with such 'biological-chemical' technology (HYV), the government policies regarding 'mechanical-engineering' technology (mechanization, irrigation facilities) also favored the large farmers since, in most cases, the objective was to boost exportable surplus

irrespective of its social cost. Mechanical-engineering technology is meant for increasing productivity per worker and as such essentially labor displacing. In a situation of favorable land-labor ratio (e.g., the Latin American countries), it may be both economically and socially desirable provided different categories of producers have equal access to such technology. However, examples from Latin America testify to the fact that mechanization characterizes essentially the large farms and benefits the rich at the expense of the poor farmers. Mechanization is capital intensive and such capital-shy small farmers can hardly afford mechanization. In a situation of high land-man ratio (e.g., the South Asian countries), the application of mechanical-engineering technology may be both economically and socially unjustifiable. In such cases mechanization is economically irrational since it replaces an abundant resource (labor) with a scarce one (capital). It is socially unjustifiable because it displaces labor thereby creating or aggravating unemployment and further dampens the value (wage) of labor. Yet in countries like India, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Bangladesh, governments subsidize mechanization (primarily tractorization) through liberal import policies, tax incentives or subsidizing fuel. Such mechanization is biased against the small farmers. Access to capital determines access

to mechanical-engineering technology also. The negative impact of 'biological-chemical' and 'mechanical-engineering' technology on income distribution has been well documented by numerous Latin American and Asian studies (Berry and Urrutia, 1976; Radha Sinha, 1976; Griffin, 1974; Griffin and Ghose, 1979; Farmer, 1977).

It is evident from the above discussion that the rural sector in developing countries is characterized by (a) land concentration as well as (b) high income inequality, underutilization of land, high unemployment, and unequal access of different groups to production factors such as, capital and technology implying highly asymmetric tenancy arrangement. Unequal distribution of land signifies inequality of wealth, and differential access to factors of production implies inequality of power. Such inequality in wealth (chiefly land), income and power is often cumulative and self-perpetuating. Redistribution of wealth is expected to break this self-perpetuating cycle of inequality and land reform is considered to be one of the most effective ways of ensuring such redistribution of wealth.

In short, the above discussion testifies to the fact that the objective material conditions for land reform (land concentration and asymmetric tenancy

arrangements) exist in the agrarian sector of the developing countries under study.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. A cultural element is implied here. Basic needs are not only biologically but also culturally determined. So it varies from culture to culture.


2. Market imperfection refers to a situation in which the exchange rate of goods and services are not solely determined by the 'laws of economics' (demand and supply); but is also influenced by other non-economic factors. For example, if the value of labor is determined purely on the basis of demand and supply, it is a perfect labor market. If, however, labor value is influenced by other factors also (e.g., the status of the parties involved, ethnicity of the labor employed, etc.), it is an imperfect labor market. Imperfection in respect to one factor (e.g., labor) does not necessarily mean imperfection in other factors (e.g., capital).

3. For this part of the discussion, I am greatly indebted to Griffin (1974). The schematic presentations are also largely adapted from Keith Griffin (1974: 24-25).

4. Unequal distribution of land and asymmetric tenancy arrangements are interrelated, one reinforcing the other. Concentration of land manifests itself in asymmetric tenancy arrangements and asymmetry, in turn, leads to further concentration and/or consolidation of already existing pattern of concentration of land. It is the control over land, a scarce resource (in the context of most developing countries), that gives the landlords power to decide, almost unilaterally, the terms of tenants' access to land and its produce. The degree of power of deciding the terms of tenancy increases with the degree of concentration of landholding. In this sense, land concentration and asymmetry of tenancy arrangements are positively correlated.

5. There have been many attempts to construct ideal summary concentration indexes (of income, wealth, land, market share, etc.). These attempts have attained considerable success, although each of them contains its own biases and weaknesses. The two most common such summary concentration indexes are the Gini Coefficient and the Herfindahl Index. The Gini coefficient was originally developed in 1913-14 by C. Gini. It is a statistical measure based upon the Lorenz Curve. The following figure illustrates a Lorenz Curve for a

hypothetical land distribution. Note that the Lorenz Curve, which is bowed outward toward the southeast when any inequality in land distribution exists, relates the percent of total land value to the percent of rural households or farms, cumulated from the smallest to the largest. The diagonal line OC indicates what the Lorenz Curve would look like if land was distributed with precise equality among all the farms. It should be noted that the Lorenz Curve measures relative concentration rather than the absolute measure provided by a concentration ratio.



The Gini Coefficient for land distribution in this hypothetical situation may be conceptualized as the area labeled A divided by the area labeled B. The Gini Coefficient assumes a value of zero when the value of land is distributed equally among all households and approaches an infinitely large positive number as the value of land becomes more and more unequally distributed among them. For further clarification on Gini Index see: Atkinson, A.B., "On the measurement of inequality". Journal of Economic Theory: 2, 1970; Dalton, H., "The measurement of inequality in incomes", Economic Journal: 30, 1920; Dasgupta, P., A. Sen and D. Starrett, "Notes on the measurement of inequality", Journal of Economic Theory: 6, 1973; and Weymark, J., "Generalized Gini Indices of inequality", Discussion Paper No. 78-20, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, December, 1978.

6. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this study the designation Pakistan refers to what was West Pakistan from 1947-1971. Similarly, to honor present political reality, what was East Pakistan during 1947-1971, is referred to here as Bangladesh.

7. No cause and effect relationship between concentration of land and these factors is contemplated. Since they characterize the land tenure system in most developing countries, a strong association between land concentration and asymmetric tenancy arrangements and other related factors, is emphasized. Without extensive (and intensive) empirical study, the degree of such association cannot be concretely ascertained.

8. Other Latin American economies were also characterized by significant landlessness and rural unemployment. In pre-revolution Cuba, for example, of the total labor force of 1,521,000 in 1945, only 56% (856,000) were classified as employed, 321,000 (21%) as unemployed and as much as 23% (344,000) as 'unknown'. Of the total labor force, more than 54% (829,668) were in the agricultural sector, where more than 50 percent were only temporary workers. "The average duration of employment for the temporary workers in 1945 was 4.1 months (123 days) in the case of the 423,690 paid workers, and 4.5 months in the case of the 20,561 unpaid workers (proprietors, members of family). Speaking now only of the former - the 423,690 paid, temporary workers, constituting about one-half of the gainfully occupied in agriculture and about one-fourth of the total occupied population of Cuba - ... (all of them) worked for one month, but only 52% for four months, and only 6% for as much as nine months" (IBRD, 1951: 49-50).

9. Duality here refers to the polarization of the rural sector in terms of income distribution, land ownership and access to capital and technology.

10. Technology is used here as a generic term to refer to High Yielding Varieties (HYV) of seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation facilities and farming machines (chiefly tractor). Technology is divided into two categories: biological-chemical technology (HYV; fertilizer) and mechanical-engineering technology (tractor, irrigation).

11. Governments in developing countries are becoming more and more involved in agricultural and rural development efforts. One of the areas in which governments are assuming greater roles is the regulation and supply of inputs - credit, fertilizers and farming machines

(particularly tractors and tube-wells). With increasing involvement of the government, the role of the bureaucracy is also becoming more and more critical. Availability of and access to inputs are, therefore, becoming more and more determined not by market forces, but by one's degree and type of access to the bureaucracy.

CHAPTER IV

LAND REFORM IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER IV

LAND REFORM IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A. Character of Land Reform: Core Variables

It is apparent from chapter II that the structural conditions for land reform (i.e., a 'defective' land tenure system featuring concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements) are present in the developing countries under study. In this chapter, the land reform programs undertaken in the countries under study will be compared, in terms of three 'core' factors. It is argued that these 'core' factors may roughly indicate the quality of a land reform program. A strong association between a land reform program's performance (or scores) regarding these 'core' factors and its 'success' or effectiveness is assumed.

As stated earlier, land reform usually has two interrelated and interdependent objectives: agricultural development (the economic dimension), and reduction of socioeconomic inequality in the rural sector (the social

dimension). It is argued that the 'core' factors used here to compare the 'quality' of different land reform programs will indicate, in general terms, a particular land reform program's potentiality in realizing these objectives. The procedure used is as follows.

Each land reform program will be assigned a score on each of these core factors. These scores will be weighed in terms of relevant variables. A general index thus developed for each of these countries on the basis of these factors may facilitate their land reform programs to be compared more objectively. The core factors are:

(i) Percentage of the rural population affected by land reform. This score will be weighed by the percentage of population engaged in agriculture, in order to partial out the effects of variations on this score.

(ii) Percentage of total agricultural land affected by land reform. The weighing factor, in this case, is the Gini index of land concentration. It is assumed that the degree of land concentration may affect the percentage of agricultural land redistributed or otherwise affected by land reform. These two factors ("i" and "ii") would indicate the extensiveness of the land reform programs as well as effectiveness of their implementation.

(iii) The ratio of land ceiling to the average farm size. This score will be weighed by the average farm size. This may indicate, albeit in a rough way, the degree of commitment of the political elite to the reduction of inequality. A positive relationship between land ceiling and land concentration is assumed.

The analysis will be done in two stages. First, the major land reform programs undertaken by each country will be critically examined. This critical analysis will be primarily in terms of the 'core' factors mentioned above. Secondly, the general indices will be constructed for each of the countries under study.

B. Land Reform in South Asian Countries

(i) India

In India development planning is the task of the Planning Commission, a body of experts under the direct control of the central government. Since independence the central government has repeatedly emphasized the importance of land reform for India's agricultural development. 'Land to the tiller' had long been a slogan of the Indian National Congress, the political party that ruled India for thirty years since 1947. All the Five Year Plans took great pain to pronounce and elaborate

government objectives and actions in the field of land reform.¹ In this sense land reform became an integral part of the greater socio-economic changes that the government envisaged to bring about through planned action. In recognition of the need to change the agrarian structure to ensure economic development, the First Five-Year Plan observed:

Many of the weaknesses of Indian agriculture are inherent in the structure of the rural economy. A comprehensive inquiry into the undivided Punjab showed that about 81 per cent of the holdings were below 10 acres and about 64 per cent below 5.... Similar facts can be cited from other States. The bulk of the agricultural producers live on the margin and are unable to invest in the improvement of the land.... The problems of Indian agriculture are far more fundamental than is commonly appreciated. (Indian Planning Commission, The First Five -Year Plan: A Draft Outline, Delhi, 1951: 94).

Subsequent Plans reiterated the need for structural changes in the rural sector.² The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) went so far as to say that

there are many gaps between objectives and legislation and between the laws and their implementation.... One of the important tasks of the Fourth Plan will be to try and ensure that land reforms become a reality in the village and the field. (Indian Planning Commission, The Fourth Five-Year Plan, Delhi 1969: 174).

However, in India land reform is a State subject over which the State legislatures have supreme authority. As a result, India abounds with land reform laws passed by different State governments at different times with different intentions, to be implemented by different institutions or agencies. And since these States are often diverse in terms of social, economic, political and even cultural characteristics, their land reform laws often have little in common.

Moreover, the Indian States differ in terms of population size and density, irrigation facilities, soil quality, average rain fall and so on. The average size of landholding also varies significantly from one State to another; it is 11.17 acres in the Punjab (1960-61); 13.06 acres in Maharashtra, 11.98 acres in Gujarat, and 13.79 acres in Rajasthan; on the other hand, the average size of landholding is only 3.88 acres in the West Bengal, 4.60 acres in Uttar Pradesh, 3.99 acres in Bihar, and a mere 1.96 acres in Kerala. The States vary not only in terms of population density, but also in terms of rate of population increase, level of overall development, degree of industrialization, rate of literacy, degree of mechanization of agriculture, urbanization, the degree of concentration of landholding and wealth and so on. Each State, therefore, faced

different sorts of problems relating to agriculture and reacted differently. Besides, the land reform policies and programs of the central and State governments were often in conflict having disastrous implications for the whole effort.

Another factor also seems to have contributed to this confusion. It has been asserted that in India the political elite is composed of an urban bourgeoisie bent on industrialization and a group of commercial farmers in the countryside bent on capitalization of agriculture; and that while the urban bourgeoisie (urban capitalists, the upper crust of the professions, and the civil service) is dominant in the central government, the State governments are dominated by the rich commercial farmers or landed interests (Bell, 1974; Byres, 1974).³ The Indian National Congress is traditionally based on a coalition of these two groups having somewhat contradictory interests. The urban bourgeoisie has a prime interest in abundant and cheap supply of food and agricultural raw materials and, therefore, it would support "variants of land reform which would improve the terms on which the marketed surplus is extracted from agriculture" (Bell, 1974: 195). The rich farmers, on the other hand, as "producers in agriculture with a net surplus to sell obviously want high prices

for their outputs (basically, foodgrains and fibres) and low prices for their industrially produced inputs (chemical fertilizers and pesticides, pumping sets and electricity or diesel fuel)" (Bell, 1974: 196). The rich farmers, therefore, would push for variants of land reform that would ensure cheap supply of inputs and high prices for outputs.

This conflict in interests between the urban bourgeoisie (powerful at the centre) and the commercial farmers (powerful at the State level) has resulted in an impasse concerning land reform in India. Moreover, with increasing power, due, among other factors, to the success of the so-called 'Green Revolution' since the 1960s, the landed interests have effectively penetrated the power structure at the centre. Conflicting policy pronouncements and frequent failure of land reform measures in India may be traced, partly at least, to these developments.

Land reform in India seems to have progressed by stages. Since independence, the ruling party (the Indian National Congress) tried to initiate and implement land reform laws first to (i) abolish the zamindari system (intermediaries between the government and the actual cultivators), and then (ii) to control rent and introduce

other tenancy reforms; and finally, (iii) to impose ceilings on landholding. The zamindari abolition had been a slogan for the Congress Party in its struggle for independence and, therefore, abolition attempts began almost immediately after 1947 and continued till 1954-55. Starting in 1953, governments directed their energy primarily to tenancy reforms (rent control, security of tenants, etc.). Since late 1950s, imposition of land ceiling seems to have become the prime concern of the authorities.

The zamindari abolition Acts passed by the State legislatures between 1950 and 1954 initiated major changes in the pattern of landownership in those States where the zamindari system was prevalent on a large scale.⁴ In these States (notably Assam, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) proprietary rights over vast estates changed hands - from a few absentee landlords to State governments. Instead of paying rent to the landlords, the cultivators were now required to pay taxes directly to the state. In spite of the Indian Planning Commission's assertion to the contrary, zamindari abolition can hardly be called an agrarian transformation.⁵ A series of provisions sharply reduced the effectiveness of the Acts. The zamindars were allowed to keep a good portion of their former

estates as personal farm; in most cases, no ceiling was placed on such 'personal farm'. Moreover, the zamindars were conferred full ownership rights on such personal farms, while the tenants, in most cases, received only 'right-to-use' - the State being the new landlord. In some States (e.g. Uttar Pradesh), in order to acquire full ownership rights, tenants were required to pay a sum of money ten times that of their land revenue to the State. Besides, generous monetary compensation paid to the ex-zamindars by the government kept in tact, almost completely, their (zamindars) economic muscle and political power.⁶

Other land reform laws followed a similar pattern.⁷ The principle of imposing a ceiling on landholding, for instance, was also shrouded with confusion and lack of direction from the beginning. The Indian National Congress, as early as in 1949, expressed its strong support for the imposition of a land ceiling. The Report of the Congress Agrarian Reforms Committee (Delhi, 1949: 22) observed:

Very large holdings could be properly worked, managed and supervised by the owner himself only when they are mechanized. We have already pointed out the social evils of mechanised capitalist farmings. As in other sectors of the national economy, namely commerce and industry, so in agriculture, an individual can

have a high level of income only through exploitation.... While recommending a ceiling to individual ownership of land, we feel that the Indian National Congress should immediately appoint committees to consider the question of fixing the maximum limit of income in other sectors of our economic life.

By 1956, the Congress worked out detailed recommendations on this issue and in its Nagpur session in January 1959, at the instance of Prime Minister Nehru, a resolution was passed urging the State governments to enact land ceiling legislations before the end of 1959. However, the experts at the Planning Commission were not so enthusiastic about land ceiling right from the beginning. The First Five-Year Plan, for example, warned against the possible harmful consequences of imposing a ceiling on landholdings (The First Five-Year Plan: A Draft Outline, 1951: 99-100). The Second Five-Year Plan (1956) also expressed doubt that "(i)n view of the existing pattern of distribution and size of agricultural holdings, redistribution of land in excess of a ceiling may yield relatively limited results" (Second Five-Year Plan, 1956: 178). Yet, in the name of the necessity of 'building up a progressive rural economy', it recommended that "(s)teps should be taken in each State to impose ceilings on existing agricultural holdings" (1956: 194). Thus, it is evident that

the programme for ceiling on agricultural holdings never had a clear objective purpose in view. The economic considerations of productivity ran against the suggestions of division of landed properties to satisfy the demands of political pressure based on passionate zeal for social equality. The recommendations of the Planning Commission, therefore, were never very clear and the State governments interpreted them the way it was expedient.
(Sidhu, 1976: 95).

However, land reform was under the jurisdiction of the State governments and hardly any of them passed any ceiling law before 1960/61. The character, content and mode of implementation of ceiling legislations, therefore, varied widely from State to State depending on various factors - e.g., population density, existing average farm size and, most importantly, in terms of the 'varying political strength of the well-to-do farm lobbies'. Different states fixed the ceiling differently, and specified differential exemptions. Some States imposed it on land 'held by an individual', while others to land 'held by a family'. Applicable size of the family also varied from one State to another. In one State (Andhra Pradesh), for example, in the case of families of more than 5 members, "an extent of land equal to $4\frac{1}{2}$ times the family holding for every such member in excess of five, was allowed" (Parthasarathy

and Rao, 1969: 177). Often landed property held by women as Stridhana land (land given to wife as part of a marriage contract) was also exempted from the ceiling. The list of exemptions was big in Bihar too. Along with other exemptions, the landlord in Bihar was granted the right to retain,

in addition to his ceiling area, lands forming part of his "homestead" not exceeding 10 acres in area. He could retain all established structures together with the lands on which they stood, and such other lands as might be considered by the appropriate local authority (in this instance the Collector) necessary for the use and enjoyment of his homestead lands. He could retain any land in consolidated blocks (not exceeding 15 acres in area) used for growing fodder at the time of the Act's commencement, and destined to be used for that purpose in future. Moreover, a landholder with more than four dependents could retain lands in excess of his ceiling area provided that the aggregate of lands held by him would in no case exceed two times his specified ceiling area.

(Jannuzi, in Frykenberg, ed., 1977: 221).

In Andhra Pradesh, even lands in compact blocks on which the landlord has made heavy investments or permanent structural improvements and whose break-up may lead to a fall in production (according to the opinion of the Divisional Revenue Officer) are also exempted. In many States ceiling vary for different types of land or farm.

Ceiling legislation in all States, therefore, abounds with exemptions and other loopholes. Table 4.1 clearly presents the complexity of the situation in different States of India. Ceiling laws are, as a consequence, most often either not forcefully implemented or carefully evaded. As late as in 1973, the Task Force on Agrarian Relations reported that "as a result of the high level of ceilings, large number of exemptions from the law, malafide transfers and partitions, and poor implementation, the results (of land ceilings) have been meagre" (Report of the Task Force on Agrarian Relations, 1973: 4). Indian statistics seem to support such a conclusion. The Fourth Plan (1969-74) reported that

about 964,800 hectares have been so far declared surplus after scrutiny of the statements submitted by substantial holders out of which about 640,000 hectares have been taken possession of by the State governments.... and 464,176 hectares are reported to have been finally distributed.
(The Fourth Five-Year Plan, Delhi, 1969: 179-180).

It is reported in 1973 that ceiling legislations released only about 2.7 million acres of land (declared as surplus), out of which only about 1.3 million acres have actually been redistributed (India: 1973: 214). Moreover, it has been reported that these surplus lands are most

TABLE 4:1

CEILING LEGISLATIONS IN INDIAN STATES

State and Year of Act	Average farm size (1960-61) acres	Ceiling ¹	Family or individual ²	Types of land exempted ³
PUNJAB, 1955	11.17	30-1000	I	1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 25, 26, 28, 31
MAHARASHTRA, 1961	13.06	18-126	F ⁴	11, 23-26, 31
GUJARAT, 1960	11.98	19-132	F	6, 23-26, 28
MADHYA PRADESH, 1960	10.01	25-75	I ⁴	1-4, 8, 23-28
MYSORE, 1961	9.65	27-216	F ⁴	1-4, 7, 9, 10, 13, 17, 28
MADRAS, 1961	3.89	24-120	F ⁴	1-4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 17, 19 24-26, 29-31
WEST BANGAL, 1955	3.88	25	I	2, 4, 9, 10, 24-26
RAJASTHAN, 1960	13.79	22-336	F ⁴	1, 8-12, 26, 28
ANDHRA PRADESH, 1961	6.64	27-324	I ⁴	1-4, 7-10, 25, 26, 28
ASSAM, 1959	4.13	50	F	1, 2, 4, 5, 26, 28

TABLE 4:1 (continued)

State and Year of Act	Average farm size (1960-61) acres	Ceiling ¹	Family or individual ²	Types of land exempted ³
ORISSA, 1960	4.61	25-100	I ⁴	1,2,4,7-9,16,18,22, 26-28
JAMMU-KASHMIR, 1950	3.87	23	I	4,14,15,26
UTTAR PRADESH, 1960	4.60	40-80	I ⁴	2,3,7,9,10,12,20,23 25,32
BIHAR, 1961	3.99	20-60	I ⁴	1,2,21,23,25,30
KERALA, 1960	1.96	15-38	F ⁴	2,3,7,16-k7,25,26,30

1. Most states prescribe different ceiling levels according to quality of land and access or nearness to water/irrigation facilities. Only the lowest and highest ceilings are mentioned here. All the ceilings listed here are for existing holdings. Ceilings on future land acquisitions are the same in most states. Only three states have different ceilings on future acquisitions: Andhra Pradesh (18-216 acres), Mysore (18-144 acres), and Uttar Pradesh (12½ acres).

2. Some State Acts applied to ceilings on family ownership, while others prescribed ceilings to registered individual land holders.

TABLE 4:1 (continued)

3. Extra allowance for large families, most often for families of more than five children. Allowances vary from State to State, but in most States are up to twice the prescribed ceiling acreage.

4. Key to types of land exempted; 1= sugar cane; 2= tea; 3= coffee; 4= orchard; 5= citrus; 6= fruit trees; 7= rubber; 8= cattle raising; 9= dairy farming; 10= livestock; 11= stud farm; 12= groves; 13= pepper; 14= fuel trees; 15= grass; 16= cashew nuts; 17= cardamon; 18= casuarine; 19= chinchona; 20= pharmacological products; 21= lacbrood farms; 22= sisal; 23= specially approved lease farms; 24= commercial/industrial undertakings; 25= religious, charitable, educational or medical institutions' land; 26= cooperative society land; 27= government approved exempted area; 28= 'efficiently managed farms in compact blocks whose breakup might result in fall in production'; 29= hill land; 30= Bhoodan and gramdan land; 31= land awarded for gallantry; 32= miscellaneous/other.

Sources: Kalra: "Employment and Productivity of Agricultural Working Force", Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol I, January-March, 1966; and

Planning Commission of India: Progress of Land Reforms Delhi, Government Press, 1963.

often the worst ones. Ladejinsky, for example, observed:

small as these figures (of surplus) are, they may be treated with caution. The presumption is that they are inflated, that quality of some of that land is so poor as not to be worthy of distribution, that an undetermined acreage of the distributed land could fall into the category of wasteland, and that a portion of that land was vested in the States rather than acquired from owners under the ceiling programmes. Considering all the machinations typical of the so-called enforcement of the ceiling Acts, it is far from clear that the landless have indeed received all of that million acres which made up the 'area distributed'.
(Ladejinsky, 1972: 403).

In short, land reform in India achieved little. Taking India as a whole it can be said that in 1960-61, the average farm size was 3.05 hectares, while the ceiling was 42.5 hectares - almost 14 times the average farm size. Indian data on the percentage of land or rural population benefited or otherwise affected by land reform is scant. It has been estimated that in the whole of India during 1951-1966, 8,450,400 acres of land was acquired for redistribution (or actually redistributed) by various State governments. This comprised only a mere 2.56 percent of the total cropland of India (329,585,000 acres). Number of farm families who acquired land stood at 3,056,000 while the total number of farm families in India was 72,466,000 in 1961-62. In other words, only 4.21 percent of the farm families benefited from land

redistribution (Tai, 1974: 308).

(ii) Bangladesh

Since 1947, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) - an essentially agricultural country⁸ - had three major land reform attempts, none of which seems to have made much impact either on the land ownership pattern or on agricultural production (Stepanek, 1979; Zaman, 1975, 76; Abu Abdullah, 1976). The first was the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950, whose primary objective was to abolish intermediaries (zamindars) between the State and the peasantry. Like India, zamindari abolition was a popular political demand in pre-1947 East Bengal, although unlike India, this demand was not accepted as a slogan by the Muslim League, the political party that fought for Pakistan.⁹ Such a step would be contrary to the ideology of the Muslim League which was dominated almost exclusively by the landed elite. However, once Pakistan was achieved Zamindari abolition, in East Pakistan, became not only an irresistible popular demand but also a politically expedient proposition. At the time of partition, an overwhelming majority of the big zamindars in East Pakistan were Hindus (1,879 out of 2,237) while the peasantry was predominantly Moslem (more than 80 percent). Most of

these Hindu zamindars were forced either to flee to or stay back in Calcutta. The zamindars thereby lost their claim to their estates. Most of these 'abandoned' estates were already seized either by tenants or by other sub-intermediaries who so long acted as local representatives of the mostly absentee landlords.

The 1950 Act abolished the zamindari system and imposed a ceiling of 100 bighas (33.3 acres) on the landlords' cultivated land. All land in excess of the ceiling was to be redistributed by the state. However, only 163,741 acres were taken over by the state which constituted less than 1 percent of the total agricultural land (21,726,000 acres) in 1960; and only a small percentage of this 'surplus' land was actually redistributed (Stepanek, 1979). The average farm size in 1960 was 3.5 acres. The ceiling (33 acres), therefore, was 9.5 times the average farm size.

Apart from officially proclaiming a ceiling on farmland and taking over and redistributing an insignificant amount of 'surplus' land, the 1950 Act did little to change the land tenure system.¹⁰ The mass exodus of the Hindu landlords was a consequence of the partition of India and the following communal disturbances, not that of the 'land reform' Act. Land thus vacated was already

seized mostly by sub-intermediaries. The Act, therefore, simply legalized a fait accompli, and did little in way of restructuring the tenure relationships.

Moreover, the Act did not abolish sharecropping or sub-letting of agricultural land. It defined a cultivating landlord as one who

holds land by cultivating it either by himself or by members of his family or by servants or by bargadars (share-croppers) or by or with the aid of hired labourers or with the aid of partners.

(Qt. in Stepanek, 1979: 95).

Thus, by allowing sharecropping, the Act perpetuated the old zamindari system in a new form. Absentee landlordism continued uninterrupted. Through bargadari, one of the noted Indian authorities on agrarian reform observed,

the legal owners or those having owner-like possession continued to thrive as non-cultivating, rent-receiving landlords without active interest in the productive management of land or in the organization of agriculture. The Act of 1950, therefore, only removed the top layer of big zamindars but did not make a serious dent into the problem of subinfeudation which was the bone of the land system in Bengal since the British period. Thus tenancy signifying discrepancy between ownership and operation of land which earlier existed on a wide scale continues to exist today, even though the precise magnitude of it is not known.

(Joshi, in V.K.V.R. Rao, ed., 1972: 70).

This failure of the 1950 Act both in terms of reducing inequality and increasing agricultural production has been widely emphasized by development theorists (Joshi, 1972; Khan, 1972; Stepanek, 1979). Yet little effort was initiated by the government till 1960. In 1961, the military government headed by Ayub Khan, raised the land ceiling from 33 acres to 125 acres (375 bighas), purportedly to modernize agriculture through mechanization (primarily tractorization) and the introduction of high yielding varieties of rice (HYV). This raising of the land ceiling to 125 acres - 35.71 times the average farm size - contributed to further worsen rural inequality. Although agricultural productivity registered modest increase between 1960 and 1968, the incidence of landlessness, sharecropping and rural poverty increased considerably (Griffin and Khan, 1972; ILO, 1977). Moreover, the full potential of the new 'biological-chemical' technology (HYV) could not be used primarily because of the existing ownership pattern in agriculture. The small farmers could not generate enough internal surplus to purchase and apply the technology and the big farmers, being mostly absentee landowners, was not too enthusiastic in improving the means of production. In the absence of any worthwhile attempt at land reform, the degeneration of the rural economy continued unabated throughout the 1960s (Khan, 1972, 1977; Griffin

and Khan, 1972).

Since independence in December 1971, the economy of Bangladesh declined sharply.

During 1970-71, the gross domestic product fell by 5.5%, and by an additional 14% in 1972. A turn-around of 8.2% in 1972-73, and of a further 11.5% the following year, were caused primarily by good harvests and better utilization of industrial capacity. No change occurred in 1974-75; the growth in 1975-76 was 11% and in 1976-77, 4 to 5%; again because of good harvests. The overall change has, therefore, been about 2% per year, which the 3% population growth rate diminishes to less than nothing. Real per capita income, unchanged in the late 1960s, suffered a decline after independence.
(Stepanek, 1979: 20).

The situation in the rural sector worsened dramatically. While the Master Survey of Agriculture in 1967-68 noted that 20 percent of the farm families were landless, recent studies indicate that almost 50 percent of rural households are landless (Land Occupancy Survey, 1976). In a recent interview, the Minister responsible for land reform put the landless figure at 40 percent of the rural households (Bangladesh Times, Dec. 20, 1978). Most importantly, land concentration and sharecropping have increased substantially. The Land Occupancy Survey estimates that "only 10.5% of the cultivable acreage is tilled exclusively with family labor", the rest of

the land in Bangladesh is farmed by sharecroppers or tenants under varying forms of tenurial arrangements. The Survey also indicates that in contemporary Bangladesh, 10 percent of the farm families control 50 percent of the agricultural land. Inequality in land distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient also increased significantly, from 0.47 in 1960 to 0.57 in 1974 (Griffin and Ghose, 1979: 366).

Nevertheless, the government of Bangladesh did little for rural development or land reform. The new government's first act was to exempt farms of 25 bighas (8.3 acres) or less from land tax. This sharply reduced government's revenue from land - from 86 million rupees in 1968-69 to only 3.5 million takas in 1972-72 (Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh, 1975: 166), making its collection a highly uneconomic proposition (the cost of collection increased from 53.4% of the total land revenue in 1967-68 to more than 297% of the total land revenue in 1972-73). Then, land ceiling was re-fixed at 100 bighas (33.3 acres). This reduction in land ceiling was expected to release more than 76,000 acres of land for redistribution; however, till 1975 only about 33,000 acres were acquired by the government. No attempts were made to arrest the increasing sub-division of farmland (the average farm size declined from 3.5 acres in 1967

to 2.3 acres in 1976), or concentration of landholdings. Thus, the government so far avoided decisions on land reform, although all development plans pronounced rural development and self-sufficiency in food as major objectives.

(iii) Pakistan

After twelve years of independence (in 1947), Pakistan had its first major land reform program in the form of a Martial Law Regulation (MLR 64) decreed by the military regime of Ayub Khan in 1959. The philosophy behind this land reform program was made clear by the Land Reforms Commission:

... in determining the extent of the ceiling, social justice has not been the only criterion before us... the ends of social justice, in the sense of securing land for the entire landless population, thus being almost unattainable, what we thought prudent was to fix the ceiling at a level which will on the one hand eradicate the feudalistic elements from the existing tenure structure, and on the other, by causing the minimum necessary disturbance of the social edifice, lead to a harmonious changeover and at the same time, by providing incentives at all levels, conducive to greater production.

(Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan, Lahore, 1959: 30).

The central aspect of the land reforms Act was to limit individual landownership to 500 acres (for

irrigated land) or 1,000 acres (for non-irrigated land). Orchards, livestock farms and religious, charitable and educational institutions' land were exempted. Furthermore, the MLR granted permission to transfer to heirs 18,000 Produce Index Units of land equivalent.¹¹ In 1960, the average size of farm in Pakistan was 9.8 acres. The ceiling, therefore, was more than 102 times the average farm size (or 51 times if ceiling on irrigated land only is considered). The implementation was slow and sluggish. Out of a total of 5,068,376 only 5,064 landowners declared excess land. Government acquired only 2.35 million acres of land for redistribution which comprised only 4.6 percent of the total agricultural land (48,642,530 acres). More than 42 percent of the acquired land (9,379,360 acres) was either uncultivable or otherwise waste (forest, hill, etc.). Therefore, out of the total acquired land of 2.35 million acres, government actually redistributed only 855,000 acres; 755,000 acres to 196,000 already existing tenants (3.85 acres per tenant on average) and 100,000 acres to 4,000 small cultivators (25 acres per cultivator on average). Thus a total of 200,000 families were benefited - a mere 8 percent of the estimated 2.5 million subsistence rural households (ILO, 1979: 51).

The 1959 land reforms did little to improve the agrarian situation in Pakistan, although the 'Green Revolution' made impressive gain. Acreage under HYV increased steadily and by 1969-70 more than 45 percent of the total acreage (7,000,000 out of 15,361,000 acres) was under HYV. Wheat production also increased substantially; the growth rate of wheat production increased from 9.7 percent in 1963-65 to 18.6 percent by 1968-70. However, land concentration and income inequality also increased during the period. High profits from increased production not only pushed up the land price, but also encouraged the big landowners to acquire more land and to convert their tenants into wage laborers. Moreover, the introduction of modern technology (primarily tractors and tubewells) which was heavily subsidized by the government, reduced the need for labor pushing agricultural workers out of land. A study conducted in 1969 reported that "interviewing farmers in the Punjab (the agriculturally most developed region in Pakistan) who have mechanised, we received a remarkably consistent response that the labour force per acre had been reduced about 50 per cent from the pre-mechanisation period" (Bose and Clark, 1969). The big-farmer bias of such mechanisation may lead to greater concentration of wealth and increasing landlessness. Several studies warned that this process may culminate in a dualistic pattern within

the rural sector in which increases in productivity, output and income 'will be concentrated to a large extent in a subsector of large-scale, capital-intensive farm enterprises', instead being more equitably shared by the great majority of the cultivators (Hamza Alavi, 1973; ILO, 1977). In the context of Pakistan, the Green Revolution also contributed to regional imbalance and income inequality. Since it is heavily dependent upon adequate and controlled water supply, the Green Revolution made its biggest impact on the economy of Punjab, where the irrigation system is highly developed. Other regions could not equally benefit from the Green Revolution. In terms of agricultural growth, wealth and income, a disparity, therefore, emerged between the Punjab and the other regions. The breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 may be traced back to such disparity in regional economic growth, particularly in agriculture (Stevens, et.al., 1976; Cleaver, Jr., 1972; Griffin, 1974).

Amidst growing rural unrest, another land reform attempt was undertaken in 1972, this time by a civilian government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It reduced the land ceiling to 300 acres (for unirrigated land) or 150 acres (for irrigated land), or a land area equivalent to 15,000 PIUs, whichever is greater. Exemption previously given

for orchards, stud and livestock farms were discontinued. However, a landowner having a tractor or tubewell as of December 20, 1971, was allowed an additional land area equivalent to 3,000 PIUs. Subsequently, the ceiling was reduced to 12,000 PIUs, and the tubewell and tractor exemption to 2,000 PIUs. The most radical aspects of the 1972 land reform were that it allowed no compensation to affected landlords and redistribution in subsistence size plots of around 5 hectares was to be free. The effects (or even the degree of implementation) of this land reform are not yet clear. According to Herring and Chaudhry (1974), nearly 2.8 million acres should be available for redistribution. However, by 31 October, 1974 only 879,000 acres were resumed by the government (ILO, 1977). Eventually the number of expropriated landlords may come down to only 600 and probably less than 5 percent of the tenantry may benefit from such redistribution (Esposito, 1974). The overthrow and subsequent killing of Bhutto may totally halt the implementation of these land reform measures.

It is evident that land reforms in Pakistan have had little positive impact on the rural sector. S.M. Naseem, in his ILO study concluded:

the preceding discussion of land reform measures indicates that a total of only 250,000 farm families, or only 5 per cent

of the farm families in 1960, were favourably affected by the two land reforms through direct redistribution of land. Whether those families continued to retain the land and whether the land was always sufficient to pull them above the subsistence level cannot be determined... In any event, neither of the two land reform measures helped to improve the lot of the landless labourers directly. Moreover, to the extent that the land reforms, or fear of further reforms, induced absentee landlords to cultivate their land themselves, they may have led to a displacement of tenants.
(ILO, 1977: 51-2).

C. Land Reform in the Latin American Countries

(i) Colombia

Being the first in Latin America after the Cuban revolution and the emergence of the Alliance for Progress, the Colombian land reform law of 1961 aroused much interest among social scientists and Latin American scholars. It was often hailed as a case of truly democratic land reform and as a 'model' for other Latin American countries.¹² However, as Felstehausen (in Dorner, ed., 1971: 167) noted, "(t)he record of the past decade is now being written with much of the early optimism tempered by reports of only modest accomplishments."

Persistent rural unrest and violence have forced Colombian government to initiate a variety of land

reform measures during the past half a century. The forerunner of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1961 was the Law 200 of 1936 enacted during the administration of Alfonso Lopez (1934-38). It was designed specifically to tackle title-insecurity related problems. The Law gave the state the right to take over, without compensation, lands not economically exploited for a continuous period of ten years. It prescribed stricter requirements for evicting colonos and created a body of 'travelling land judges' to deal with all legal problems arising out of the enforcement of the law. Initially the law was relatively successful in realizing its objectives. It was successful also in substantially reducing rural unrest by providing title-security to a large number of colonos (Hirschman, 1963: 107). However,

once the immediate problems and conflicts subsided... succeeding administrations, more conservative in nature, ignored or softened the more important provisions of Law 200. Thus, Law 4 of 1943 did away with the controversial land judges and returned their jurisdictions to the local civil courts (which generally favor the vested interests in their community). And the reversion of title provision were never exercised until after the enactment of Law 135 of 1961. (Thome, in Havens and Flinn, eds., 1970: 150).

The 1961 Law, from a logical point of view, was fairly comprehensive; it created a separate agency to

implement its provisions - Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA) - and organized a detailed administrative structure to run the agency. However, its provisions, particularly those regarding ceilings on private landholding and expropriation, were too vague to be strongly effective. Ceilings were fixed at 2,000 hectares for uncultivated estates and 100 hectares for intensively farmed estates. However, only lands (not farms) 'inadequately cultivated' by their owners (or their agents) were subject to expropriation. Consequently, only the poorly used portions of a latifundia, often the worst and uncultivable lands, were purchased by the INCORA for redistribution, in most cases, without paying attention to the landlords' total landholdings (Feder, 1963; King, 1977). The ratio of ceiling to the average farm size (22.60 hectares in 1960) was 88.5 for uncultivated land and 8.5 for 'intensively farmed' land (Dorner, 1971).

In Colombia colonization (settling cultivators on public land) was much more emphasized and practised than expropriation and redistribution of existing latifundia or private land. By 1970, INCORA acquired about 3 million hectares of land, which constitute a little more than 1 percent of the total agricultural land of Colombia in 1960 (27,337,827 hectares). According to Tai (1974: 309),

the redistribution process may have benefited, by 1969, only 35,000 families, a mere 2.89 percent of the total farm families in Colombia in 1960 (1,209,672). However, it is significant to note that almost 96 percent of the land and 96 percent of the titles thus assigned were to settlers already living on public land. Expropriation of private land was insignificant and such attempts were thwarted by landowners through prolonged legal battles. By the end of 1969, INCORA initiated 115 cases of expropriation of private land; it won only 23 cases, lost 13, while the rest were withdrawn in favor of 'friendly settlements'. The successful expropriation cases (23) netted INCORA only 4,194 hectares of land, while the 'friendly settlements' brought in another 120,000 hectares.

Much of the expropriated and purchased land obtained by INCORA was used for reclamation and public works projects, not for retitling to farmers. Through mid-1969 INCORA had titled 1,194 parcels of purchased and expropriated lands, distributing to private owners 13,600 of the 124,000 hectares acquired. These titles represent 1.3 per cent of all those granted in the past nine years.

(Felstehausen, in Dorner, ed., 1971: 172).

In other words, during the period 1961-69, expropriation (outright expropriation and purchase) activities of INCORA benefited only 1,194 families, "little more than the estimated number of new families added to the rural

population each week" (King, 1977: AID, 1970).

Development of irrigation facilities was another major area of activity of the INCORA. In fact, irrigation and drainage projects absorbed the largest share of INCORA's capital expenditure. During the 1960s, according to a World Bank report, INCORA spent only 4 percent of its budget on land purchase and related activities, while irrigation and drainage projects received 40 percent of the budget (IBRD, 1967). However, the extent of such irrigation projects and their effects (in terms of distribution of benefits to various categories of farmers) are still largely undetermined (Felstehausen, in Dorner, ed., 1971).

Another major feature of the Colombian agrarian reform measure is a supervised credit program. The importance of the accessibility of small farmers to credit was recognized at the very outset, and therefore, INCORA was entrusted with the task of supervising a rural credit program also. The credit program received generous initial assistance from the United States Agency for International Development. The number of farmers under this supervised credit program increased steadily - from 2,556 in 1964 to 11,570 in 1966 and to 29,849 in 1969 (Adams, et.al., 1966; Dorner, 1971).

However, high cost and related problems of supervising small credit to small farmers lured INCORA to concentrate on big farmers and larger loans. Consequently, the average loan size sharply increased, from \$800 in 1965 to \$1,500 in 1968. The social effects of such shift of emphasis from small to big farmer are yet to be fully investigated, although its disastrous impact on small farmers is widely recognized (Feder, 1965; King, 1977; Dorner, 1971).

The Agrarian Reform Law had some serious drawbacks that reduced substantially the effectiveness of the INCORA. Table 4:2 clearly shows the poor performance of the INCORA in the context of the Colombian agriculture. Apart from its legal inability to expropriate partially exploited lands, another major drawback of the law was INCORA's powerlessness to deal with the problem of absentee landownership or sharecropping. To overcome this difficulty, a supplementary law was passed in 1968 giving tenants and sharecroppers of less than 15 hectares of land the right to purchase the land they lease or work on. In such cases, INCORA would first purchase (or expropriate) the land and then sell it to the tenant/sharecroppers. It is too early to evaluate fully the effectiveness of this scheme. However, several studies seem to conclude that the program is a failure. The

target was to bestow ownership status to 100,000 families during the first two years of its operation (1968-70). But by 1969, INCORA 'had taken over only 29 large farms totaling 21,380 hectares for resale to fewer than 2,000 tenants and sharecroppers' (Felstehausen, in Dorner, ed., 1971: 175).

Moreover, capital shortage was another problem that plagued INCORA operations concerning expropriation and redistribution.¹³

TABLE 4:2

SUMMARY OF INCORA'S LAND TITLING AND CREDIT ACTIVITIES
IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FARMS AND FARM LAND,

AS OF JUNE, 1969

	National total	INCORA activity	INCORA activity as a % of na- tional total
Land in farms in relation to land added to farms by INCORA (thousands of hectares)	27,372	2,833	10.3
'Available public land' in relation to land titled by INCORA (thousands of hectares)	29,488	2,833	9.6
Number of farms in 1960 in relation to farms titled by INCORA	1,209,672	88,200	7.3
Number of farms in Colombia in relation to number receiving INCORA credit	1,209,672	29,849	2.5

Source: Felstehausen, in Dorner, ed., 1971: 172.

The ineffectiveness of the Colombian Agrarian Reform Law of 1961 has been forcefully demonstrated by various authors (Feder, 1965, 1971; Duff, 1968, Dorner, 1971; Barraclough, 1973). The land reform effort suffered a further setback when in 1971 the government suspended all redistribution activities arguing that all institutional help should be directed towards the existing beneficiaries 'in the interests of national agricultural production' (Findley, in Scott, ed., 1973: 144-45). Such emphasis on growth rather than reform seems to have dominated the philosophy of the INCORA administration right from the beginning. After all, INCORA had the dubious distinction of declaring in 1964 that

landownership concentration was not a problem and land redistribution was unnecessary. The institute even claimed that latifundia occupied only a small proportion of poor quality land. This is probably history's first instance of a land reform agency arguing away its own right to existence.
(King, 1977: 159).

(ii) Mexico

It is in the aftermath of a revolution that cost more than a million lives that the Mexican land reform began to unfold. The most distinguishing feature of the Mexican land reform is perhaps the fact that it has become almost institutionalized, an on-going process

carried on by successive governments. The famous decree of 1915, promulgated by Venustiano Carranza, only declared that all communal lands expropriated since 1856 would be returned to their former owners. Its primary aim was to restore lands to the Indian villages. Thereafter the constitution of 1917 incorporated and expanded this 1915 decree and subsequently additional provisions were added to strengthen and further expand the Agrarian Code.

Although it has been an on-going process, land redistribution varied considerably from one regime to another. As table 4:3 indicates, land redistribution was more vigorous during the regimes of Presidents Alvaro Obregon (1920-24), Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-28), Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40), Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-64) and Gustavo Diaz Ortiz (1964-68). By late 1960s, land redistribution had virtually been officially 'completed' and since then the emphasis seems to have shifted to creating new settlements and reclaiming virgin lands.

From the beginning the agrarian policy in Mexico has been marked by two seemingly contradictory orientations, one stressing communal ownership of land, while the other emphasizes that "only the full and free private property of land can lead to progress and well-being"

TABLE 4:3
MEXICO: LAND DISTRIBUTION BY PRESIDENTIAL TERM, 1915-64

President and Term	Total hectares distributed	Average per month	Cumulative total	Cumulative total as % of Mexico's surface	Recipients	
					Number	Average hectare total
Carranza 1915-20	167,936	2,525	167,936	0.1	46,398	3.6
Huerta 1920	33,696	5,616	201,632	0.1	6,330	5.3
Obregon 1920-24	1,110,117	22,919	1,301,749	0.7	128,468	8.6
Calles 1924-28	2,972,876	61,935	4,274,625	2.2	297,428	10.6
Portes Gil 1928-30	1,707,750	121,117	5,982,375	3.0	171,577	10.0
Ortiz Rubio 1930-32	944,538	30,667	6,926,913	3.5	64,573	14.6
Rodriguez 1932-34	790,694	29,285	7,717,607	3.9	68,556	11.5
Cardenas 1934-40	17,906,429	248,700	25,624,036	13.0	811,157	22.1
Camacho 1940-46	5,944,449	82,562	31,568,485	16.1	157,536	37.7
Aleman Valdes 1946-52	4,844,123	67,279	36,412,608	18.5	97,391	49.7
Cortines 1952-58	4,936,668	68,565	41,349,276	21.0	231,888	21.1
Mateos 1958-64	11,361,370	157,797	52,710,646	26.8	304,498	37.3
						2,385,800

Source: Hansen, 1971: 33-34.

(Stavenhagen, 1970: 229). The debate concerning the relative virtue of communal and private property was never resolved in one way or other, although the emphasis differed from time to time. Consequently, "(t)he resultant pattern of land tenure became an eclectic mixture of private and public, individual and collective ownership" (King, 1977: 98). However, so far as farming is concerned, in contemporary Mexico it is overwhelmingly a private enterprise; most of the ejido (communal) land is also farmed privately on individual basis, although in such cases the land is deeded to the village.

Obregon's Ejido Law, subsequently incorporated into the Agrarian Regulatory Law of 1922, had the objective of establishing the ejido as the basic tenure institution of the Mexican agrarian structure. On the one hand it emphasized the restitution of Indian lands in communal ejidos, and on the other, it laid down the legal processes through which villages may petition for land. The ceilings for ejido plots were fixed at 4 hectares for irrigated land and 8 hectares for non-irrigated land.¹⁴ The ejido program received its greatest support from President Cardenas (1934-40). His Agrarian Code of 1934 made it possible for village groups to take possession of their petitioned land within 150 days of submitting the petition. This greatly accelerated the whole process

of land redistribution. Under Cardenas almost 18 million hectares of land were distributed to more than 800,000 beneficiaries. During his regime 10,650 ejidos were set up. He showed a strong commitment to the ejido philosophy and to the development of the rural infrastructure.¹⁵

However, a change of policy became evident even under Cardenas. During his later years in the presidency, the amount of land distributed declined sharply and the emphasis gradually shifted from ejido to individual private ownership. Accordingly, the number of small and medium size private farms increased steadily, more than doubling between 1930 and 1940 - from 610,000 to 1,211,000. An amendment to the Agrarian Code in 1937 allowed livestock farmers to retain land adequate to support 500 adult cattle. By 1940 the emphasis shifted all the way to commercial farming and the Code of 1940 allowed the retention of 300 hectares of irrigated land.

Agricultural growth seems to have become the major objective for Mexican governments after Cardenas. Expansion of cultivable area and intensification of production received primary attention. Development and expansion of irrigation facilities featured prominently in government planning. Ejido land distribution, largely due to its political appeal, continued to be pursued,

but with much less speed or enthusiasm. While the Cardenas administration alone distributed 17.9 million hectares of land, the next three presidential administrations, taken together, distributed slightly more than 13 million hectares of land. Arable area began to grow faster than the ejidal sector so that between 1940 and 1960 the share of ejido of the total arable land declined from 53 percent to 40 percent. Newly irrigated land began to be given increasingly to private landowners who could pay quickly for the infrastructural and other development. This apparent shift of emphasis from social justice to economic growth paid off rather well; Mexican agricultural production increased significantly since the 1950s (Wilkie, 1968; Hansen, 1971).

This policy of rapid agricultural growth led to the development of the 'middle sector' in the Mexican rural economy - the private commercial farmers. Increasing protection and public assistance were given to this group during the 1940s, particularly during the Aleman regime (1946-52). Despite rapid agricultural growth, landlessness increased, land concentration rose again and the living condition of the mass of the rural population deteriorated (Stavenhagen, 1970). It has been estimated that only a few ejidatarios, perhaps not more than 2 or 3 percent of the total, benefited from the

massive public investment in agriculture and the resultant agricultural development. The private commercial farmers, the 'middle sector', received the lion's share of these developments. While commercial profit increased rapidly, the real value of minimum wage in agriculture fell by almost 50 percent between 1940 and 1950, and the income distribution began to demonstrate a resurgence of inequality (Hansen, 1971; Stavenhagen, 1970). Rapid population increase (at the rate of 2.75 percent during 1940-50, and 3.08 percent during 1950-60) further worsened the situation. During the 1960s, land redistribution once again gained some momentum; the administrations of Lopez Mateos (1958-64) and Diaz Ortiz (1964-68) distributed over 25 million hectares of land during 1958-68. However, as King (1977: 102) noted, "(t)hese figures exaggerate the importance of recent land redistribution... because a large proportion of the transferred land was of low productivity and in pastures."

Nevertheless, the Mexican land reform was much more comprehensive than the land reforms in other developing countries considered here. The 64 million hectares of land redistributed since the revolution (up to 1968), represents 38 percent of the total land area of Mexico (169,084,000 hectares). If only the cropland is considered, the result is more impressive: out of the 23,816,000

hectares of cropland, a total of more than 10,329,000 hectares (or 43.36%) have been affected by redistribution. Out of a total farm families of 2,870,238 (in 1960), 2,358,800 or 83 percent were affected by land reform. The comprehensiveness of the land reform was reflected in the ceiling legislation also. In 1930 the average size of farm in Mexico was 153.35 hectares (Tai, 1974: 186) and the Agrarian Code of 1940 put the ceiling at 300 hectares of irrigated land. This brings the ratio of land ceiling to average farm size to a mere 1.96 which is far lower than in other countries under scrutiny.

In spite of such 'impressive' records of land redistribution, Mexican land reform has been criticized for its failure to tackle the problems of rural development (Dovring, 1970; Stavenhagen, 1970; Hansen, 1971). It has been reported that a new form of dualism is emerging in the Mexican agricultural sector. Modernization has reached only a small segment of the rural farms; as much as 85 percent of the aggregate ejidal and private holdings are still to benefit from modernization processes. Consequently, in 1960, more than 54 percent of the total agricultural output originated from 3.3 percent of the farms that are modernized. These farms also accounted for 80 percent of the increase in production during 1950-60. Product per worker in the

agricultural sector is still lagging behind that in other sectors of the economy; it is only one-sixth of that in other sectors. Average per capita income is also lowest in agriculture; while the average monthly per capita income is \$22, \$26, \$25 in the industrial, commercial and service sectors respectively, it is only \$11 in agriculture. In 1963, 43 percent of Mexican families had a monthly income of \$48 or less, and they were overwhelmingly concentrated (two-thirds) in the agricultural sector (Hansen, 1971).

The agricultural sector is also marked by less equitable income distribution, which is but a consequence, most notably, of increasing land concentration. The agricultural census of 1960 reveals that even after three decades of land redistribution, land is still concentrated in few holdings. In 1960, 1.4 percent of holdings had 36 percent of the croplands under their disposal, while 50 percent of the households contained less than 12 percent (table 4:4). There is much evidence to agree with Stavenhagen that

(i)n order to get around the agrarian legislation, the large landholdings are mainly divided up and registered under different names, belonging to family members or friends of the owners. In this way have been formed the new latifundia, particularly in the rich, irrigated areas of the northwest. For example, in the Yaqui valley 85 proprietors control

116,800 hectares of the best irrigated land, which are registered under 1,191 names. In other words, each landholder owns on the average 1,400 hectares. There are no statistics available which would allow us to quantify the phenomenon, but it suffices to read about the numerous complaints and denunciations of latifundia by peasants all over the country to understand that it is much more widespread than official statistics might lead us to suppose. (Stavenhagen, 1970: 234).

TABLE 4:4

MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL CROPLAND, 1960

Size of holdings (hectares)	Number of holdings (000)	Total Area (000 hectares)	Number of holdings (percent)	Area (percent)
up to 5	1,332.2	2,759.5	49.45	11.75
5.1-10	1,079.9	7,991.5	40.09	34.04
10.1-25	201.1	2,803.5	7.47	11.94
25.1-50	42.5	1,422.7	1.58	6.06
50.1-100	22.0	1,498.6	0.82	6.38
100.1-200	10.4	1,328.5	0.39	5.66
200.1-400	3.3	888.1	0.12	3.78
over 400	2.1	4,785.9	0.08	20.39
TOTAL	2,693.5	23,478.3	100.00	100.00

Source: Agricultural Census, IV, 1960 (Hansen, 1971: 79).

Another contributing factor to this dualism is the uneven access of different groups to the infrastructural services provided by the government. It has been demonstrated that the irrigation projects did not favor small farmers or the ejidatarios. Most of the irrigation facilities were developed in

the rather sparsely populated north and northwest, where large private landholdings predominated over ejidal lands In contrast, little has been done to bring water to the heavily populated central mesa region where most of the land is held by ejidatarios and the owners of small private plots.
(Hansen, 1971: 81).

Moreover, it has been alleged that much of the land benefited by the irrigation projects is owned, directly or indirectly, by prominent Mexican politicians and their families and relatives (Scott, 1964). Similar unequal access marks government's rural credit program. While government's contribution to rural credit fell from 4 percent of the federal budget during the administration of Cardenas to less than 1 percent during the 1950s, actual credit going to the ejidatarios also fell sharply, from 30 percent in 1936 to only 14 percent of the total government agricultural credit in 1960 (Stavenhagen, 1966).

The sharp increase in the number of landless agricultural workers is also indicative of dualism in the

rural sector. Since 1940, the Mexican economy as a whole has grown rapidly - at an annual rate of more than 6 percent.

On a per capita basis, the rate has exceeded 3 percent. Throughout the period manufacturing production has risen approximately 8 percent a year. Agricultural output grew at an even faster rate over the first decade of the period, then dropped to an annual rate of increase of 4.3 percent during the following decade. Between 1940 and 1962 the average product per person employed in the agricultural sector rose by 68 percent, or 2.4 percent a year. (Hansen, 1971: 41).

During this period, cropland increased 64 percent - from 14.5 million hectares to 23.8 million hectares. Between 1930 and 1960, the amount of irrigated land doubled, from 1.7 million hectares to 3.4 million hectares. In spite of such spectacular growth, the number of landless agricultural laborers increased rapidly. In 1940 there were approximately 1.9 million landless agricultural laborers in Mexico; by 1950 their numbers increased to 2.3 million - an increase of 8.6 percent. Between 1950 and 1960 their numbers increased very sharply, from 2.3 million to 3.3 million - an increase of 60 percent in a decade. This swelling of the rank of the landless agricultural workers does reflect a change in the government policy on land reform since 1940. It may be mentioned here that between 1930 and 1940, the number of landless laborers declined significantly, from 2.4 million

to 1.9 million or by 23.7 percent (Stavenhagen, 1970). This decrease may be attributed to the massive land distribution during the Cardenas years. The pool of landless agricultural laborers continued to increase during the 1960s. "The swelling pool of agricultural wage-labourers now constitutes over half the rural population but receives only 8 per cent of the total agricultural income" (King, 1977: 108).

It is thus evident that 1940 marks a turning point in the Mexican revolution. It marks the end of the Cardenas era and the beginning of the subordination of agrarian reform to agricultural growth, although there was little evidence to suggest that, in the Mexican context, reform and growth were incompatible. Out of this shift in government policy emerged the paradox of the Mexican revolution - a revolution that started with a promise of increasing equality but seems to have ended with increasing inequality amidst increasing growth.¹⁶

The Ejido

Although communal ownership of land had been prevalent in Mexico since the pre-Spanish era, the Ejido with elaborate internal structure, emerged as a distinctive product of the Mexican revolution. It has often been heralded as Mexico's way out - the solution to Mexico's

agrarian problems and the foundation of its economic development (Simpson, 1937; Stavenhagen, 1970). On the other hand, it has also been labeled as the problem child of the Mexican revolution (Vernon, 1963; Glade, 1965). Apart from such primarily ideological attack on or praise of the ejido, little attempt has been made to critically evaluate the role of the ejido in a more comprehensive manner.

The formation of the ejido, with its own ideological basis, remained the rallying point of the agraristas throughout the Mexican revolution. However, as a distinct economic and social unit with definitive organizational structure, the ejido did not emerge until 1934. It was the Agrarian Code of 1934 that formed the three-member ejido committee (consisting of chairman, secretary and treasurer) and the 'vigilance teams', thereby laying the organizational foundation of the ejido. The members of the ejido committee and the vigilance committee are elected by the ejidatarios. As an executive body elected for three-year term, the ejido committee is entrusted with the task of managing the business of the ejido. The vigilance committee, also elected for a three-year term, supervises the ejido committee and individual ejidatarios. Insuring the efficient use of land and other resources (primarily investment) of the ejido is the primary task

of the vigilance committee. A 'work-chief' or foreman and a number of assistants to assist the foreman (e.g., cooperative storage manager, warehouseman, etc.) are also elected. Keeping daily records of the use of ejido's implements, animals, etc., is the principal task of the foreman. He is also entrusted with the job of maintaining a close liaison with the Ejidal Bank, practically the only source of credit to ejidatarios. The role of the work-chief is more important in a collective ejido where he assigns work to each member, notes what is done and determines the weekly performance and compensation of each member.

All pastures, woodlands and other non-cultivated land (except house plots) are held in common. In a communal ejido, the cropland is also held in common and the individual members enjoy a hereditary usufruct title to their portion of the communal land. They do not possess the right to sell, rent, mortgage, lease or otherwise alienate the plot assigned to them. The ejido reserves the right to deny an individual member his title to land in case of non-use for prolonged period or other irregularities. In non-communal ejidos, land is cultivated as small individual plots, belonging to individual members of the ejido.

Totally communal ejidos are very insignificant in number. In 1960, for example, there were only 338,621 hectares of communally cultivated ejido land, while individually cultivated ejido land totalled 9,990,625 hectares. The number of collective ejido declined from 700 in the 1940s to less than 200 by 1960s. This trend towards small individual landholding is pronounced in areas of rapid economic growth. Ejidatarios in physical proximity to industrial or commercial centres have tended to become 'little landlords' or 'little capitalists' by renting out their plots or farm with the help of hired labor so that they may themselves work in the industries where the remuneration is better. In the valley of Mexico, for example, almost half the ejidatarios rent out or share-crop their land so as to work in industry in and around the Mexico City (McEntire and McEntire, 1971). To quote King (1977: 105):

in the Yacui Valley 38 per cent of the ejidatarios rent 30 per cent of ejidal land to outside interests. Ejidatarios growing cotton hire 85 per cent of their labour requirement. The fathers of the Mexican revolution certainly did not envisage the ejidatario as an absentee landlord, but in states like Sonora this is his best chance of sharing in the new prosperity.

The economic efficiency of the ejido is a controversial issue and is charged with ideological overtones.

However, recent studies suggest that, in comparison with the private sector, the ejidal sector performed rather creditably, particularly in crop production. According to the 1960 census, 43 percent of all cropland and 40 percent of all irrigated land were under ejido and the ejido sector produced 43 percent of the total crop production of Mexico in that year. "In other words, the ejido contributes to the country's agricultural production in direct proportion to its participation in the resource land" (Stavenhagen, 1970: 249). The impressive performance of the ejido is more pronounced if the data for 1940 and 1960 are compared (table 4:5), particularly that of the crop production (which is a more realistic index since the total farm output index includes livestock which is dominated by large private farms). The larger output increases on farms of more than 5 hectares is more a reflection of greater capital inputs than efficiency. Table 4:6 presents the disparity between the ejidal and private sectors in terms of certain major inputs during 1940-1960. In 1960, for instance, 70 percent of all capital in agriculture belonged to the private farms, while the ejidos had only 30 percent of the total agricultural capital.

Yet they (the ejidos) contribute ... 43 percent of the value of all crops. This suggests that the ejidatarios use the few capital resources they have at their disposal more intensively and efficiently.

TABLE 4:5

MEXICO: CROP INDICES FOR DIFFERENT TENURE GROUPS,

	1940, 1950, 1960					
	Total farm output			Crop production		
	1960/40	1960/50	1950/40	1960/40	1960/50	1950/40
Ejidos	210	154	136	223	170	131
Private farms 5 hect.	142	93	152	168	112	130
Private farms 5 hect.	364	184	198	323	166	195
TOTAL	256	155	165	262	163	161

Source: Dovring, 1969: 8.

TABLE 4:6

MEXICO: CHANGES IN MAJOR INPUTS AND PRODUCTION BETWEEN 1940

AND 1960 ON EJIDOS AND PRIVATE FARMS OF MORE THAN FIVE HECTARES.^a

Item	Value in 1940	Value in 1960	Percentage increase	Increase on private farms as percentage of increase on ejidos
Cropland area (million hectares)				
Ejidos	7.0	10.3	47	168
Private farms	6.8	12.2	79	168
Labor force (millions)				
Ejidos	n.a.	3.5	n.a.	100-200 ^b
Private farms	1.1	2.2	100	
Value of machinery, implements, and vehicles (billion pesos) ^c				
Ejidos	51	1,331	2,510	277
Private farms	50	2,893	5,686	
Gross value of total crop output (billion pesos) ^d				
Ejidos	2.6	5.8	123	180
Private farms	2.3	7.4	222	

Note: a = Mexican Census of Agriculture, 1940 and 1960; b = estimated; c = prices in 1940 and 1960; d = prices in 1960; n.a. = data not available
Source: Horton, 1968: 19.

Indeed, for every \$1,000 in capital, the ejido sector produces crops in the value of \$955, the private farms of over five hectares in size, \$763, and the small farms of up to five hectares, \$698. (Stavenhagen, 1970: 249-50).

The agrarian problems of modern Mexico, therefore, should be traced back not to the ejidos, but to the institutional framework in which they have to work. The revolution profoundly changed the land tenure structure, but contrary to the opinion of certain scholars (White, 1969), failed to change the power structure as profoundly. Since the end of the Cardenas era, agricultural productivity took precedence over agrarian reform, resulting in the emergence of a booming commercial agriculture. Public commitment to agrarian reform, however, continued unchanged; although the sincerity of such commitment is increasingly being questioned.

In spite of all these drawbacks, in comparison with other four developing countries considered here, the Mexican land reform stands out as the most extensive and farreaching. In terms of the percentage of land or population affected, it is by far the most comprehensive.

D. Summary

The land reform programs discussed above may be compared in terms of certain 'core' variables mentioned earlier. These core variables are:

(a) percentage of the rural population affected by land reform (weighting factor: percentage of population engaged in agriculture);

(b) percentage of total agricultural land affected by land reform (weighting factor: Gini index of land concentration);

(c) ratio of land ceiling to average farm size (weighting factor: average farm size).

The performance of the major land reform programs of the sample countries in terms of the core variables may be presented in a tabular form (table 4:7). It is evident from table 4:7 that in terms of the first variable (percentage of rural population affected by land reform), Mexico ranks first (83%) and no other country under study matches its performance even remotely, Pakistan and Bangladesh being in the second place with a score of 5 percent. In terms of other variables also Mexico's performance is by far the best - with 38 percent of land being affected and a land ceiling of only 2 times the average farm size. The proportion of

land ceiling to average farm size is highest in Colombia (88). In none of the countries, major land reform programs affected a significant percentage of the rural population.

TABLE 4:7

PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR LAND REFORM PROGRAMS IN THE

SELECTED COUNTRIES^a

<u>Country</u>	<u>% of rural population affected</u>	<u>% of agricultural land affected</u>	<u>ratio of ceiling to average farm size</u>
MEXICO	83	38	2
COLOMBIA	3	1	80
INDIA	4	3	14
PAKISTAN	5	5	15
BANGLADESH	5	2	15

a: all figures have been rounded

However, as mentioned earlier, these countries vary widely in terms of the volume of population (598.10 million in India, only 24.72 million in Colombia), rural-urban population distribution (91.2 percent rural in Bangladesh against only 35.70 percent in Colombia) and so on. Certain weighting factors are, therefore, introduced to take into account these differences (and their

possible impact) while comparing the performance of major land reform efforts. Introducing the weighting factors, table 4:7 may be re-written as follows (table 4:8).

Table 4:8 suggests that in terms of all the core variables, Mexico experienced the most comprehensive land reforms, and Colombia the least. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh - the South Asian countries - would lie somewhere near the negative end of the continuum.

How this performance discrepancy between the land reform programs of various countries can be explained? What factors may account for the qualitative difference between the land reform program in Mexico and that in the other selected countries? The next chapter is addressed to these basic questions.

TABLE 4:8

QUALITY OF LAND REFORM IN THE SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	(1970)			A	R _A	B ₁	B ₂	B	R _B	C ₁	C ₂	C	R _C	I	
	A ₁	A ₂	A ₂											lowest 20%	highest 5%
MEXICO	83	40	3320	1	38	.69	26.22	1	2	153	306	1	4.0	36.0	
COLOMBIA	3	41	123	5	1	.82	.82	5	88	22.6	1988	5	4.0	33.0	
INDIA	4	71	284	4	3	.66	1.98	3	14	4.5	63	2	5.0	25.0	
PAKISTAN	5	58	290	3	5	.62	3.10	2	20	7.5	150	4	8.0	18.0	
BANGLADESH	5	71	355	2	2	.57	1.14	4	15	2.3	34.5	3	9.0	17.0	

A₁ = % of rural population affected by land reform; A₂ = % of labor force in agriculture; B₁ = % of agricultural land affected by land reform; B₂ = Gini index of land concentration; C₁ = Ratio of land ceiling to average farm size; C₂ = Average farm size; A, B, C = Indices arrived at by multiplying the scores (A₁/B₁/C₁) by the weighting factors (A₂/B₂/C₂); R_A, R_B, R_C = Rank order of countries in respective measures. I = % of national income received by ... in 1970.

Sources: World Bank, World Tables - 1976;
 Tai, 1974
 King, 1977.

NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

1. Cf. The First Five-Year Plan - A Summary, 1952: 48-52; The Second Five-Year Plan, 1956: 177-220; The Third Five-Year Plan, 1961, XIV: 220-40; The Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1970: 174-83.

2. The Third Five-Year Plan stated that there are two objectives in pursuing land reform in India. "The First is to remove such impediments to increase in agricultural production as arise from the agrarian structure inherited from the past. This should help to create conditions for evolving as speedily as possible an agricultural economy with high levels of efficiency and productivity. The second objective, which is closely related to the first, is to eliminate all elements of exploitations and social injustice within the agrarian system, to provide security for the tiller of the soil and assure equality of status and opportunity to all sections of the rural population." (qt. in Sidhu, 1976: 100-101).

3. The zamindari (intermediaries) abolition of 1950s contributed to the emergence of this commercial farmer group primarily from among the ex-zamindars. The Green Revolution of 1960s greatly enhanced its economic and political power.

4. For a glimpse of various zamindari abolition Acts see: Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Legislation in India, Vol-VI, Land Reforms (Abolition of Intermediaries), 1953.

5. In its Progress of Land Reform (Delhi, 1963), the Indian Planning Commission maintained that "(i)ntermediary tenures like zamindaris, jagirs, inams, etc., which covered more than 40 per cent of the area of the country, have almost been entirely abolished.... On abolition of intermediaries, the vestiges of feudalism have been removed and a large body of tenants estimated at 20 millions have been brought into direct relationship with the State. As a result, the social and economic position of the tenants has considerably improved." (p. 3).

6. Thomas R. Metcalf, "Landlords without Land: The U.P. zamindars today", Pacific Affairs, 40 (Spring and Summer, 1967) probed into the situation of big landlords in Uttar Pradesh after the zamindari abolition. He found that the big landlords were successful in retaining very large farms ranging up to 2,000 acres, and above all, used the

compensation money as capital for agricultural improvements, thereby strengthening their economic advantage and power. Daniel Thorner found similar pattern in post-zamindari abolition Bihar (Agrarian Prospect in India, Delhi, 1956) Charles Bettelheim (India Independent, London, 1968: 185) summed it up: "They (abolition Acts) have not suppressed big property, but have limited it and have substituted a system of usus, abusus and frauctus for a feudal system... It has paved the way for rural capitalism; the big landowners and the rich peasantry will form a new and dominant class of rural capitalists."

7. Tenancy reform laws are not discussed here. Numerous studies and government reports conceded the failure of such laws. See, for example, A.M. Khusro, Economic and social effects of Jagirdari abolition and land reform in Hyderabad (Hyderabad, 1958); Government of India, Second Five Year Plan, (Delhi, 1963); V.M. Dandekar and G.T. Khudampur, Working of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1945 (Poona, India, 1957). The difficulty of enforcing tenancy laws in a surplus labor economy has been emphasized by Doreen Warriner, 1969; U.N., 1966. The U.N. Progress in Land Reform - Fourth Report (N.Y., 1966: 29) concluded: "Tenancy legislation is by no means always enforceable, as the number of dead tenancy laws entombed in the world's statute books will amply testify." The failure of tenancy reform laws in India has been recognized by the Task Force on Agrarian Relations. Its report in 1973 concluded: "Tenants have, in practice, found it extremely difficult to claim successfully tenancy rights because most of the leases, particularly crop-sharing arrangements, are oral and informal. Where tenancy is insecure, legal provisions regarding fair rent are useless and no tenant dares initiate action for getting fair rent fixed. This is so because the tenant who has the audacity to pray for fixation of fair rent faces the risk of certain ejection. Thus the objective of ensuring fair rent and security of tenure still remains unattained in large parts of the country." (Report of the Task Force on Agrarian Relations, 1973: 3-4).

8. Agriculture is the mainstay of Bangladesh economy. More than 90 percent of the population live in rural areas; over 80 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture. Agriculture's share to the GNP is about 60 percent; about 90 percent of exports are made up of either agricultural products or manufactures of them.

9. The Muslim League, at least in the region that later formed West Pakistan, was almost completely dominated by feudal interests - the big landlords. The Muslim

League, therefore, could hardly accept Zamindari abolition as a national slogan.

10. Some authors claimed that the 1950 Act did significantly change the land tenure system in East Pakistan. One author, for example, observed: "These measures, which were completed about 1954-55, have created all over East Pakistan a vast body of small landed proprietors. In place of the landlords and the rent collectors and the tenants, we have simply six million farmer-proprietors." (A.H. Khan, "Community and Agricultural Development in Pakistan", Occasional Paper, East Lansing, Michigan State University Asian Studies Center, January, 1969: 16).

11. A Produce Index Unit (PIU) is the value indicating the quality of land. It, therefore, varied from region to region. An acre of waste land in Baluchistan is equivalent to 5 PIUs, while an acre of double-cropped land in the fertile districts of Punjab is equivalent to 120 PIUs.

12. Cf. Johnson, V.W. and B.H. Kristjanson, "Programming for land reform in the developing agricultural countries of Latin America", Land Economics, 40 (4), 1964: 353-360.

13. "In 1965, for example, INCORA's total operating budget was the equivalent of about 25 million dollars. If we assume that all of this money was committed to purchase land for parcelization and that the average acquisition price of land was as low as 150 dollars per hectare, then INCORA could buy only 167 thousand hectares of land per year. If each family receives an average of 10 hectares, less than 17 thousand families could be settled yearly. On the other hand, Colombia's population will be adding an average of about 40 thousand rural families each year over the next ten years to the 500 thousand rural families in Colombia who are presently landless. New farms for 90 thousand families per year would therefore have to be provided by INCORA in order to handle the landless problem in ten years. Under the above-mentioned budgetary assumptions INCORA could not provide for even twenty per cent of this need." (Adams, in Havens and Flinn, eds., 1970: 140).

14. These ceiling levels were raised to 6 hectares and 12 hectares for irrigated and seasonal lands respectively in 1943 and to 10 and 20 hectares in 1947.

15. "During his six-year term as President, Cardenas crushed the power of the remaining Mexican hacendados. He redistributed more than 10 percent of Mexico's entire territory, three times as much as had been touched by agrarian reform between 1915 and 1934. By the end of his term the ejido proportion of total Mexican cropland had risen from 13 per cent to 47 per cent, and it included some of the finest agricultural land in Mexico. In the rich Bajio region huge commercial farms were expropriated and turned into communally organized and operated ejidos. By 1940 the newer ejidos were producing significant proportions of such commercial crops as cotton, henequen, wheat and coffee. As a result of the changes in land tenure, the number of recipients of land - over 800,000 families in six years - rose from 21 percent to 42 per cent of the population employed in agriculture" (Hansen, 1971: 91).

16. To quote Hansen (1971: 95): "By 1940 the social goals of the revolution were finally being implemented, and at a dramatic pace. Organized labor and the rural masses were directly represented in the official party, and were numerically the most important of that party's four sectors. The vast majority of the Mexican population was at long last beginning to share in the distribution of Mexican wealth. After 1940 the trends reversed. A development strategy emerged which tightly controlled labor union activity, slowed the pace of agrarian reform, and reduced the relative share of total income of the bottom 60 per cent of the Mexican population. How is it that the only Latin American country to have experienced a profound revolution before the 1950s chose to follow an approach to economic development which combined sustained sacrifices at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale with growing rewards at the top."

CHAPTER V

DYNAMICS OF LAND REFORM: POLITICAL ELITES AND THE

PEASANTRY

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(ii) The peasantry as the vehicle for land reform

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(iii) Political elites in the Latin American Countries

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C. The Peasantry and Land Reform: the Case of Mexico

D. Peasant Organization: Structural Obstacles

(i) Peasants as passive and resistant to change

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psyche

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CHAPTER V

DYNAMICS OF LAND REFORM: POLITICAL ELITES AND THE PEASANTRY

A. Dynamics of Land Reform: Two Views

It is apparent from the discussion so far that the presence of certain 'defective' structural characteristics (land concentration and asymmetric tenancy arrangements) do not constitute the sufficient condition for land reform. In other words, their presence do not necessarily lead to the formulation and implementation of comprehensive (measured in terms of their scores on the key variables described above) land reform programs. These defective structural features do constitute the necessary condition in so far as they serve as the objective basis for land reforms. It is evident from Chapter II that all the countries under study are characterized, in varying degrees, by concentration of landholding and asymmetric tenancy arrangements. Nevertheless, the character and impact of the major land reform programs undertaken in these countries vary significantly (chapter IV). Measured in terms of the key variables - percent of rural population affected by

land reform, the percentage of agricultural land affected by redistribution, and the ratio of land ceiling to average farm size - only Mexico seems to have experienced more or less comprehensive land reform, while the land reform programs of other selected countries failed to significantly alter their land tenure systems. What factors may explain these qualitative differences between the land reform programs of Mexico and the other developing countries?

(i) Political elites as the champions of land reform

Two seemingly contradictory explanations for 'successful' (or genuine/reformative) land reforms may be discerned in the literature. One view assigns the most critical role in the dynamics of land reform to the political elites (Ladejinsky, 1977; Tai, 1974). Wolf Ladejinsky, for example, remarked:

politicians, and only politicians, make good or poor reforms or do not make them at all. They control the political climate, which determines the will or lack of will to proceed with the task; the specific measures with which the reform is or is not endowed; the care or lack of care with which the enabling legislation is formulated; the preparation or lack of preparation of the pertinent and administrative services; the presence or absence of technical services with their bearing upon the success or failure of the reform; and, most important, the drive or lack of drive behind the enforcement of the provisions of the law. (Ladejinsky, 1977: 362).

Allowing some minor concessions to other factors, Tai (1974) also seems to favor the idea of the almost absolute independence of the political elite in this regard. He mentioned certain factors - rural unrest, communist threat, etc. - that may lead to land reform and then suggested that irrespective of these conditions, the political elite will initiate land reform only when such action would serve its political interests - the supreme political interest being the achievement of legitimacy. To quote Tai (1974: 56);

in initiating land reform a political elite is decisively influenced by the perceived need to gain political legitimacy, i.e., to strengthen popular support for a new political order or to safeguard an existing regime against threatened political changes. When the political elite perceives the need to gain legitimacy, the conditions likely to lead to reform will become relevant and important; when it fails to perceive such a need, the mere presence of these conditions may not lead to reform.

(ii) The peasantry as the vehicle for land reform

Other scholars emphasized the crucial role of peasant organizations and peasant movements in the initiation and successful implementation of land reform (Feder, 1971; Landsberger, 1969; Stavenhagen, 1970; Huizer, 1974, 1973). Huizer, for example, observed:

(e)ffective agrarian reform legislation and its proper implementation is generally brought about only where the peasantry itself, with or without help from other forces, exercises strong pressure...

(Huizer, in Stavenhagen, 1970: 375).

Eric R. Wolf (1969) tried to emphasize the crucial role played by the peasantry in some twentieth-century revolutions (notably, the Mexican revolution, the Chinese revolution and the Algerian, Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions). Similarly, Stavenhagen stressed the role of peasant movements in the political history of Latin America.

The role of the peasants themselves, their organizations, their movements, their struggles and their sacrifices, is generally underestimated if not openly neglected in the analysis of agrarian change and particularly in the study of the land reform process. This is not surprising in view of the fact that peasants usually do not write their own history, and that those who do frequently look at the issues involved from the other side. Yet in Latin America agrarian struggles are as old as the colonization process itself and the active participation of peasants in social and political movements of various kinds has been more widespread than is commonly assumed.
(Stavenhagen, 1970: 371).

According to Landsberger, peasant organization and peasant movements are not only phenomena of historical interest, but also constitute essential ingredients of societal development. Development, as conceived of

here, consists of two interrelated continua - horizontal (or structural) differentiation and vertical assimilation. Horizontal differentiation refers to the degree to which a society is characterized by separate organizations and institutions performing different functions - political, economic, social, religious, educational and so on. Such institutional division of labor and specialization, to a certain point, contribute to "greater satisfaction of the basic human needs for material goods, culture, personal autonomy, creativity, new experiences, and so on" (Landsberger, 1969: 15). The second continuum, vertical assimilation, is a

necessary complement of horizontal differentiation as a kind of arithmetical 'weighting system'; it is a measure of the gap between the richest and the poorest, the most powerful and least powerful politically, those with most and least access to education and aesthetics, and so on (Landsberger, 1969: 17).

In other words, horizontal differentiation measures the degree of division of labor and specialization in the institutional structure of a society, while vertical assimilation measures the degree of equality/inequality.

Following the notion of political modernization and development developed by Gabriel Almond and his associates, Landsberger, argues that the formation of peasant organiza-

tion in itself constitute development in so far as (a) it signifies institutional differentiation in the political sphere, and (b) serves to articulate the interests of the so far powerless, low status, economically weak peasantry. To quote Landsberger (1969: 18):

a new organization to articulate the interests of those already powerful in the political system contributes less to political welfare than an organization for those who do not have other ways of articulating their demands. Likewise, at the level of individual attitudes, a greater increase in 'civic culture' has taken place when a group previously without interest in political affairs voices a demand and seeks to influence events than when a group already involved in a 'participant culture' does so.

So Landsberger argues (1969: 18),

if this "weighting", by a vertical factor, of the concept of horizontal differentiation is accepted, then at least those peasant movements which have the explicit objective of improving the conditions of their low-status members become even more integrally linked to the concept "development".

The critical role of peasant organization as an agent of the articulation of peasants' interests in the initiation of land reform measures has been emphasized by various empirical studies also. The United Nations' third report on Progress in Land Reform (1962), for example, states that without a demand for reform from below, land reform legislation is seldom enacted and that

even after enactment the successful implementation of land reform measures depends, to a great extent, upon "local support by the people concerned,... since otherwise it is likely to remain a dead letter because of opposition from entrenched interests". Organization of the peasantry through community development programs is therefore emphasized.

After laws have been passed, many illiterate peasants have been ignorant of their new rights. Even where fairly adequate means of public education have been available, a lack of strong peasant organizations in rural areas has helped landowners to disregard legislation, or to get around it. The presence of such strong community organizations, at the local level, on the other hand, has turned the tide in favor of enforcement. (U.N., 1962: 15).

Thus, this point of view emphasizes the crucial role of peasant organization both in the formulation and implementation of land reform measures. The role of the political elite is somewhat deemphasized; the political elites are relegated to a secondary position where they 'respond' to pressures from below rather than act as independent agents of change.

As mentioned earlier, among the countries under study only Mexico experienced substantial genuine or reformative land reform. The other countries limited their activities primarily to the enactment of land

reform laws from time to time which did not bring about significant changes in the land tenure system either because of faulty (or 'soft') legislations or their non-implementation or both. Possible explanation may be found either in the differential character of political elites in Mexico and other countries or in the character of peasant organization and peasant movements in these countries. In order to evaluate the relative explanatory value of these two variables, their character in the sample countries will be analyzed. No fundamental difference between the political elites of these countries would weaken the thesis put forward by Ladejinsky and supported by Tai that the political elite plays the central role in land reform. In such event, the other explanatory variable (peasant organization) would demand closer scrutiny.

B. Political Elites in Selected Countries

(i) The concept of elite

Although since the beginning of the nineteenth-century the term elite started to receive increasingly wider currency in political and sociological literature, scholars remained in disagreement regarding the precise meaning of the concept. Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Lasswell, Mills - all seem to have used the term differently. Such

controversy stemmed, partly at least, from the fact that classical elite theorists (Pareto, Mosca, Michels) almost implied that elites are blessed with superior endowments of intelligence, skill, talent or energy. The idea of such inherent superiority came in sharp conflict with the ideals of democracy and equality. More democratically oriented theorists, therefore, strongly criticized this view and emphasized that elites are not blessed with superior endowments, but are in a socially advantageous position to monopolise (or otherwise exercise) power and privilege (Mills, 1956; Porter, 1965; Bottomore, 1968). In recent years attempts have been made to free the concept of elite from such controversies and to establish it on a more fundamental and universal foundation (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Bottomore, 1968; Lenski, 1969). Elite is therefore conceived of as a collective term to refer to those who have power.

Following these later scholars (Mills, Lasswell, Porter, Lenski, Bottomore), the term elite, as conceived of here, refers to the power holders of a society, those few who exercise power on behalf of the many. "Power roles are essential to all forms of social organization" (Porter, 1965), and as such, elites constitute an inherent feature of any society. Elites are the incumbents of

strategic roles, roles that are entrusted with the task of decision-making or influencing it.

Organization of any size or complexity always involves decision-making by those who happen to be strategically placed. If we call these persons elites we can say that organization beyond some minimum size and complexity necessarily gives rise to elites.... In the abstract we can call elites those persons who individually, regularly and seriously have power to affect organizational outcomes. Power can be defined as the ability to make offers and threats that are likely to alter the motivations of persons other than the power wielder. Although we know of no way in which power can be observed directly and measured accurately, we presume that it normally inheres in the uppermost positions of an organization. For only organization creates elites, and only incumbency in the strategic (which are normally uppermost) positions in organizations allows actors individually but regularly and seriously to choose effectively between alternative modes of organization and operation. (Higley, Field and Groholt, 1976: 16-17).

When used to refer to the incumbents of strategic power roles, elites are identifiable. They can be identified at the micro-level of, say, a particular political party, a particular commercial enterprise or religious organization; or they can be identified at the macro-level of a society or its subsystems. Every subsystem of the social system has its own power roles or strategic positions and, therefore, elites. Accordingly,

one can talk of economic elites, political elites, administrative or bureaucratic elites, military elites and ideological or cultural elites. Although the institutional (or formal) spheres of influence of these various elites differ, their positions may often overlap in the sense that a particular elite may concurrently wield power in two or more subsystems. The degree of such concentration of power varies according to the level of overall development of the society. The more complex and developed a society is, the more specific the power roles of its elites are likely to be. In other words, concentration and convergence of power is likely to be inversely related to the complexity and general level of development of a society. In developing countries, therefore, power roles are often fused together resulting in the concentration of different institutional powers in the same hands. Political and economic elites, for instance, are often the same individuals.

It is therefore evident that elites form an integral part of organized social existence. Whether they are intellectually or otherwise superior or whether elites are recruited from privileged social groups are questions to be empirically investigated. Similarly how elites in different subsystems are interrelated, whether they form

a cohesive group or act 'almost like a class'; whether they act selfishly or capriciously, whether they are repressive, arrogant or altruistic - all need to be tested empirically and may vary from society to society or over time. An analysis of their composition or recruitment pattern may help explain, partially at least, their behavior or mode of operation, but cannot be taken as the basis either for their existence or elimination.

All that is certain is the basically arbitrary nature of their actions from the standpoint of other participants. In the nature of things... there is no other way for decisions to be made and hence for organizations to be effective some person or persons must decide. (Higley, et.al., 1976: 15-16).

Political elites are incumbents of power roles within the political system who have direct or indirect input into the formulation and implementation of national policies. Elites from other spheres - the military or bureaucracy, for example, may and often do contribute to the formulation of national policies; however, the term political elite (often referred to simply as elite) as used here, refers specifically to those who occupy power roles within the political system, e.g., the leaders of the government, legislative representatives at various levels, leaders of political parties and the like. Their input may be direct as that of elites 'in power'

(governing elite) or indirect as that of the elites 'out-of-power' (non-governing elite). The non-governing elites are important in so far as their views and "possible actions regarding specific decisions are consistently seen by others as significant factors in the making of those decisions." (Higley, et.al., 1976: 18).

Elites possess and wield power and as such their basic concern is the retention of power.

If possession and exercise of power is the principal distinction between elites and non-elites, it is highly likely that the possession and exercise of power is the principal interest of elites... While elites undoubtedly pursue other interests - which vary according to historical circumstances, cultural and group affiliations, and so on - the possession of power is a permanent, abiding elite interest regardless of time and place. (Higley, et.al., 1976: 60).

Since retention, enhancement or consolidation of power is the goal for political elites, land reform may assume an instrumental value; it may often be used simply as an instrument or tool to achieve that goal. It is highly likely that when land reform is used primarily as an instrument for enhancing, consolidating or legitimizing power, it (the reform) will be devoid of much of its economic (agricultural growth) and, more importantly,

social (promoting equality) rationales. Such land reform may be termed palliative, rather than reformative.

The important question is to investigate under what circumstances a particular political elite, given its preoccupation with power, would initiate reformative land reform (measured in terms of the key variables discussed earlier)? Under what conditions the land reform measures would be palliative? In the following pages the character of the political elites in the sampled countries will be analyzed. The purpose is to examine the relationship between (a) the character of the political elites, and (b) the character (palliative/reformative) of the land reform measures undertaken. More specifically, the purpose is to examine how far the qualitative difference between the land reforms in Mexico (reformative land reform) and other sampled countries (palliative land reforms) can be explained in terms of differential character of the political elites in these countries.

(ii) Political elites in the south Asian countries

(a) Pakistan

The social base of the political elite in Pakistan is traditional wealth and power - land in the Punjab and Sind and tribal leadership coupled, most often, with land in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier. The political

elite is composed, by and large, of three groups: (a) the top-level military officers (colonel through general ranks). Within the military, the top-brass of the army and the air force wield more power than that of the navy, since, on the one hand, it is numerically weaker compared to other two branches of the military, and, on the other, traditionally the navy has not "attracted the most ambitious sons of the landowning class". Moreover, the army and the air force traditionally receive a greater share of the defence budget and therefore are equipped with more modern weapons; (b) the central elite civil services, particularly, the Civil Service of Pakistan CSP) and the Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS); and (c) other members of the large landowning families who chose occupations outside the civil service and the military (Maddison, 1971; LaPorte, 1975).

Landlords dominated the political arena of Pakistan since the British rule. Almost all the top leaders of the Muslim League, the political party that fought for and won the independence of Pakistan, were either landlords or members of big landowning families in legal profession. In fact the Muslim League was founded (in 1906) by the Nabob (feudal lord) of Dacca, the biggest of the big landlords of the then East Bengal. Since the inception of Pakistan(1947), the landlords (mainly from the Punjab

and Sind) exercised a preponderant influence at all levels of government; a sizeable share of seats in the legislatures were also traditionally occupied by the big landowning families. The Pakistan Constituent Assembly of 1947 and 1955 had 40 members from West Pakistan (what is now Pakistan), and among them as much as 28 (70 percent) were landlords (Mushtaq Ahmad, 1963: 97). Similarly, the West Pakistan contingent of the National Assembly of Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 contained a large number of landlords, 38 in 1962 and 32 in 1965 (out of a total of 70). The provincial legislature of west Pakistan was also dominated by landlord interests (Feldman, 1967; Callard, 1959; Goodnow, 1964; Jahan, 1972). The bureaucratic-military clique that ruled Pakistan, directly or indirectly, throughout its entire history, had close link with the traditional landowning interests. The top officers of the army and the civil service are recruited predominantly from the big landowning families (Sayeed, 1967; Maddison, 1971; LaPorte, 1975).¹

On the whole, when one spoke of an elite in Pakistan, one meant the Punjabi (and some Sindi) landlords and their counterparts (tribal leadership who often also held land) in the Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan.
(LaPorte, 1975: 127).

(b) Bangladesh

Data on the political elite in Bangladesh is very scant. It has been asserted that at the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Bangladesh (then the eastern wing of Pakistan) was dominated by a 'non-vernacular', traditional and conservative landed elite (Jahan, 1972). It was non-vernacular in the sense that the elite had a language (Persian) different from that of the broad masses (Bengali). The founder of the Muslim League as well as most of his lieutenants and subsequent leadership aspirants from the then East Bengal were such non-vernacular landowning elites. However, the power of this non-vernacular landed elite began to decline almost immediately after the emergence of Pakistan. The forced migration of a large number of landlords (who were mostly Hindus, and not non-vernacular) to India (1946-47) and the subsequent Zamindari Abolition Act of 1950 severely curtailed the power of the traditional landed elite.

The large scale exodus of Hindus following the partition of the subcontinent,² gave a strong impetus to the development of an educated Muslim middle class in Bangladesh.³ Along with landlords, Hindu professionals, government servants and commercial elites also migrated to India.⁴ Consequently, a vacuum was created so far as

the classes of professionals, middle-class intellectuals and landed aristocracy were concerned. Largely in response to this vacuum, a Muslim middle class quickly emerged. From the very beginning, this rising middle class was in conflict in Bangladesh with the traditional non-vernacular political elites. However, this conflict for power between a declining landed aristocracy and a rising middle class, in the context of Bangladesh, easily degenerated into a conflict between two language groups - one (Urdu) representing the traditional landed aristocracy (and their counterparts in the then West Pakistan), and the other (Bengali) representing the emerging middle class. From 1947 to 1970, East Pakistan remained a battle-ground for the declining non-vernacular landed elites and the rising vernacular elites from within the educated middle-income groups. This vernacular elite was composed, mostly, of professionals (particularly lawyers). Political power quickly passed on to this urban-based, non-conservative vernacular elite (Jahan, 1972). For instance, as early as in 1955, 50 per cent of the members from East Pakistan to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan were lawyers (Mushtaq Ahmad, 1963: 97). Likewise, East Pakistan had 27 lawyers (out of 63 for whom data are available) in its contingent to the National Assembly of Pakistan in 1962. In 1965, the number of lawyers elected as members of the National Assembly from East Pakistan increased

to 30 (out of 70 for whom data are available). In 1962 and 1965, East Pakistan sent only 4 and 7 landlords respectively to the National Assembly (Mushtaq Ahmad, 1963; Jahan, 1972). Through successive mass-based movements (the language movement of 1952, the reform movement of 1962, the six-point movement of 1966, the anti-Ayub movement of 1969), this vernacular elite consolidated its political power. The struggle for, and the emergence of, Bangladesh in late 1971 culminated this process of political power consolidation by the vernacular elite.

The political elite in present-day Bangladesh is largely composed of professionals (particularly lawyers) and top-ranking civil and military officers. However, these so-called middle-class elites have acquired, over time, a new characteristic - landownership. Therefore, the absence of traditional landlords does not mean the absence of landed interests. Most of these professionals and bureaucrats are large absentee landowners deriving a substantial part of their income from land. Most importantly, they usually represent rural constituencies and landownership helps them consolidate their political power base. They can establish a client-patron relationship with the peasantry through parcelling out their land on sharecropping to the land-hungry cultivators. The political elite, therefore, has a vested interest in

absentee landownership.⁵

(c) India

The composition of the Indian political elite has undergone a change since the beginning of the movement for independence from the British rule.⁶ The leadership of the Congress Party since the end of the First World War was drawn chiefly from other than the landed groups. The All-India Congress Committee, the highest organ of the party, for instance, was composed mainly of intellectuals and professionals - lawyers, teachers, doctors, and the like. Landowners were not significantly represented in the Congress hierarchy.⁷ However, since independence, the representation of intellectuals and professionals to the Congress party hierarchy and to the national, state and local governments tended to decline. Consequently, the representation of the landed interests began to increase gradually.

Consisting mainly of medium-sized landlords and large owner-farmers, these interests also appear increasingly more influential at the lower levels of the Congress and government hierarchies. In contrast, the professionals have gradually lost some of their strength, as exemplified by the decline in the representation of lawyers (table 5:1). In the pre-independence period and the early years of the new nation, the law, among all professions, supplied the largest number of elite members; gradually agriculture (here referring

to a profession consisting mainly of landowners rather than small cultivators) became the most dominant group. (Tai, 1974: 94).

Table 5:1 indicates that the political power of the landed interests increased consistently and significantly both at the national and state levels. Moreover, the non-agricultural elites also owned land or had significant interest on land. For instance, according to Stanley Kochanek's survey of 224 Congress members of the 1960 Lok Sabha (lower house of the parliament), 54 or 24.1 per cent were agriculturists by occupational background; but if classified in terms of landownership, the percentage of landowning parliament members would jump to about 70 per cent (157). 95 M.P.s (42.4 per cent) identified land as their main source of income (table 5:2). This illustrates that the political elite has a vested interest in the existing land tenure system.

The landowning interests seem to have gained an even larger representation at the state level. For example, in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly, the "representation of the landed interests increased from 39 per cent in 1952 to 42 per cent in 1962" (Kochanek, 1968: 373). Rich farmers have become a significant part of the state elite structure. These rich farmers - or, as Clive Bell

TABLE 5:1

INDIA: PROPORTION OF LAWYERS AND AGRICULTURISTS IN

THE CONGRESS PARTY AND IN THE LOK SABHA

Leadership Groups	Year	Lawyers		Occupational Groups		All Occupations	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A.I.C.C.	1919	104	64.6	7	4.4	160	100
	1921	83	50.9	4	2.5	163	100
	1923	72	21.3	5	1.5	338	100
	1956	108	16.9	71	11.1	639	100
M.P.s	1952	130	38.3	62	18.3	339	100
	1957	52	23.3	54	24.2	224	100
	1962	90	26.4	93	27.2	357	100
	1967		22.2		36.8		
Uttar Pradesh MLA	1952	86	22.1	151	38.7	390	100
	1957	49	17.1	108	37.8	386	100
	1962	39	15.7	105	42.2	249	100
Lok Sabha (All Parties)	1950	100	32.0	20	6.4	313	100
	1952		35.6		22.4		
	1957		30.3		29.1		
	1962		24.5		27.4		
	1967		17.5		31.1		

Source: Tai, 1974: 95.

TABLE 5:2

INDIA: OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF CONGRESS PARTY

MEMBERS OF THE LOK SABHA, 1960

Occupation	Congress Party MPs No.	Owned land	Land	Parlia- ment	Main Source of Income Business	Profes- sion	Other	Unknown
Agriculture	54	24.1	53	48	3	1	2	-
Business	25	11.2	17	1	-	18	3	-
Law	52	23.2	36	14	12	2	4	-
Profession	16	7.1	10	1	7	2	-	-
Public Work	63	28.1	35 ^a	25	26	4	2	4
Other	13	5.8	6	3	6	-	2	-
Unknown	1	0.4	0	-	-	-	-	1
	224	100	157 ^a	95	54	27	13	5
			(70.1%)	(42.4%)	(24.1%)	(12.1%)	(5.8%)	(2.2%)

a. Not including 2 who did not answer the question as to whether they owned land.

Source: Kochanek, "The Relation between social background and attitudes of Indian legislators." Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, VI (March, 1968): 40-41.

(in Lehmann, 1974) prefers to call them - Kulaks, have become increasingly powerful at the state level dominating the formulation and implementation of agrarian reform policies. The Green Revolution seems to have further strengthened the economic and political power of these kulaks (Bell, 1974; Griffin, 1974; Frankel, 1978). At the district or village level, as some recent studies confirm, landed interests are more heavily represented in the elite (Iqbal Narain and Pande, 1976; Prasad Singh, n.d. 1974?).

Political elites in South Asian countries: a summary

It is evident from the above discussion that the political elite of all the South Asian countries - India, Pakistan and Bangladesh - is dominated by landed interests. In Pakistan, the landlords form the dominant section of the national political elite; while in India they (landlords) are more active at the regional or state level, the central political elite being dominated more by professionals and urban industrial interests. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, the political elite is composed of professionals and bureaucrats who, mostly, are big absentee landowners.

It follows, therefore, that in these countries the extant land tenure system benefits the political elite. Or, in other words, the economic wealth (land) is concentrated in the hands of a group of people who also control political power. Consequently, the political elite is more interested in preserving the extant land tenure system than in initiating genuine land reforms that would undermine its privileges and jeopardise the power base. The failure (or, the palliative nature) of the land reform programs of these countries can, therefore, be explained, to a considerable extent, in terms of the character of the political elite.

(iii) Political elites in the Latin American countries

Mexico and Colombia

In spite of 'official' democracy, both Mexico and Colombia are one-party states. Since the 1930s, Mexico is governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which claims to be the one and the only torch-bearer of the great revolution of 1910-20. Similarly, since late 1950s, Colombia is under the rule of the National Front, a broad coalition of the Liberals and the Conservatives. The distinctive element of the Colombian National Front is the arrangement by which the Liberal and the Conservative parties alternate in the presidency

every four years and share equally other elective and appointive posts. An analysis of the structures of the PRI and the National Front is required to understand the character of the political elite in these two Latin American countries.

(a) The PRI and the Mexican political elite

Since its emergence in 1929, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mexico's 'official' party, has held power without interruption; it has held since its inception not only the presidency, but also all state governorships and all federal senatorial seats. Although token opposition is allowed, the PRI effectively claims to be the exclusive inheritor of political legitimacy. "The one-party system allows token opposition only to create the facade of democracy, but only the facade" (Johnson, 1978: 16). The PRI has become, for all practical purposes, a 'branch of the government, its electoral agency'. The PRI presidential candidate usually receives about 90 percent of the votes; only on two occasions, in 1946 and 1952, the PRI presidential candidates polled less than 80 per cent of the votes (Johnson, 1978). Repression as well as 'electoral fraud of every description' ensure the official party's electoral preeminence. When these methods fail, cooptation is applied to neutralize the opposition (Cockroft and Anderson, in Cockroft, et.al.,

1972).

"Cooptation" is a term used to describe the process by which individuals or groups independent enough to threaten the ongoing domination of a single group or party (in this case, the PRI) are traded small concessions or favors in exchange for moderating their demands and reducing their challenge to the dominant group's control over the system. This process takes place to some extent in almost every political system. But in Mexico, the process has been refined by the PRI to the point that it has paralyzed almost all potential opposition. (Hellman, 1978: 100).

Through cooptation and repression, the PRI has successfully insured itself against worthwhile opposition, while maintaining the facade of democracy. The opposition parties, therefore, became more concerned with receiving concessions from the PRI than challenging its power. Thus, the PRI emerged as the sole foci of power and also the only 'legitimate' perpetrator of violence and repression. Reform, revolution and justice are the proclaimed ideals, while authoritarianism, repression, cooptation and violence are the usual means.⁹

The PRI, therefore, is often termed 'an organized dominant class, having at its apex an official family or coterie of privileged elites' rather than 'a distinct political party that could be treated analytically as a homogenous ideological group' (Johnson, 1978: 77). The

president of Mexico stands at the apex of this 'organized dominant class' and all power is vested in him.

The constitution and established precedent, plus amendments, give strong governing prerogatives to the president should he choose to use them. Among other things, he has the power to intervene in state and local governments, to replace their elected magistrates virtually by decree. He has strong powers of the purse over all levels of government... The president has the power to expel foreigners and their companies. He is invested with extensive powers to protect the internal security of the nation. Security can have various meanings, including security from verbal assault, thus giving the president de facto censorship powers over the media and press.... the president has power to carry out land distribution via the ejido program of collective farms.... The president is also invested with the power to promote collective bargaining among workers, peasants, and private sector ownership.
(Johnson, 1978: 47).

Immediately beneath the president in the political power hierarchy lies three mutually complementary and often intertwined organs of the PRI, the National Assembly, representing the people on a state-by-state basis, the National Council or the Grand Commission representing regional and functional groups, and the National Executive Committee known as CEN (Comite Ejecutive Nacional), which is by far the most powerful of the three organs. It is through the CEN that the president of the republic exercises his control over

the party apparatus.¹⁰

Members of these three organs constitute, broadly speaking, the upperlevel of the political elite structure in Mexico. The preseident of the republic, obviously, stands at the helm of this power structure. The second level of the political elite is composed of the regional and local leaders of the PRI's three sectors - the agrarian sector represented by the CNC (Confederacion Nacional Campesina), the labor sector represented by the CTM (Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos), and the popular sector represented by the CNOP (Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Populares), and other middle-level PRI functionaries. The agrarian sector is the largest of the three, claiming a membership strength of over three million. All ejidatarios are automatically counted as members of the CNC and they constitute the overwhelming majority of the agrarian sector.

The labor sector is organized around the giant CTM which boasts a membership of more than two million. However, the labor sector is not as homogenous as the agrarian sector. There are rival unions and labor organizations some of which often support opposition parties. Nevertheless, "the CTM continues to be the most powerful

voice of organized labor in Mexico today and, as such, is a major bulwark of the PRI" (Johnson, 1978: 80).

Most heterogenous of the three sectors is the popular sector integrated around the CNOP. Organizations of small farmers, businessmen, teachers, professionals, as well as of public employees are attached to the CNOP. It has a total membership of about two million and is often labeled as Mexico's 'organized middle class'.

Regional and local level leaders of the CNC, CTM and the CNOP, as mentioned earlier, constitute the middle layer of the political elite structure in Mexico. Unfortunately, data on the socio-economic background of the Mexican political elites, particularly on those at the middle level, are scanty. One study found that in terms of fathers' occupation, the upper-level political elites originated exclusively from either the middle- or the upper class. None of the upper-level political elite's father belonged to the lower class (worker/peasant). An overwhelming majority - 27 out of 33 or 82 per cent - of the upper-level political elites had middle class background (merchant, employee, civil servant, professional, military, etc.). Most of the fathers (10 of 27 or 37 per cent) were professionals.

Eighteen per cent (6 out of 33) of the upper-level political elites originated from the upper class. Most importantly, an overwhelming majority of them (66 per cent) had landowning families. However, when the total political elite is considered, 24 per cent had lower class origin, while 64 per cent had middle class and 12 per cent upper class origin. Among those having upper class origin, a great majority (17 out of 23 or 74 per cent) came from landowning families (Smith; in Reyna and Weinert, 1977).

The origin of the political elites from privileged socioeconomic background is apparent from other considerations also. "(N)ational political leaders were overwhelmingly of urban origin, about half the total elite came from relatively major cities, very often the state capitals, while nearly two-thirds of the upper-level group came from sizeable cities" (Smith, in Reyna and Weinert, eds., 1977: 134). Educational and occupational background study reveals the same trend. In a society where less than 3 per cent of the literate adult male population had attended university, 87 per cent of the upper-level political elites (73 per cent of the total elite) had a university education. The professions, particularly law, supplied the largest number of political elites. 91 per cent of the upper-level elites (or 84 per cent of the total elite) had professional

occupational backgrounds (table 5:3).

Thus, the PRI and the political elite in Mexico are dominated by upper- and middle-class interests. The lower classes - peasants and workers - do not have much representation in the elite structure. Some scholars have gone so far as to maintain that in Mexico the whole political structure and the decision-making process are dominated by a small elite - an oligarchy - that emerged victorious in the revolution and since then reaped most of its benefits. The PRI with all its functional sectors is there simply to serve the interests of this small elite. The middle level elites, discussed above, thus, have little input in the decision-making process. Brandenburg refers to this small elite as the 'Revolutionary Family' (Brandenburg, 1964); while Padgett terms it the 'Revolutionary Coalition' (Padgett, 1966).

The Revolutionary Family is composed of the men who have run Mexico for over half a century, who have laid the policy-lines of the Revolution, and who today hold effective decision-making power.
(Brandenburg, 1964: 3).

According to Brandenburg the elite operates at three different levels. An inner council includes the Family head (who, since 1934, has also been the president of Mexico) and about twenty favorite sons of the

TABLE 5:3

EDUCATIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND OF MEXICAN

POLITICAL ELITES

1946-1971

	Level of Education			Occupational Stratum			
	Primary or less	Secon- dary	Higher Secon.	Univ- ersity	Worker/ peasant	Emplo- yee	Prof- ess. Other
Total elite	6%	3%	18%	73%	6%	4%	6%
Upper-level elite	0%	3%	11%	87%	less than 1%	less than 1%	8%

For level of education: Total elite N = 1,371

Upper-level elite N = 151

For Occupational background: Total elite N = 1,429

Upper-level elite N = 153

Source: Smith, in Reyna and Weinert, eds., 1977: 136-37.

Revolution. The inner council

keeps the Revolution intact and rolling forward by understanding the relative power of the major vested interests - the economic, political, social, governmental, religious, educational, and military order of Mexico.

(Brandenburg, 1964: 4).

A second level is composed of some two hundred representatives from various interest groups - commerce, industry, finance, agriculture; from government ministries and state bureaucracy, from labor unions, agrarian leagues, armed forces and other politically active or important groups. The new leadership is co-opted into the Revolutionary Family from this level. At the third and the bottom level comes the PRI and 'the captive opposition parties' and the state and local public administrations. "All these segments", Brandenburg contends,

owe ultimate loyalty to the chief of state, and the orientation and timing of policies and programs under their charges depend upon instructions received from the President of Mexico. Failure to observe his dictates means an eclipse of prestige, discharge from position, and often an even worse fate.

(Brandenburg, 1964: 6).

The Revolutionary Family, therefore, is the ultimate source of power. The Revolutionary Coalition, to use Padgett's term, incorporates

that cluster of groups and leaders whose political prominence is directly or indirectly connected with the 'revolutionary' struggle and the victories that were won in that struggle. These are the men and groups who because of their connection with the Revolution have some influence, or at the very least, hope of gaining influence in decision-making within the Mexican political system. (Padgett, 1966: 34).

What is the character of this Revolutionary Coalition?

As Padgett and Brandenburg maintain, it consists of individuals and groups that emerged victorious in the Revolution and benefited from it. Madero, who led the revolution initially, was a member of one of Mexico's great landholding families. Venustiano Carranza was also a big landlord. Plutarco Calles, who was the president of Mexico from 1924 to 1928 and the founder of the PRI, was a poor school teacher, but by the end of the presidential term, his personal fortune was estimated at "no less than twenty million pesos" (Lieuwen, 1968: 90). By the early 1930s Calles "settled at Cuernavaca, where he lived surrounded by wealthy revolutionaries, on what was popularly known as the Street of the Forty Thieves..." (Parkes, 1940: 393). The revolutionary millionaires surrounding Calles included Abelardo Rodriguez, Aaron Saenz, Alberto Pani, Luis Leon and Puig Casauranc, among others. Among them General Abelardo Rodriguez served Calles as governor of Baja California,

minister of war, and also as president of Mexico for a year, and accumulated one of Mexico's largest revolutionary fortunes.

In the border towns of Tijuana, Ensenada and Mexicali, Governor Rodriguez was the principal entrepreneur in the horseracing, casino, and brothel business. Subsequently, he invested in real estate, food processing, stocks, and banking. When he became President in 1932 his fortune was over 100 million pesos. (Lieuwen, 1968: 91-92).

Thus, the Revolution produced a host of profiteers; they used power to amass wealth and formed a Coalition or Family to maintain their newly earned privileges and power. The PRI has provided the means by which the coalition perpetuates its power and at the same time maintains a facade of democracy and legitimacy. In Mexico,

...politics has been and continues to be used as an avenue to personal fortune and social mobility. So common is this trait that even those politicos who have showed some interest in and commitment to social reform have used political office in the best mestizo tradition. The classic case is Calles, the reformer of the 1910s and 1920s, who by the 1930s was one of Mexico's large landholders, a millionaire surrounded by other revolutionary millionaires. He ended by opposing both land redistribution and the organization of labor. Like all the other revolutionaries, he was publicly committed to the "no reelection" dictate of the Mexican constitution; yet he personally ruled Mexico for close to six years after he retired from the presidency. He espoused the revolutionary cry for "effective suffrage", yet he

imposed his son Rodolfo as governor of Sonora, his son Plutarco as governor of Nuevo Leon, and tried to bequeath Tamaulipas to his son Alfredo. (Hansen, 1971: 167).

The life style initiated by Calles was followed by other caciques from the North who ultimately formed the Revolutionary Family. Corruption, distribution of economic and political favors in return for loyalty and use of political office for pecuniary benefits continue to characterize the Revolutionary Coalition. In Huntington's language a praetorian mentality and values dominated the behavior of the Mexican political elite.¹² This praetorian mentality and value-orientation explain, to a considerable extent,

why the members of the mestizo elite that emerged in firm control of Mexican politics by the 1940s have favored and promoted the present pattern of economic development in Mexico. Regardless of the depth of their commitment to the reform strand of the revolution, their use of political power to enhance their own social and economic mobility transformed them from a "white collar proletariat" into wealthy members of a new mestizo aristocracy. Again, as in the reform period, theirs was above all a revolution of access, not a leveling movement which sought to eradicate distinctions. The very force of the revolution did in fact remove much of the Diaz elite circle from the Mexican scene, but this aristocracy was as much a victim of the ravages of war as of any conscious social policy on the part of the northern revolutionaries. (Hansen, 1971: 167-68).

The revolution, therefore, did little to change the character of the political elite in Mexico. If in pre-revolutionary Mexico political elites served the interests of the economically powerful, in post-revolutionary Mexico, the new elites simply tried to join their ranks. In the words of Hansen,

...the same values which had motivated earlier mestizo power seekers affected the politicos who have presided over Mexico since 1940. They too have viewed politics as a means of personal mobility, and strive not to level the post-revolutionary economic and social elites in Mexico but to join them. They are not simply open to bribes that the economic elite can easily afford and often provide; they are also attracted to the status which that elite has in its power to convey.
(Hansen, 1971: 168).

Thus, whether viewed as a broader group (composed of the PRI and its three sectors) or as an oligarchy (composed of the Revolutionary Family or Coalition), the upper-class bias of the Mexican political elite is evident. Such a political elite can hardly be committed to the social equality principle underlying genuine land reform.

(b) The National Front and the Colombian Political Elite

After a brief interlude with military rule (under General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla) from 1953 to 1957, Colombia

was reverted to constitutional rule under a unique National Front system which calls for alternation of the presidency (every four years) between the two traditionally 'antagonistic' political parties - the Liberals and the Conservatives. The arrangement also prescribed equal representation of these two parties in the national and state legislatures and even in municipal councils. Executive appointments are also to be divided equally among these parties. It was, thus, a power-sharing device. With this National Front system, the political elites tried not only to preserve their power and privileges, but also to minimize the extent of internal conflict through ensuring a sort of circulation of elites.

In Latin America in general, William Thiesenhusen and Marion Brown (1967) once concluded:

(f)or generations the landowning class
has occupied the seats of government.
Large landowners have been able to
legislate in their own behalf.

This rather broad statement is true for Colombia. In Colombia there is a fusion between not only landed wealth and political power but also between these and the industrial/manufacturing wealth. The top political elites of both the Liberal and the Conservative parties are big landowners.

Members of both party hierarchies have been officers of the powerful, semi-official National Federation of Coffee Growers, which tends to be dominated by the large growers and exporters. Former Conservative President Mariano Ospina Perez, whose interests extended to cattle, real estate, mining, and the tobacco industry, was for four years its manager. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, elected president in 1966, has been a member of the Federation's national committee, as well as an officer of various important business enterprises. The family of former President Alfonso Lopez was prominent in the coffee trade. A perusal of Colombia's *Quien es Quien* (Who's Who) confirms the large degree of fusion among the elites of property, social standing, education, and political power. Within certain limits, it is therefore legitimate to speak of Colombia's upper social stratum as a ruling class or oligarchy, membership in which "is a virtually indispensable prerequisite of eligibility for induction into a major political role." (Dix, 1967: 43-44).

As Dix mentions, in Colombia power tends to be cumulative. Control over one form of power resource, such as large landholdings, is likely to lead to control over other forms of power resource, such as education or political office. As a consequence, there is a high degree of fusion of landownership, political power and social prestige. The Colombian elite is, therefore, often referred to as an oligarchy, accessibility to which is quite restricted. According to Dix (1967: 43):

In the more technical, non-perjorative sense of the word, the term oligarchy is a justifiable one to the extent that the Colombian elite is substantially a self-perpetuating minority in control of the key power resources of the society, without any real accountability to the rest of the community.

The supremacy of the elite is based on at least four factors. Traditionally landownership is the basic prerequisite for elite status. Along with economic power and social prestige, landownership also meant domination over those who labor the land or otherwise depend on the patron for livelihood. Hacienda ownership or at least tracing one's origin to a hacienda owner is a symbol of elite status (Whiteford, 1963).

Although one's family name or ancestry (abolengo) has been closely associated with hacienda ownership, abolengo often acts as an independent source of elite status. The tracing and affirming of genealogy as far back as the vice-royalty of Nueva Granada in 1717 is a persistent preoccupation of traditional Colombian elites. Thirdly, elite status has also a racial basis in Colombia. Most of the elites are predominantly of white European descent.

The emphasis placed on genealogy by families of the traditional elite is not only to prove descent from notable forebearers but to prove racial purity (even

though there are relatively few Colombian families without at least a trace of remote Indian ancestry). A dark complexion is not in itself an insurmountable barrier, especially in certain parts of the country, nor is a light skin a sure passprt. But if one possesses other criteria of elite status, a white skin is one of the outward manifestations that one belongs.

(Dix, 1967: 46).

Education serves as the fourth source of elite status. The elites have privileged access to education; and many of Colombia's landed elites are in fact professionals - lawyers, doctors, artists, writers, etc. - although they derive a substantial, if not the larger, part of their income from land. Until quite recently, access to education, especially to higher education, was restricted largely to the elites. In recent years, however, a group of technocrats has been emerging from among the middle classes. Technical or administrative skills are the basis of recognition and social prestige of these technicos.

Yet without some other claim to social position - unless, for example, he is able to use his education or professional reputation to acquire wealth, or unless he can marry into the upper class - the man of intellect will seldom acquire elite standing. Those who base their social status solely on membership in a profession belong as a rule more appropriately to the middle sectors.

(Dix, 1967: 47).

Perhaps the most important feature of the Colombian elite is the fusion of industrial and agricultural wealth within their ranks. Colombian capitalists of both industry and agriculture have, by and large, their origins in families of the traditional landed aristocracy. The landowning and the capitalist classes in Colombia are thus mutually overlapping. Consequently, there does not seem to have much of a conflict of interests between what may be called the bourgeoisie and the landed oligarchy.

On the contrary, the agricultural, financial and industrial interests are often found in the same economic groups, in the same companies, and even in the same families.
(Stavenhagen, 1968: 30).

Havens and Flinn (1970) termed this group of fused industrialists and agriculturalists as landowning capitalists. Havens and Flinn reiterated that because of this interpenetration of industrial and capitalist agricultural interests,

there is no real conflict between the industrial elite and the landowning elite. Rather, these supposed conflicting elites constitute the same elite that has emerged to fill the gap left when the Spanish elite was evicted.
(Havens and Flinn, 1970: 10).

These landowning capitalists, according to Havens and Flinn, are more interested in ensuring the unhindered mobility of their capital from one mode of production

to another than in having a conflict for power among themselves.¹³

The current situation in Colombia seems to be so structured that the individuals who have accumulated capital seem to be very satisfied with the degree to which they can move their capital from agriculture to Swiss banks, to industry, to agriculture, to commerce, and back to Swiss banks.

(Havens and Flinn, 1970: 12).

Such an elite can hardly be sympathetic to genuine land reform. The character of the land reform programs initiated in Colombia in recent decades testifies this contention.

Summary

In terms of composition and socioeconomic background, the political elites in the selected countries hardly demonstrate any fundamental difference. Landownership and, therefore, an interest in preserving the existing land tenure system seem to characterize all of the elites. However, landownership as a dominant feature seems to be more firmly established among the political elites of Pakistan and Colombia. In India, landownership is more prevalent among regional political elites, while the national political elite is more urban-oriented and from professional occupational background. In Bangladesh,

elites are predominantly professionals, but at the same time they are also absentee landlords. The political elite in Mexico is a distinct group which seems to have successfully used its 'revolutionary' connection in amassing wealth including huge land.

In other words, the political elites in all the sampled countries are predominantly upper-class in origin, having substantial interest in land. The character of the political elites does not differ fundamentally from one country to the other. And yet, while Mexico seems to have experienced a 'genuine' land reform, the other countries' did not. The 'character of the political elite' as a factor can hardly explain this dissimilar land reform experience of the selected countries. It is therefore argued that an examination of the other factor - peasant organization - is warranted.

It may be further argued that the peasantry plays a crucial role in determining the character of land reform, and that an organized and conscious peasantry is almost a prerequisite for genuine land reform. The following section explores these questions in the light of the Mexican revolution.

C. The Peasantry and Land Reform

(a) Mexican Revolution and the Peasantry

It is evident that an analysis of the character of political elites can hardly explain the nature (reformative) of land reform that Mexico experienced since the revolution of 1910. In terms of socioeconomic background, the Mexican political elite does not seem to be much different from that of, say, Colombia where, in spite of rhetoric, a genuine land reform did not take place. It seems the explanation for Mexican land reform should be sought not in its political elite, but in its peasantry who fought for land reform so violently. It was the organized peasantry that forced the political elite to initiate and implement land reform measures. The key to the understanding of the Mexican land reform, therefore, lies in the peasant movement that characterized the Revolution from the beginning.

If land redistribution is considered as the prime indicator of its intensity, the Mexican land reform seems to have varied widely over time according to the commitment of the government (or the president) in power. Immediately after the revolution, there was no rush to land redistribution; the first five post-revolution


presidents seemed to have cared little for land reform. However, under Cardenas (1934-40) land redistribution was followed vigorously. Then again the pace dramatically slowed down. During the 1960s, under Mateos (1958-64) and Ordaz (1964-70), land redistribution picked up the momentum once again (figure 5:1). By 1968, the whole operation seems to have reached its conclusion. How this wide fluctuation in the intensity of land distribution over time can be explained? An analysis of the Mexican revolution and of the formation and functioning of the agrarian sector of the PRI may help understand the dynamics of land reform in Mexico. This may also shed a light on the vital question of the relative role of political elites and peasant organization in land reform.

The Mexican revolution was perhaps one of the most brutal in history. Starting in 1910, it ravaged the Mexican society for more than a decade killing as many as one and a half million people (Hellman, 1978; Wolf, 1969; Tannenbaum, 1937).¹⁴ Yet at the same time, it was perhaps one of the most disorganized revolutions; no single group was at the command of the revolution for its entire period.

In contrast to other revolutionary movements of the twentieth century, the Mexican Revolution was not to be

FIGURE 5:1

MEXICO: LAND REDISTRIBUTION^a BY PRESIDENTIAL
TERMS, 1910-64.



a= figures rounded

1 = Carranza; 2 = Obregon; 3 = Calles; 4 = Gil; 5 =
 Rubio; 6 = Rodriguez; 7 = Cardenas; 8 = Camacho; 9 =
 Aleman; 10 = Cortines; 11 = Mateos; 12 = Ordaz.

led by any one group organized around a central program. In no other revolutionary movement did the participants in the drama prove so unaware of their roles and their lines.

(Wolf, 1969: 25-26).

It was not conceived by any organized political party.

It had no Lenin, Mao or Castro with firm ideological commitment and a blueprint of the society to be built.

No organized party presided at its birth. No great intellectuals prescribed its program, formulated its doctrine, outlined its objectives.

(Tannenbaum, 1937: 115-16).

The Revolution had hardly any doctrine at all. In a sense, the Revolution did not have 'revolutionary' leaders, it created them. Its revolutionary leaders

were children of the upheaval.... The Revolution made them, gave them means and support. They were the instruments of a movement; they did not make it, and have barely been able to guide it.

(Tannenbaum, 1937: 116).

Two groups with differential and often seemingly contradictory interests, were the chief protagonists of the Mexican Revolution. The revolutionaries from the North were a conglomeration of heterogenous people from different social strata - landowners, industrialists, businessmen, intellectuals and the like. Led first by Francisco Madero, a politically progressive landowner, and subsequently by Carranza (landowner) and Obregon

(rancher), this group - labeled as Constitutionalists - sought to overthrow the regime of Porfirio Diaz, then the longest running dictatorship in Latin America. The prime objective was to establish a liberal democracy in which "presidential succession would be determined by the principle of 'effective suffrage and no reelection'" (Hellman, 1978: 2). Behind this political goal were the socioeconomic interests of the participatory groups. The Diaz dictatorship frustrated the economic ambitions of the northern bourgeoisie by following an economic policy which gave foreign capital easy access to the Mexican economy. The penetration of the Mexican economy by foreign capital under Diaz reached to such a level that on the eve of the Revolution foreign capital made up more than two-thirds of all investment in Mexico (Cumberland, 1968). For example, the U.S. investment increased more than five-fold between 1897 and 1910, from \$200 million in 1897 to \$1100 million in 1911. The British investment rose from \$164 million in 1880 to over \$300 million in 1911 (Vernon, 1963). Economic and political advancement of these groups were thwarted also by Diaz' policy of concentrating economic/political power in the hands of a small favored elite who allied with him. Being left with no institutional means to gain social, economic or political power, these disgruntled

bourgeois groups banded together to overthrow the Diaz government.

The bourgeoisie was joined by the members of the middle classes - teachers, small businessmen, professionals, small and medium-sized farmers and the like. The growing middle classes were disenchanted with the Diaz regime because of lack of employment opportunities and of mobility. The growing mestizo middle class

demanded employment consistent with its status orientations. In essence the demand was for white collar jobs, enough to employ the 10 to 15 percent of Mexico's population which was literate - at least semi-education - by the end of the Diaz years.... All those mestizos with any education demanded as an 'indisputable right' employment in the government bureaucracy. Inheriting both the earlier Hispanic desire for public office and a distaste for physical forms of labor, the educated mestizos pressed their demands with increasing virulence after the War of the Reform broke the creole monopoly of political power. (Hansen, 1971: 151).

This status conscious but dissatisfied educated unemployed posed a threat to Diaz' dictatorial political stability. In non-industrialized society with a rural sector dominated by haciendas, there were just too few employment opportunities for the educated mestizos. Moreover, the educated middle classes also felt a lack of mobility since upward mobility became a power tool

in the hands of Diaz and his favored lieutenants and was granted only to the selected few.

While the bourgeoisie and the mestizo middle classes formed the elite of the Revolution in the North, its mass base

was formed by workers, miners, agricultural laborers, peasants, cowboys, shepherds, muleteers, and drifters. Before the Revolution this sector had been characterized by a pattern of horizontal mobility; according to the work available men moved back and forth among various jobs on the estates, in the mines, in the factories or across the border in the United States. But the years of recession and depression immediately prior to 1910 simultaneously eliminated most of these alternative work opportunities. And the northern working class and peasantry, whose economic condition was already precarious at best, found themselves squeezed even harder. (Hellman, 1978: 3).

The revolution in the North, in short, was a mestizo revolt led by middle- and upper-class mestizos supported by workers and agricultural laborers (Hansen, 1971). The revolutionary army of the North was manned by these workers, peasants, miners, cowboys and drafters and was led by Pancho Villa who had been a peon on a hacienda.¹⁵ In tune with their diverse social origin, the participants articulated diverse goals. The bourgeoisie and the middle classes fought for political reforms - to put an end to

dictatorship, to broaden the base of political participation, to curb the power of the Catholic Church and to impose state control on foreign investment and ownership of Mexican resources and the like. The lower classes, who formed the rank and file of the revolutionary army, had their own demands - job security, adequate pay, right to organize, improved working conditions and so on.

In the South, it was essentially an Indian revolution. Led by Emiliano Zapata, son of a small farmer,¹⁶ the southern revolution was a peasant revolt with the explicit goal of the restoration of communal village lands expropriated by haciendas.

It was centered in Morelos and the adjoining states of Puebla, Guerrero, Mexico and Hidalgo, heavy in indigenous population. It was a classic example of the peasant jacquerie, a spontaneous uprising on the part of the rural population which, in the face of new production methods and deteriorating standards of living, attempted to return to a "golden age" in its past.

(Hansen, 1971: 152).

The revolution of the South was more contiguous; landless peasants formed its army and its goal was clear and explicit: to get back the communal village lands expropriated by the haciendas under Diaz. It had little

interest in the political reforms articulated by the northern leaders, and showed little enthusiasm in understanding the problems of the northern industrial workers. Zapata's goals were compelling to his peasant followers, but it never succeeded in attracting considerable non-peasant support.

throughout the years of struggle, Zapata was able to count upon the adhesion and collaboration of a group of urban and rural radical intellectuals. These men helped Zapata formulate his Plan de Ayala and other proclamations and programs calling for the breakup of the large estates and the restoration of lands to the peasant villages. But apart from these intellectuals, Zapata seemed unable to understand or reach urban Mexicans. Thus a serious limitation of zapatismo lay in the movement's inability to broaden its appeal or move beyond the land question to other issues that concerned industrial workers. (Hellman, 1978: 7).

Nevertheless, the class interests represented by Zapata's Plan de Ayala were close to those represented by the revolutionary army of the North led by Villa. In the North there were almost no traditional village communities and, as mentioned earlier, Villa's army mainly consisted of cowboys, drifters, miners, railroad workers, industrial laborers and agricultural workers (working mostly on cattle farms). Villa, therefore, was not so much acquainted with the problems of the South where traditional village communities were being destroyed

by the aggressive advance of agricultural capitalism represented by sugar-cane haciendas and mills. Yet, the Villistas explicitly adopted Zapata's Plan de Ayala by 1914 (De Oca in Reyna and Weiner, eds., 1977: 47).

However, the Mexican revolution bestowed political victory neither to Zapata nor to Villa, but to the Constitutionalists led by Carranza and Alvaro Obregon. Carranza, himself a large landowner, was a conservative force among the revolutionaries and sought to replace the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz with a narrowly based 'constitutional democracy'. The radicalism of Zapata and to a lesser extent of Villa was tantamount to anarchy to Carranza; and his hatred for the despotic centralism of Diaz was matched by his fear and distaste of the radicalism of Zapatistas. According to the Carrancistas, anarchy and centralism were the major enemies of the Revolution.

Anarchy was incarnated in the radical agrarians who hoped to transform the political revolution into a social movement of violent character. And centralismo was incarnated in the old regime and the followers of Huerta. The liberals opted for a middle term: they wanted to create a federal and democratic republic, in which the middle class would play the leading role.

(Quirk, 1953: 511).

Carranza was aided by the troops of General Alvaro Obregon. Son of a "once wealthy rancho who had fallen on hard times", Obregon was more receptive to radical demands. His army mainly consisted of well-to-do ranchers and was therefore known as 'the Rich Man's Battalion' (Dillon, 1956: 262). Obregon was

by no means a socialist, but favored nationalist legislation and agrarian and labor reforms which would at one and the same time curtail United States encroachment, break the power of the great landed families, and widen opportunities in the market for both labor and his kind of middle class. (Wolf, 1969: 39).

Thus the Mexican Revolution, broadly speaking, had two forces - the radical forces led by Zapata and Villa who sought the liquidation of the latifundia system, the restoration of communal village lands, a program of land reform and a higher and more secure standard of living for the working class, the right to unionize, to strike and other democratic rights of the workers; and the conservative forces led by Carranza and Obregon who sought to fashion a state on the principle of constitutional democracy. The radicalism of Zapata and Villa was abhorred by the Constitutionalists, although for the sake of tactical advantage, they had to accept some of the radical demands.¹⁷

The Revolution succeeded with the blood of the peasant and working class armies of Zapata and Villa; but it gave political power to Carranza and Obregon, the Constitutionalists. The gains made by the radical forces were undermined "by the manipulations of politicians like Carranza who represented the aspirations of land-owners, industrialists, and a highly mobile and ambitious middle class." Although they were the principal actors in the revolutionary drama, at no point the radical forces were able to hold national power (Frank, 1962). Zapata was treacherously assassinated in 1919; Pancho Villa faced the same fate four years later. With Constitutionalists at the top, a new ruling coalition emerged. This ruling coalition was composed of (a) the new elite of revolutionary generals who amassed land and wealth during the Revolution;¹⁸ (b) industrialists and businessmen who had prospered during and immediately after the Revolution; and (c) members of the old landed oligarchy who could preserve their wealth by switching allegiance to the new regime. The reconstruction and economic development that followed the Revolution consolidated the economic and political power of this ruling coalition. Beneficiaries of the Revolution and the traditional landed aristocracy usurped the benefits of the post-revolutionary economic development and formed the new bourgeoisie.

The viable economic base of the more aristocratic upper class was destroyed by the Revolution. But many of its members and their wealth survived. Their money was invested in finance, commerce, industry and later again in agriculture; and the ex-aristocrats became the nucleus of the new bourgeoisie. Their ranks were soon supplemented by their erstwhile enemies, the individual beneficiaries of the same Revolution, many politicians and generals among them. As their economic position became consolidated, so did their political power.

(Frank, 1962: 383-84).

However, the radicals remained as an active pressure group. When in 1917 Carranza called a constitutional convention to draft a new constitution for Mexico, the Carranistas tried to prevent from attendance the followers of Zapata and Villa. Yet the elected representatives from different regions of Mexico were agrarian radicals and they formed the effective majority.

The resulting constitution bore the imprint of the radicals. Secular education, separation of Church and State, liquidation of the latifundium and land reform, wide-ranging labor legislation, and an assertion of the eminent domain of the nation over resources within the country were all written into constitutional provisions that became the law of the land.

(Wolf, 1969: 43).

Article 27 of the Constitution included most of Zapata's land reform provisions. When Carranza bypassed these provisions and refused to implement land reform measures, the Zapatistas fought against Carranza. The ascendancy

to power of Obregon in 1920 gave a new impetus to land reform.¹⁹ However, land reform was not actively pursued until mid 1930s, when Cardenas assumed the presidency.

Thus it is evident that agrarian reform was imposed on a reluctant political elite by Zapatistas and peasant revolutionaries. After the assassination of Zapata in 1919, his intellectual associates carried on the struggle for agrarian reform, and the newly conscious peasantry continued to rally behind the banner of Zapata. In 1920, Diaz Soto y Gama, one of Zapata's long time chief spokesmen, formed the Partido Nacional Agrarista (National Agrarian Party, NAP) to organize the peasantry so as to put effective pressure on the new political elite. Shortly after the victorious General Obregon entered Mexico City in May 1920, Diaz Gama, as a representative of the NAP, met the new leader and was assured that the new government would give prime attention to the question of land redistribution. Shortly afterwards, Obregon signed the Ley de Ejidos (the Ejido Law), thereby giving a new impetus to land distribution (Dulles, 1961).

From then on the National Agrarian Party tried vigorously to organize the peasantry and to bear pressure on the government. In 1921 it managed to convoke a special

session of the National Congress to discuss and formulate a comprehensive agrarian reform law. Diaz Gama and his associates

traveled throughout Mexico and fomented such popular pressure by peasant groups on both President Obregon and the Congress that in 1922 the Agrarian Regulatory Law was passed. This law firmly established the ejido system as the framework within which Mexico's land reform would take place. Under the Agrarian Regulatory Law settlements on abandoned haciendas as well as villages with categoria politica were eligible to receive land, but the resident laborers on haciendas were still excluded. The size of ejido plot and the minimum amount of land exempted from expropriation were fixed, and the legal process was established for initiating petitions for ejidos and for making decisions on definitive possession.

(White, in Landsberger, ed., 1969: 163).

By 1923, the National Agrarian Party became more organized and started to coordinate the activities of various peasant groups throughout the country. By the early 1930s, peasants' confederations were organized in almost all of Mexico's states. Its first national convention in 1923 attracted "thousands of delegates representing hundreds of thousands of campesinos from all parts of Mexico". The convention aired the problems faced by peasants in organizing their ejidos and suggested measures to overcome these problems. It demanded the rescindment of the provision of court injunctions to hold up distribution of haciendas (Dulles, 1961; White, 1969). The NAP, thus, began to exert enormous influence

in the development of agrarian reform policies during the formative years of post-revolutionary Mexico. Silva-Herzog rightly comments that,

the National Agrarian Party was, during six or seven years, the genuine representative and defender of the Mexican campesinos. The brain of the party, the source of doctrine and ideology - we know by personal experience - was Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama. (qt. in White, 1969: 164).

The growing power and influence of the NAP eventually became a threat to the new elites. Organized peasantry began to be looked upon as a threat to political stability and to the emerging power structure. As a result there emerged a growing conflict between the National Agrarian Party and the political elites in power. The conflict first surfaced seriously in 1924 during the presidency of Calles, Obregon's successor. Calles tried to undermine the power of the agraristas. It was during Calles' term that a new law was passed that allowed the distribution of ejido land in small plots to individual owners for private cultivation (Simpson, 1937: 88-90).

The continued radicalism of the organized peasantry posed a serious threat to the power of the new Revolutionary Family led at that time by General Obregon and Calles. Therefore, they tried to contain the peasant radicalism,

to take the National Agrarian Party within the official fold. The revolutionary military leaders who amassed fortunes through their participation in the Revolution and loyalty to the two top men who controlled the Mexican presidency between 1920 and 1934, Generals Obregon and Calles, also supported this move to contain peasant radicalism.²⁰ In 1929 Calles and Portes Gil (who succeeded Calles as president) took the initiative to form an 'official' party - Partido Revolucionario Nacional (PRN), and to attach the various interest groups including the NAP to this official party. The NAP was brought into this new official party; but its founder and guiding light, Diaz Soto y Gama, was carefully excluded (White, 1969: 164). The formation of this official party and the attempt to accommodate all other interest groups within this party, seriously jeopardized the independence and autonomy of peasant movements. The NAP and with it the entire peasant movement were subjugated to the interests of the official party. The Revolutionary Family, through the PRN, tried to concentrate and consolidate the power of all political parties and politically active groups into its own hands. To quote White (1969: 164),

It soon became apparent that Calles had gathered the power of the various parties into his own hands and that the campesinos had lost an autonomous party which was primarily responsive to their demands and which articulated their interests.

It is at this point when the Agrarian Party was absorbed into the official Revolutionary Party and lost the independence that Zapata had so tenaciously fought for, that the Zapatista movement can be said to have ceased to exist as an autonomous, collective force.

The agraristas, however, fought back and gained several concessions from the veteranos (the old Revolutionaries). The major agrarista figures of this period were Gilberto Fabila, Marte Gomez, Narcisco Bassols and Graciano Sanchez. They continued to carry on the Zapata movement, mostly through legal manoeuvres. The Agrarian Code of 1934 was the greatest victory for these agraristas and it greatly speeded up land redistribution by making it possible for hacienda communities to petition for ejido land and to obtain definitive possession within 150 days of petitioning. Soon afterwards, during the presidency of Cardenas who shared the agrarista's positive view of the ejido program, land redistribution made its greatest advance in Mexican history (White, 1969; Hansen, 1971).

Gradually, however, the strength of the agraristas and of the NAP waned. Cardenas revamped the party, renamed it as Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC) was created

to form the agrarian sector of the PRI. Cardenas intended to give a voice to the peasants within the PRI. In reality, however, the CNC became another organ of the PRI tightly controlled by the PRI leadership and ultimately by the Revolutionary Family. It is this degeneration of the CNC into a carefully controlled organ of the PRI rather than an independent force representing the peasantry, that robbed the campesino of its power to effectively influence agrarian reform policies. Land distribution, as a consequence, suffered seriously. Gradually, it (land distribution) became a symbolic gesture on the part of the president to the campesinos. Land distribution became, for all practical purposes, a ritual performed periodically by the head of the state (as well as head of the Revolutionary Family) either to ensure his control over the CNC or to pay lip service to the principle of social justice and equality, so enshrined in the Revolution itself.²¹

Thus it is evident that the organized peasantry played the most crucial role in Mexican land reform. The Revolution did not fundamentally alter the character of the political elite, but it drastically changed the character of the peasantry, at least for the time being. It not only organized the peasantry, thereby giving them power, but also altered the psyche of the campesino.

The peasantry became aware of its rights; it gave the peasantry a sense of pride and self-confidence. It was this conscious, organized and frequently violent peasantry that forced the political elite to initiate and implement land reform measures. As soon as the political elite succeeded in subordinating the organized peasantry to its own political machine, its enthusiasm for land reform also declined. The Mexican experience, thus, gives credence to the idea that a conscious, organized peasantry is almost a prerequisite for successful initiation and implementation of land reform programs. In such cases, the demand for land reform comes from below and the political elite more or less responds to this demand. At the same time, the Mexican Revolution also points out the fact that the survival and effectiveness of a peasant organization depend not only on the radicalism of a peasantry but on other factors too, such as, the character of its leadership, the support of other groups, and so on. The next section attempts to elaborate these points.

D. Peasant Organization: Structural Obstacles

It is evident that among the countries under study only Mexico experienced a genuine land reform and that this can be attributed, to a large extent, to the peasant

movement that swept Mexico during 1910-1920. Land reform measures were initiated and implemented in Mexico so long as the organized peasantry was able to exert effective pressure. Once the political elite was successful in containing the peasant movement within its own political apparatus, land reform lost much of its vigor. It is intriguing how the peasant movement lost its independent identity and was made subservient to the 'official' political party. It is more intriguing to explain why Mexican style peasant movement did not emerge in other developing countries under scrutiny. What prevented the peasants to organize in India, Pakistan or Bangladesh? Why did the Colombian Vionencia fail to significantly alter the land tenure system? Lack of detailed data would not allow such intensive inquiry into the factors responsible for the lack of Mexican style peasant movement in each of the sample countries. Therefore, an attempt is made to discuss the problems of peasant organization and movement in developing countries as outlined by various theorists. It should be noted that peasant movement does not necessarily involve Mexican-style violence. A social movement, according to Herberle (1951),

aims at bringing about fundamental changes in the social order, especially in the basic institutions of property and labour relationships... a commotion, a stirring among people, an unrest, a

collective attempt to reach a visualized goal, especially a change in certain social institutions.

Defining the peasant as "being a rural cultivator of low economic and political status", Landsberger (1969, 1974) argued that the term peasant movement refers to "any collective reaction of the peasantry to such low status." More precisely, it can be said that peasant movement means (a) collective action of the peasantry, (b) under the banner of certain organization (e.g., a political party, or parties, or otherwise politically active groups), with a view to (c) bring about favorable changes in certain socioeconomic institutions.

(i) Peasants as passive and resistant to change

Peasants have long been characterized as politically passive and ideologically naive. Anthropologists Diaz and Potter (1967: 159), for example, noted that "(i)n Latin America... the striking thing is the relative absence of a sense of association, which makes it extremely difficult for peasants in this area to organize to meet the challenges of the modern world." In a similar tone, sociologists Landsberger and Hewitt (1970: 559) concluded that "(i)t is unfortunate but true that peasant organizations have been difficult to establish in Latin America." Social scientists working in Asia seem to have gained similar experience. Talking about

the peasants in India and Pakistan, Ladejinsky (1964: 456) noted:

The cultivators themselves, although dissatisfied, have not developed any movement, be it in the form of tenant unions in Japan before the reforms, or political peasant parties, as in Eastern Europe after the First World War.... mostly the peasants behaved as if every change in their conditions depends on somebodyelse. By their apathy they refuted the reasonable assumption that in an agrarian country a government must be supported by the peasantry. The central and federal parliaments in Asia do not represent the interests of the peasantry; were it otherwise, the reform would have taken a fully different character. The reality is: even if the vote is free, the peasantry in Asia does not yet vote according to its own interests.

Political scientists discovered similar negative traits among the peasantry. Adie and Poitras (1974: 49) found the vast majority of peasants "essentially apolitical", and, therefore, they reasoned, "peasants aspire to nothing other than what they have, they will not make demands on the political system." Williams and Wright (1975: 155) argued that "the peasantry has simply repudiated politics", while Mathiason and Powell seem to have gathered enough evidence to suggest that,

peasants are conservative, that they are difficult to organize, and that they tend to be passive, feel politically powerless, and lack interest in politics. (Mathiason and Powell, 1972: 304).

Numerous attempts have been made to explain this social and political passivity of the peasantry, and its reluctance to take active part in the processes of socioeconomic change and development. Two basic trends can be discerned in these explanations; one emphasizes the personality traits of the peasantry, while the other emphasizes the structural conditions of peasants' lives.²² Banfield, Foster and Erasmus are the leading proponents of a docile, passive and traditional peasant psyche; while among the authors emphasizing structural factors, the most noteworthy are Ernest Feder and Huizer.

(ii) Foster, Banfield and Erasmus: traditional peasant psyche

Foster introduced the term 'image of the limited good' to describe the peasant psyche that may explain why peasants espouse conservatism, show little enthusiasm for change and lack interest in exploiting new social and economic opportunities. It was during fieldwork in Tzintzuntzan, a peasant village in northern Mexico, that Foster discovered this peasant psyche. So long, Foster argues,

(t)he kinds of behavior that have been suggested as adversely influencing economic growth are, among many, the 'luck' syndrome, a 'fatalistic' outlook, inter- and intra-familial quarrels, difficulties in co-operation, extra-ordinary ritual expenses by poor people and the problems these expenses

pose for capital accumulation, and the apparent lack of what the psychologist McClelland has called "Need for Achievement".

(Foster, 1965: 196).

According to Foster, all these attributes may be traced back to the peasants' view of the world, their cognitive model of the world, which is strikingly different from that of other categories of people. For the peasant the world is essentially finite in which one's gains are always at the expense of somebody else's; it is a zero-sum game. To quote Foster,

In Tzintzuntzan, and by extension other peasant communities, I believe that a great deal of behavior can be explained if it is viewed as a function of the assumption that almost all good things in life, material and otherwise, exist in limited and unexpandable quantities. If the most valued expressions of goods such as wealth, friendship, love, masculinity and power exist in finite, constant quantities, it logically follows that someone's improvement with respect to any of these forms can only be at the expense of others. This view - that individual improvement can only be at the cost of that of others - seems to me to be the key to understanding why Tzintzuntzenos behave as they do. It also explains why they often seem so conservative in their views, so timid in accepting the opportunities a changing world increasingly offers them.

(Foster, 1967: 12).

Thus, according to Foster, peasants perceive their social world as a finite one, where goods available are scarce and limited. Since one's gain means someone else's

loss, those who try to take in an inappropriate share of this limited good are socially scorned and disliked. It is this image of the limited good that discourages the peasant to be aggressive and demonstrate more initiative and entrepreneurial spirit. Peasants, therefore, are not responsive to change, show little interest in taking risk or to take an active role in the processes of development. So it is difficult to organize peasants and more so to make them take part in struggles for socioeconomic change and development.

Gerrit Huizer (1972, 1973) challenged not only the correctness of Foster's data, but also the validity of his theoretical conclusions. According to Huizer (1972), Foster paid little attention to the fact that the peasants of the state of Michoacan (in which Tzintzuntzan is located) took active part in the Mexican Revolution and in the subsequent struggle for agrarian reform that followed.²³ Therefore, according to Huizer, it is misleading to characterize the peasantry as essentially conservative or passive.²⁴

Banfield coined the term 'amoral familism' to describe the peasant culture. Peasants are family centered, their world does not usually transcend the immediate family. Moreover, they are suspicious and distrustful

and envious of others. They are not in competition with one another, but rather in conflict for scarce resources. In this conflict, there is hardly any place for moral values. It is a bitter conflict where the end justifies the means. Peasants are amoral familists and, therefore, can hardly take any collective stand. According to Banfield,

in a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interests of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so.... For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as abnormal and even improper. (Banfield, 1958: 83-84).

While carrying out fieldwork in northwestern Mexico (states of Sonora and Sinaloa), Charles Erasmus also noticed a mentality of resistance to change among the peasants. Erasmus developed the term 'encogido syndrom' to characterize the peasants' attitude. The term was used by the local people to refer to someone who is timid and withdrawn and generally avoids persons of higher status. Conversely, a person who is aggressive and rather too willing to interact with persons of higher status to earn economic and social advantages was called *entron*. Generally speaking, the peasants have *encogido* personality. It is this *encogido* personality which holds, to use Foster's term, the image of the limited good.²⁵

It is because of this encogido personality that we find a situation in Sonora, much like that in Bolivia, where a peasant population has been provided with opportunities for advancement but has persisted in clinging to order, more primitive patterns of consumption. (Erasmus, 1965: 631).

According to Erasmus, the expectations of encogido personality are too low

to motivate him to look around. Frequently, when I asked peasants if they would not like to have refrigerators and gas stoves like the people in the towns, they replied that they would, of course, but that poor people like them could never expect to have such things. (Erasmus, 1965: 631).

Thus Erasmus also characterized the peasant as timid, passive, conservative and resistant to change. However, history of peasant movements in various countries (including Mexico where both Foster and Erasmus had their fieldwork) do not support the idea that peasants are inherently timid or resistant to change. Moreover, although Banfield, Foster and Erasmus may have been successful in describing the pattern of peasant behavior, they clearly avoided the problem of explaining why the peasantry behaves as it does. Huizer rightly argues:

it seems that Banfield, Foster and Erasmus, although aware of some of the wider and political implications of the resistance to change of the peasants, limited themselves to the

introduction of concepts (amoral familism, the image of the limited good and ecogido syndrom respectively) which only describe or qualify the behavior of the peasants, but do not clearly indicate or explain the motivations behind it.

(Huizer, 1972: 60).

(iii) Peasants as victims: Huizer and Feder

Ernest Feder and Huizer tried to explain the phenomenon that Banfield, Foster and Erasmus discovered - peasants' passivity and resistance to change. Huizer coined the term 'culture of repression' to describe the structural conditions in which the peasantry finds itself and to which it reacts or adapts by being passive or resistant to change. Huizer too derived his hypothesis from fieldwork in Latin America where the rural sector is dominated by a latifundia-minifundia complex, and where

plainly speaking, ownership or control of land is power in the sense of real or potential ability to make another person do one's will. Power over rural labor is reflected in tenure institutions which bind workers to the land while conceding them little income and few continuing rights.

(Barracough and Domike, 1966: 392).

This latifundia-minifundia complex meant servitude for the peasantry, and this servitude is maintained by force and by creating a climate of fear, uncertainty and insecurity among the peasants. This fear of losing

the job, of hunger, punishment and property loss has produced among the peasants an almost pathological mentality. In a typical estate in the Peruvian highlands, for example,

the Vicos manor serf suffered from a number of forms of fears - so many, and often so serious that we entertain some doubts as to whether the local subculture ever really worked out effective escapes from danger that permitted the serf to enjoy a state of relaxation. In the most general terms of interpersonal interaction, the serf regards all human relationships as hostile, since they are basically power-oriented. (Holmberg, qt. in Huizer, 1972: 9).

Severe repression is used to buy conformity from the subdued peasantry. The more the traditional hacienda system felt threatened by modernizing influences among the peasantry (e.g., education, development of communication/transportation facilities, and so on), the more repressive the power elite became. The peasantry is forced to live under this culture of repression and in Latin America in particular it has been continuing for the last few centuries. Peasants' attitude to change, their distrust of others and their conservatism can be made intelligible only when understood in the context of this culture of repression. The concepts of amoral familism, the image of the limited good or the *encogido* syndrom have viewed peasants' resistance to change or

distrust of others as inherent general characteristics of peasant personality; the culture of repression, on the contrary, views them as quite pragmatic response of the peasantry to the structural conditions in which he finds himself.²⁶ To quote Huizer,

(s)ome observers give the impression that characteristics such as distrustfulness, lack of innovative spirit, fatalism, family-orientedness, dependence on government, and lack of cosmopolitan orientation are part of a generalized subculture of peasantry, without stressing the fact that such a subculture may be determined by culture of repression as it prevails in the rural areas in most of Latin America.
(Huizer, 1972: 19).

Ernest Feder (1969) emphasized the same point when he noted that it is the entire social structure which keeps the peasantry subservient, powerless and ineffective. The latifundio system is based on the 'economic, social, and political weakness' of the peasantry and a 'whole set of institutions and mechanisms has been developed' to maintain this system. The peasantry lacks bargaining power either as individuals or as a group. A labor surplus on land, subsistence income and "strong social and political pressures originating from the rural power elite to prevent peasants from organizing, have so far proven to be almost unsurmountable obstacles to raising individual and collective bargaining power".

(Feder, 1970: 400). Organized collective action is the only way for the peasantry to gain some bargaining power under conditions of extreme poverty and surplus labor. However, the whole social structure seems to turn against the peasantry whenever it attempts to exercise the right to organize.

Peasants face an entire environment hostile to collective action. In practical terms, this results from the efforts of the rural power elite to isolate farm people from the remainder of society and to atomize their efforts. When farm people try to gain additional rights and privileges for themselves, this must be viewed as an attempt to close the gap between themselves and the outside, nonfarm world. In this sense, the "integration" of farm people into the economy implies the breakdown of the economic, political, and social barriers which have been erected to keep them in isolation.
(Feder, 1969: 400).

Thus, it is through isolating the peasantry from the broader society, by atomizing its efforts that the elites maintain their power and privileges. Deceit, violence and repression are used to obstruct the formation of peasant organizations.

...(p)easants are surrounded by a society hostile to improving their lot, which is to lead a life at the subsistence level, and the various institutions are all linked together and combine to deprive them of the ways and means to improve their status.... Hopelessness is characteristic for the peasants in large parts of the Latin America of today because they know, instinctively

or by experience, that under present conditions even honest large-scale efforts to improve their lot seem to be bound to failure.
(Feder, 1969: 450).

The culture of repression, therefore, is the most important factor contributing to peasants' resistance to change. To organize the peasantry, to ensure their involvement in the processes of social change and development the first task is to change this culture of repression. In other words, the active participation of the peasantry in the formulation and implementation of land reform policies presupposes the abolishment of the culture of repression that engulfs the life of the peasantry. How this could be done is a matter of great controversy. However, the community development approach advocated by the United Nations and the World Bank seems to have significant potential in this respect.

(iv) Other structural factors

Although the culture of repression is of paramount importance, it seems that it cannot entirely explain the phenomenon of peasant behavior. Culture of repression, it can safely be assumed, characterizes the peasantries of all the developing countries under study. If so, how can the peasant movements be explained? What led the peasantry to break through the barriers of the culture

of repression and engage in rebellion in Mexico during 1910-1920? Or in Colombia during 1949-1958? Why didn't the South Asian countries, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, experience peasant movement in such a wide scale? Taking the culture of repression as a constant factor, how can such peasant radicalism be explained? Although it is beyond the scope of the present research endeavor, certain hypotheses regarding peasant radicalism may briefly be discussed.

Landsberger (1969), Wolf (1969a, 1969b), Huizer (1972, 1973) and others tried to develop certain hypotheses to explain peasant movement - its occurrence, leadership structure, composition, ideological orientation, mode of operation and the like.²⁷ They all seem to agree that certain degree of modernization and the resultant socioeconomic and political changes are necessary for the occurrence of peasant movements. To quote Wolf,

(t)he peasant rebellions of the twentieth century are no longer simple responses to local problems, if indeed they ever were. They are but the parochial reactions to major social dislocations, set in motion by overwhelming societal change. The spread of the market has torn men up by their roots, and shaken them loose from the social relationships into which they were born. Industrialization and expanded communication have given rise to new social clusters, as yet unsure of their

own social positions and interests, but forced by the very imbalance of their lives to seek new adjustment. Traditional political authority has eroded or collapsed; new contenders for power are seeking new constituencies for entry into the vacant political arena. Thus when the peasant protagonist lights the torch of rebellion, the edifice of society is already smouldering and ready to take fire. When the battle is over, the structure will not be the same. (Wolf, 1969b).

Similarly, according to Landsberger,

Peasant movements are most likely to occur in societies where traditional elites have lost ground relative to newer elites through objective economic changes in the importance and structure of agriculture or objective political changes, such as war. (Landsberger, 1969: 23).

In other words, according to Landsberger and Wolf, peasant movements are preceded by (a) a certain degree of modernization (measured in terms of industrialization, urbanization, etc.); (b) emergence of new elites competing for political power, and (c) relative loss of power by the traditional elite.

Other factors also seem to be equally important. Following Landsberger's hypothesis regarding the character of the participants in peasant movements,²⁸ it can be said that peasant movement can hardly occur where the peasantry is too poor (both in absolute and relative terms), where the land-man ratio is too high

depressing the standard of living. A high land-man ratio also means there is more competition for land among the peasantry and that, as a consequence, the peasantry has little room for manoeuvre. A poor peasantry fighting each other intensely to gain access to a meagre plot of land can hardly initiate or sustain rebellion. To attack the power of the landlord, the attacking peasantry must have some economic independence from him, either being relatively well-to-do, or being "located in a peripheral area outside the domains of landlord control" (Wolf, 1969b).

The poor peasant or the landless labourer who depends on a landlord for the largest part of his livelihood, or the totality of it, has no tactical power; he is completely within the power domain of his employer, without sufficient resources of his own to serve him usefully in the power struggle. Poor peasants and landless labourers, therefore, are unlikely to pursue the course of rebellion unless they are able to rely on some external power to challenge the power which constraints them.
(Wolf, 1969b).

In other words, peasant movement is not likely to occur in a country where (a) population density (particularly in the rural sector) is high; and (b) there is a high percentage of poor peasants/landless laborers.

From these arguments it follows that Latin America is more likely to experience peasant movements than

South Asia. Modernization (measured in terms of industrialization and urbanization) has definitely made more inroads into Latin America. In 1975, for example, 62 percent of the population in Mexico, and 64 percent of the population in Colombia were living in urban areas. In contrast, India had only 20 percent of its population in urban areas (1974), Pakistan slightly more than 25 percent (1972), and Bangladesh only about 9 percent (1975). Per capita income is higher in Latin American countries than in South Asian ones; on the other hand, the SACs have a much higher land-man ratio and a greater percentage of poor peasants and landless laborers (chapter III). In short, the Latin American countries are more likely to experience violent peasant upheavals demanding structural and institutional changes in the rural sector.

However, as the Mexican experience demonstrates, the long-term effectiveness of a peasant movement depends on its ability to transform itself into a stable organization - an union, a peasant league, or a political party articulating the demands of the peasantry. Following Herberle (1951), Wolf (1969), and Landsberger (1969) it can be said that the following factors should be taken into consideration in understanding the origins, structure and outcome of a peasant movement (and

subsequently of a peasant organization):

(a) the economic and political structure of the larger society in which the peasant movement takes place;

(b) the events or catalysts preceding the movement;

(c) the mass base of the movement;

(d) the relative strength of the allies and enemies of the movement. In this respect, the most crucial factor is the degree of alliance between the peasantry and other sectors of the society from which it may expect support (e.g. the urban working class, the intelligentsia and the like);

(e) the ideology of the movement; and

(f) the character of the leadership.

These factors are clearly interdependent; one can hardly be treated in isolation from the others. However, following Wolf (1969) and Huntington (1968), it seems two factors are of paramount importance in analyzing the character, effectiveness and outcome of a peasant organization:

(a) whether and to what degree the organization is successful in enlisting the support of other potential forces from the urban sector. Most crucial in this respect is the alliance between the peasantry and the urban working class and the intelligentsia; and

(b) the source of recruitment and character of the leadership. As Landsberger noted (1969), often a substantial proportion of the leadership is drawn not from within the peasantry, but 'from the same groups which, when they act as groups, are the peasants' allies: the craftsmen and shopkeepers of market towns, urban intellectuals, lower clergy, lawyers, and the like'.

Thus, the complexity of analyzing peasant movement is evident; its origin, structure and outcome depend on so many interrelated historical, structural and socio-economic factors. A peasant movement may take different forms under different circumstances; under certain circumstances it may gradually lead to the formation of a peasant organization. Similarly, under certain circumstances a peasant organization may launch a movement whose form, content and outcome would be influenced by a host of other factors. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to precisely identify the factors responsible for the relative absence of effective peasant movement and peasant organization in the selected developing countries save Mexico during 1910-1940. However, it is evident that without effective peasant organization genuine land reform can hardly be initiated.

NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. Various authors have stressed the definitive links between land ownership and institutional positions of power in the political system of Pakistan (K.B. Sayeed, 1967; LaPorte, 1975; K. Siddiqui, 1972). LaPorte quoted one anonymous source that described these linkages in the following way: "Traditionally the Punjab has been a squirearchy not unsimilar to that of 17th and 18th century England. By this I mean that the key rural families controlled politics through elections and the holding of appointive offices. They have also maintained close family links with the bureaucracy at the higher levels and with the officer corps in the military. Lower level bureaucrats and other ranks in the military were often recruited from the areas in which the landlords held sway.... The dominance of rural elites in alliance with some urban elements which dominated before independence continued after independence. It is possible, but only in retrospect, to see, perhaps, some diminution of this in the more highly developed agricultural districts along the Grand Trunk Road (Multan, Montgomery, Lahore, Lyallpur, Sheikhpura, Gujranwala and Sialkot) during the late stages of the Ayub period (1958-1969). The elites cooperated with Ayub almost to a man - as indeed they had with the Mughal, Sikh, British and pre-Ayub Pakistani regimes" (LaPorte, 1975: 126).

2. The partition of India in 1947 on the basis of religion resulted in "one of the largest and quickest mass migrations in human history". In a period of one year, Pakistan as a whole received more than seven million Moslems from India and lost about six million Hindus. From East Pakistan (what is now Bangladesh) alone about 2.5 million Hindus left for India and .7 million Moslems came in. The largest migration occurred in West Pakistan (Nafis Ahmad, An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1968).

3. Those who left East Pakistan for India were mostly from upper-class socioeconomic background. One study suggests that among those who migrated to India from East Pakistan only 11.9 percent were either engaged in agriculture or derived their income from agriculture. A vast majority of the emigrants (88%) were engaged in non-agricultural pursuits; they were government servants, professionals, and businessmen (M.V. George, Internal Migration in Assam and Bengal, 1901-1961, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 1965). Such mass migration of professionals and businessmen gave a strong impetus to the development of an

educated moslem middle class in Bangladesh.

4. It may be noted here that in pre-1947 Bengal, the commercial and business elite was composed mainly of Hindus. Hindus dominated the bureaucracy also. At the time of partition, there were 1,157 officers in the Indian Civil Service and Indian Political Service, of whom only 101 were Moslems. 95 of them opted for Pakistan, and out of these 95 only 2 were from East Pakistan (Sayeed, 1967: 132).

5. It may be recalled that according to the Land Occupancy Survey (LOS), only "10.5% of the cultivable acreage is tilled exclusively with family labor." The remaining 81.5% of land is farmed by borgadars (share-croppers) and other types of leaseholders, and by landless laborers under the direction of local representatives of mostly absentee landowners. The LOS was conducted in 1977 by Dr. A.K.M. Gulam Rabbani of the Ministry of Planning, Government of Bangladesh in conjunction with James Peach and Tom Jannuzi of the USAID at Dacca.

6. In British India, the British administrators obviously constituted the dominant political elite. However, the discussion here will be limited to the indigenous Indian elite, particularly the leaders of the Congress Party.

7. Cf. Gopal Krishna, "The Development of Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923", The Journal of Asian Studies, xxv (May, 1966); and Ducan B. Forrester, "Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in India", The Review of Politics, xxviii (July, 1966).

8. The sad state of the opposition parties has been noted by a contemporary observer. "In the new regime the opposition parties have never been able to win a governorship or a place in the Senate, to say nothing of the presidency. Their only victories have been very modest, a few representatives at the National Congress and in a few municipal governments. In order to receive the registro that enables them to appear on the ballot and to use free time on radio and television, opposition parties have to prove that they will behave more or less as a 'loyal opposition'. They must shy away from attacking the bases of legitimacy of the system, they must not endanger the hegemony of the PRI, and they must not represent a real alternative" (Meyer, in Reynā and Weinert, 1977: 10).

9. Ironically, the PRI also shoulders the burdens of denouncing violence and delivering justice. In the words of one Mexican scholar: "The PRI proclaims democracy and denounces its own violence and constitutional violations. The PRI accuses. The PRI investigates. The PRI is judge. The PRI is witness. The PRI is jury.... The PRI executes. The PRI is the court of appeals. The PRI directs and guides.... We have had for years the same basic leaders of the PRI who are irremovable. These people circulate from position to position, from governorships to the national congress and back again. Our theory is perennial rotation. It is the logic of power. (qt. in Johnson, 1978: 17).

10. The CEN is composed of seven members: "president, general secretary, and secretaries for agrarian affairs, labor, popular action, political action representing the national senate, and political action representing the national Chamber of Deputies. Key posts in the CEN are those of labor, agrarian affairs, and popular action which usually are held respectively by top leaders of the PRI's labor sector, its agrarian sector, and the popular sector" (Johnson, 1978: 79).

11. The CEN has extensive power over the party organization. It stands at the apex of Mexican political party structure and is answerable to, and controlled by, the president of the republic. (Cf. Padgett, 1976; Johnson, 1978; Hansen, 1971).

12. According to Huntington, "in institutionalized systems, politicians expand their loyalties from social group to political institution and political community as they mount the ladder of authority. In the praetorian society the successful politician simply transfers his identity and loyalty from one social group to another. In the most extreme form, a popular demagogue may emerge, develop a widespread but poorly organized following, threaten the established interests of the rich and aristocrats, be voted into political office, and then be bought off by the very interests which he has attacked. In less extreme forms, the individuals who mount the ladder to wealth and power simply transfer their allegiance from the masses to the oligarchy. They are absorbed or captured by a social force with narrower interests than that to which they previously owed allegiance. The rise to the top in an institutionalized civic polity broadens a man's horizons; in a praetorian system it narrows them" (Huntington, 1968: 197).

13. On the fusion of industrial and agricultural capitalists in developing countries, Havens and Flinn note: "internal colonialism has characterized the structural arrangements of most Third World countries immediately following their "independence" from the colonial powers. As these internal colonial powers became established, a class structure emerged which was largely described by the classical Marxian concepts of early capitalism, landowners, capitalists, and wage laborers. However, as the traditional colonial structure began to crumble and as world wars forced the major antagonists to seek new sources of raw materials and new industrial bases in case their own were attacked, external pressures deformed this traditional class structure. The competing interests of the landowners and the capitalists disappeared. Landowners found greater sources of profit in industry and capitalists found land to be a source of prestige and an excellent hedge against inflation as the demand for products shifted in the world market thrust upon Third World countries. The landowners and capitalists found it in their best interests to merge rather than to struggle amongst themselves" (Havens and Flinn, 1970: 20).

14. The Mexican Revolution is the bloodiest conflict ever witnessed in the Western Hemisphere. In terms of the proportion of population lost, it is perhaps the most violent in human history. In 1910, Mexico had a population of only 14.5 million; by 1920, more than 1.5 million people lost their lives. It is reported that, as a direct result of the Revolution, a total of 8,000 villages disappeared completely from the map of Mexico. (Cf. Hellman, 1978; Wolf, 1969a; Tannenbaum, 1937).

15. Pancho Villa had a humble origin. In his youth, he worked as a peon on a large hacienda. However, the greatest part of his life was spent as a cattle rustler, and a bandit, an outlaw. By 1910, Villa built up a reputation as Robin Hood who took from the rich to give to the poor. (Cf. Wolf, 1969a; Tannenbaum, 1937).

16. Zapata was born in 1879 in San Miguel Anenecuilco, close to Cuautla in the state of Morelos. His father owned a small farm. From early years he was active in peasant struggles. He was a charismatic leader and a brilliant peasant organizer. In the agrarian revolution of Mexico Zapata is considered the single most important influence. Even today he is revered as the symbol of peasant rebellion. (Cf. Womack, 1970).

17. In 1914 the Zapatistas and Villistas called a convention to articulate their demands. The convention was dominated by anarchist and socialist rhetoric. Its demands produced horror among the Constitutionalists so much so that they "refused to accept the sovereignty of the Convention when they realized that this organism was dominated by the Vilistas and Zapatistas, or rather, by the radicals, by the rabble of the Revolution. They thought that stability could never be attained if the reins of the government were placed in the hands of the radicals. The Constitutionalists were controlled, on the other hand, by various lawyers and men experienced in the art of ruling. Carranza had been senator and governor. Palaviani, Macias, Cabrera, and Rojas had been congressmen during Madero's administration." (Quirk, 1953: 506).

18. A large number of army chiefs, particularly from among Pancho Villa's Army of the North, amassed wealth and appropriated large tracts of land for themselves. As Parkes (1950: 338-39) noted, their slogans were land, liberty and democracy, "but for most of them, as they rode southwards on troop trains... the Revolution meant power and plunder."

19. Carranza was assassinated in 1920. Obregon came to power with the help of the Zapatistas and, therefore, was more inclined to implement land reform measures.

20. Plunder and accumulation of wealth by revolutionary military leaders were common features of Mexican political scene. To quote Hansen (1971: 159), "Military fortunes were accumulated by those generals and colonels who remained loyal to the two men who controlled the Mexican presidency between 1920 and 1934, Generals Obregon and Calles. As in the Diaz system, loyalty was rewarded with lucre, and the sources of wealth were very similar to those of the earlier period. The traditional pattern reemerged at the state level as well. Governorships were used as they had been under Diaz to build personal fortunes, and the local and district office holders were given carte blanche to steal, embezzle and murder so long as they could deliver the needed support to keep the governor and his coterie in power."

21. Johnson (1978: 47) observed: "In recent years such grants of land took on meaning to the extent that the land had value without introducing artificial means (for example, irrigation) of giving it such value. President

Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40) is remembered for his vast distribution of naturally valuable land to many peasants. More recent presidents have made land distribution into a more symbolic gesture. President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) is said to have distributed land of which some 85 percent was worthless. President Luis Echeverria (1970-76) made a major grant of valuable land in the northwestern state of Sonora only three weeks before his presidency ended, thus leaving to his successor a solution of the bitter fighting that ensued between peasants and latifundistas, the large landowners."

22. It is not implied that those emphasizing the personality traits do not recognize, or totally reject the structural conditions. On the contrary, such personality traits are often explained in terms of certain structural features of peasant society. However, they have emphasized these personality traits to such an extent that all other factors were treated as secondary.

23. Huizer (1972: 51), for example, observed: "Foster apparently did not take into account the hard realities of the agrarian struggle in the area he studied and the fact that peasant leaders risked their lives for the common good on many occasions."

24. For other criticisms of Foster's model see: J.W. Bennet, "Further remarks on Foster's 'Image of the Limited Good'", American Anthropologist, (68) 1966; D. Kaplan and B. Sadler, "Foster's Image of the Limited Good: An Example of Anthropological Explanation", American Anthropologist (68), 1966; J.G. Kennedy, "Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good", American Anthropologist (68), 1966.

25. Cf. Huizer, 1972: 54.

26. Foster also on occasion mentioned the circumstances that may help understand peasants' behavior. Consider his following observation: "The behavior of a peasant villager, however stubborn and unreasoned it may seem to an outsider, is the product of centuries of experience. It is an effective protective device in a relatively unchanging world. It is less effective in a rapidly industrializing world, and ultimately it becomes a hindrance. But the peasant is pragmatic; he is not going to discard the clothing that has served him well until he is convinced that he will profit by so doing. He sees that the future holds new things, but he remembers the past: 'Our lives are oppressed by many fears; We fear the rent collector, we fear the police watchman, we fear everyone

who looks as though he might claim some authority over us; we fear our creditors, we fear our patrons, we fear too much rain, we fear locusts, we fear thieves, we fear the evil spirits which threaten our children and our animals, and we fear the strength of our neighbor" (Foster, 1962: 57).

27. The present study is primarily interested in explaining the relationship between peasant movements and land reform. Other aspects of peasant movements are not discussed here.

28. According to Landsberger (1969: 39): "It will be the better-off sectors of the peasantry who will be more likely to organize, and certainly the most depressed sectors who will be underrepresented. Within each group, the better-off individuals, certainly not the least well-off groups, will furnish proportionately more leadership and activists."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although it runs the risk of being repetitive, it may be worthwhile to state, very briefly, the broad objectives pursued by the present study before summarizing the findings. It had three prime objectives:

(a) to analyze the land tenure systems in five developing countries with a view to determining how far they are characterized by (i) concentration of landholdings, and (ii) asymmetric tenancy arrangements. Since these two features are widely recognized as 'impediments' to socioeconomic development, a land tenure system characterized by these features is regarded as providing the objective material conditions for land reform. In other words, such a 'defective' land tenure system serves as the rationale for the initiation of land reform programs;

(b) to critically examine the major land reform programs undertaken in a sample of five countries. The quality of a particular land reform program is determined, along with other factors, on the basis of the following core variables: (i) the percentage of the rural population affected by the land reform program; (ii) the percentage of agricultural land affected by the program; and (iii) the ratio of proposed land ceiling to the average size of farm. It is assumed that these core

variables roughly indicate the potentiality of a land reform program in realizing the cherished goals of increasing agricultural productivity and reducing socioeconomic inequality. The experience of Japan, Taiwan, and China seem to suggest a close relationship between a land reform program's scores on these variables and its effectiveness in realizing the social and economic goals. In these cases, the land reform programs affected a large percentage of the rural population, and of the agricultural land (more than 40 per cent). At the same time, the ratio of proposed land ceiling to the average farm size was quite low (less than 4:1). An analysis of the major land reform programs in the sampled countries in terms of these variables is made to determine their qualities and their potential value in realizing the stated goals. Accordingly, land reform programs are divided into two broad categories - palliative, where political goals (gaining legitimacy, power consolidation, etc.) are pursued, and reformative, where the developmental goals are emphasized; and

(c) to analyze the role of political elites and the peasantry in the initiation and implementation of land reform programs. However, since the study is based on secondary data, a unique method is followed to analyze their roles. The character of political elites in the sample countries is discussed. It is argued that if the

political elite is the determining factor, its character would differ substantially from the countries that experienced reformative land reform (here, Mexico) to the countries that experienced palliative ones (Colombia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). In the event of no such fundamental difference between political elites of these two groups of countries, peasant movement and/or organization is offered as an alternative explanatory variable. The role of peasant movement in a country that experienced reformative land reform is therefore discussed. Certain theories explaining the incidence of lack of peasant movement in developing countries in general are also briefly discussed to illuminate the problem of land reform and rural development in the Third World.

Land tenure system in the sampled countries

It is quite evident that the land tenure systems of all the countries sampled are characterized by what has been termed 'defective' features - concentration of landholdings and asymmetric tenancy arrangements, although their degree varies from country to country.

Unequal distribution of land not only characterized the land tenure systems of these countries, it often actually increased over time. In India, for example, the

Gini index of land concentration was 0.628 in 1953-54, in 1961-62, it increased to 0.650 and by 1971-72, to 0.66. Similarly, the Gini index of land concentration in Bangladesh increased from 0.511 in 1960 to 0.57 in 1974. Pakistan presents a similar picture. In 1960, the Gini index of land concentration in Pakistan was 0.615; in that year almost a quarter of the Pakistani farm families controlled only 0.7 per cent of the total agricultural land, while almost 43 per cent of the farmland was owned by only 7 per cent of the rural households.

The Latin American countries, in general, demonstrate a more unequal distribution of land. In Colombia, for example, the top 1 per cent of the rural households in 1960 controlled 45 per cent of the total agricultural land, while almost 69 per cent of the farm families were left with a mere 5.5 per cent of the land to earn their livelihood. Perhaps, pre-revolution Mexico demonstrates the highest degree of land concentration - a mere 5 per cent of the rural households (hacienda) occupying 93 per cent of the farmland in 1930. However, while land concentration apparently increased over time in the South Asian countries, in the Latin American countries it showed some decline. Mexico registered by far the biggest decline in land concentration when the Gini index fell from 0.959 in 1930 to 0.694 in 1960. In

Colombia, the Gini index of land concentration declined from 0.864 in 1960 to 0.818 in 1969. Nevertheless, the degree of land concentration is still higher in the Latin American countries.

These land tenure systems are also characterized by asymmetric tenancy arrangements, indicated by significant unemployment in the rural sector, highly skewed income distribution, highly unequal access of different groups to various infrastructural institutions (e.g., institutional credit) and technology (e.g., irrigation facilities, fertilizers, high yielding varieties of seeds, etc.), concentration of political power, high land rent and so on.

In short, it may be concluded that the objective material conditions for land reform exist in the agrarian sectors of the developing countries under study.

Land reform programs in the selected countries

Land reform is meant to deal with these 'defective' features of the land tenure system, and the discussion in chapter IV amply suggests that all the developing countries under study, on various occasions, initiated a good number of land reform programs. Judging by numbers,

the history of land reform in these countries seems to be quite impressive. All of them launched quite a few land reform programs and passed an almost incredible number of land reform legislations with India heading the list.

However, the basic problem is to differentiate this multitude of land reform programs in terms of their effectiveness and potentiality of realizing the intended goals of agricultural growth and socioeconomic equality. If analyzed in terms of the core variables developed in this study, only Mexico seems to have experienced a reformative land reform. It affected 38 per cent of Mexico's land area and more than 80 per cent of its rural population. Land reform programs initiated in all other sampled countries were palliative in nature affecting neither a significant proportion of their rural population nor that of their agricultural land. The palliative nature of these land reform programs becomes more evident when the ratio of proposed land ceiling to average farm size is considered. While in Mexico the ratio of proposed land ceiling to average farm size was fixed at less than 2:1, in India it was 14, in Bangladesh 15, in Pakistan 20, and in Colombia, a staggering 88.

The character of political elites

How can this differential character of land reform in Mexico and the other sampled countries be explained? Can it be explained in terms of the differential character of political elites in these countries? An investigation into their character failed to locate any fundamental difference between the political elites in Mexico and those in the other countries. Political elites seem to be more or less equally dominated by landed interests in all the selected countries. In terms of socioeconomic background and policy orientation, there seems to be little fundamental difference between the political elites in Mexico and the political elites in the other developing countries.

Therefore, it is argued that the variable 'political elite' can hardly explain the character of the land reform programs. Consequently, an attempt has been made to analyze the role of peasants in determining the character of the land reform programs.

Peasant movement

The uniqueness of Mexico seems to lie in its Revolution of 1910-1920 which was characterized by a

mass-based peasant revolt against the latifundia system. It was this Revolution - its violence, destruction and radicalism - that forced the political elite to initiate a restructuring of the Mexican rural sector. Emiliano Zapata and his peasant revolt seem to have played the most crucial role in determining the character of the Mexican Revolution, and it was this widespread violent peasant movement that led to the initiation of agrarian reform in Mexico. The reformatory character of the Mexican land reform, thus, owes its origin to the peasant movement that rocked Mexico during 1910-1920 and remained an effective force till 1940. The gradual strengthening of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional and subordination of the peasant movement to the official party through the formation of the CNC, contributed to the demise of the land reform movement since 1940. With the loss of organizational independence, peasant movement lost its effectiveness and, consequently, land reform programs lost much of their appeal to the political elites. In other words, the Mexican peasant movement failed to transform itself into a strong peasant organization. Through co-optation and repression, the radical leadership of the peasant movement was either neutralized or eliminated. This 'containment' of peasant movement substantially reduced the pressure for reformatory land reform from below. The palliative character of the

post-1940 agrarian policies of the Mexican political elites testifies this argument.

Structural obstacles to peasant organization

The palliative character of the land reform programs in the countries under study may, therefore, be explained, partially at least, in terms of the absence of strong peasant organization. In developing countries there are certain structural as well as psychological factors that act as obstacles to the formation of strong peasant organization and movement. The culture of repression in which the Third World peasantry finds itself makes him more or less submissive and resistant to change. Concepts like the 'image of the limited good', 'the encogido syndrome' and 'amoral familism' may partially describe his personality, but the root cause of this personality must be searched into the culture of repression which engulfs the life of the peasantry. Only a change in this culture of repression may make the peasantry more aggressive, outward oriented and responsive to change.

Other sociocultural and even demographic factors also significantly affect the formation of peasant organization and movement. For instance, acute population pressure that results in intense competition among the

peasantry for access to land seems to discourage the formation of peasant organization and movement. Following this line of argument, it can be said that the Latin American countries where population pressure on land is not that acute (relative to the South Asian countries), have a greater potentiality for the development of peasant organization and movement. However, peasant movement is a complex phenomenon and its origin, form, structure and outcome depend on so many historical, cultural and socio-economic factors. Likewise, the formation, character and effectiveness of a peasant organization can hardly be understood without considering the broader socio-political structure in which it has to operate, the degree and type of linkage between the peasant organization and other potentially supportive urban groups, and, obviously, on the character of the leadership. Considering such complex nature of the problem, it is emphasized that more intensive study is required to analyze the presence or absence (and character) of peasant organization or movement in the selected countries. Due to the complex interrelationship between the sociocultural and historical background of a society and its peasant movement(s), each country may present a unique case in this respect. Leaving these issues for further study, the present study emphasizes the fact that genuine land reform can hardly be initiated without

the presence of strong peasant movement or organization.

Policy implications and some hypotheses

Strong peasant organization seems to be a pre-condition for successful initiation and implementation of land reform and for ensuring rural development. Political elites seem to initiate reformative land reform only when there is strong demand for such reform from below. In other words, a conscious organized peasantry is the guarantor of genuine land reform. This observation challenges the established thinking that land reform is simply a measure to be implemented by either the development planners or the political elites. The traditional views of pushing land reform through developing the manpower potential of the development planners or motivating the political elites are seriously questioned by the present study. It emphasizes a policy shift towards the peasantry. A community development approach may be followed in the developing countries to make the peasants more conscious, organized and responsive to the challenges of modernization and development. A conscious organized peasantry that places strong demands on the political system for structural changes in the agrarian sector is the architect of socioeconomic development.

The present study was not intended to test any specific hypothesis. However, a number of hypotheses may be derived from the discussion:

(a) there is no positive relationship between the existence of a defective land tenure system and the initiation and implementation of reformative land reform;

(b) the existence of strong peasant organization or movement seems to be positively correlated with the initiation and implementation of reformative land reform;

(c) in the absence of strong peasant organization or movement, the political elites are more likely to initiate palliative rather than reformative land reform; and

(d) peasants having intense competition among themselves for access to scarce land are less likely to organize and fight for their rights.

These hypotheses are essentially tentative. Being based on secondary data, the present study is not in a position to strongly substantiate these hypotheses. It only emphasizes the need for more intensive and extensive research and analysis.

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